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APPROACHES TO EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON TNF SUGGESTED

Hamburg AUSSENPOLITIK in German No 4, 1980 pp 347-357

/Article by Gerhard Wettig: "Agreement on Eurostrategic Armament?"/

/Text/ The future of East-West relations depends in decisive measure upon whether the two sides succeed in reaching agreement on Eurostragegic arms /TNF/. On the strength of a study entitled "Security, Arms Limitation and Detente — USSR Positions and Possibilities for an East-West Settlement," which will appear in book form within the next few months, Dr Gerhard Wettig of the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies in Cologne perceives a chance for such a settlement only if each side pays strict heed to a knowledge of and consideration for its respective opponent's existing security policy. At issue is the Soviet position that the Western FBS system /forward-based systems/ and the modernizations called for by the 1989 NATO resolution would undermine the parity that was agreed upon and accepted. Also at issue is the Western determination that the Soviet arms buildup — chiefly the emplacement of SS-20 missiles — was designed to achieve TNF superiority and that a new balance therefore had to be struck. It is possible that each side has thus far paid too little heed to the motivations of the opposing side. It is the author's contention that military stability could be achieved if Brezhnev's proposal to renounce a nuclear first-strike policy were to be accepted, provided that this could be made contingent upon a Soviet renunciation of a conventional first-attack policy.

Soviet Definition of the Challenge

Soviet experts have long been expressing the concern that the United States could set in motion a nuclear war against the USSR that would be confined to the European theater.[1] They argue that the "twofold potential" of the Americans — their ability to wage nuclear war against the Soviet Union on a global as well as a European scale — puts them in a position to do this. Since, on the other hand, the USSR is incapable of striking its main opponent within the European framework, it sees itself unprotected in the face of a dangerous challenge.[2] The situation provides the United States with "favorable strategic conditions for the use of military force."[3] The Soviet side attaches special importance in this regard to the observation

that the imbalance of options might make it appear to the Americans that political blackmail efforts directed against the USSR could be successful.

Underlying the Soviet thesis is the idea that Moscow would be faced with a fatal choice no matter whether it had to decide in favor of a nuclear exchange in Europe that would spare the United States unilaterally, or in favor of a globalization of the holocaust. To be sure, from the Western perspective the assumption appears inapt that the Americans might risk the total physical annihilation of Western Europe (their alliance with which is an indispensable pillar of American prestige) in order to pressure the USSR politically or neutralize it militarily, while at the same time trusting the Eastern leadership (which would consider its existence threatened) to restrain itself militarily on a global scale. Is it plausible that Soviet foreign policy and security policy managers have actually made this kind of assumption? Or is their declared concern not genuine, being only instrumental in nature?

The purpose which the USSR could be pursuing with merely a pretense of concern regarding the "twofold potential" of the United States would consist in the attainment of regional nuclear superiority in the European theater. This objective inference is to be found in the claims which the USSR deduces from its thesis. Accordingly, the existence of a "twofold potential" on the American side conflicts with the principal of "equal security" for both superpowers. The effort by NATO to counter the growing Soviet superiority in the TNF area by way of a limited counterbuildup is characterized by the Soviets as an unrestrained striving for superiority, an effort which, as an attempt to undermine the prescribed global parity between the United States and the USSR, must be fought against unconditionally.[4] The Western position that a nuclear balance is necessary not only globally but also in the European theater — is expressly rejected in Moscow.[5]

Equal Security and Imbalances

The security policy logic propounded by the USSR applies exclusively to the two superpowers. In terms of a bilateral "equal security," all the imbalances that still exist between them (imbalances which favor the Americans, according to the Moscow thesis) should be removed. The parity that is so defined leaves no room to satisfy the security requirements of third parties — those of the West European countries, for instance. This is clearly expressed in the Soviet argument concerning the "forward-based (nuclear) systems" (FBS). The Soviet side has coined this phrase for all U.S. delivery systems with a nuclear capacity deployed in and around Europe and which are conceivably capable of reaching Soviet territory.

Linked to this is the claim that the FBS's, since they can be used against the territory of the other superpower, must be counted among the American side's global strategic systems. On the other hand, however, the analogous Soviet delivery systems should not be incorporated into the "strategic equation" between the USSR and the United States because they are aimed not against the other superpower but "only" against Western Europe. This logic would be appropriate if the United States and the Soviet Union were the only countries in the world, or if the West European states, independently and jointly, possessed a TNF potential equal to that of the USSR. Since neither is the case, however, the Western Europeans need an American counterbalance to the nuclear threat emanating from the Soviet Union. If this security policy linkage between the United States and its European allies is repudiated,

and American nuclear weapons are allowed to function only as a counterbalance to the USSR's intercontinental capacities, then a nuclear deterrence gap will develop for Western Europe.

It is not possible for an outsider to determine whether this result is the conscious aim being pursued by Moscow, or whether it must be considered more as an incidental by-product of Soviet overinsurance vis-a-vis the United States. Whatever the case may be, the actions of the Soviets are to all intents and purposes pursuing the policy that would necessarily lead to such a result. The USSR is thus acquiring capabilities which its leaders could one day employ against Western countries, even though they perhaps do not have these intentions today.

SS-20 Versus FBS

With its thesis that the FBS's constitute an especially serious — even intolerable — threat to the Soviet Union, Moscow is justifying the offensive strategy of the Warsaw Pact in the European theater: The enemy must be put on the defensive instantaneously and driven back swiftly as soon as he attacks (officially, this is the only conceivable form for the beginning of war). If it is assumed that the Soviet leaders are directing their attention toward a defense against the nuclear threat emanating from the FBS's, this strategy has reasonable implications: Constituting an additional deterrence factor with regard to the Western enemy is the danger that large portions of its territory could be taken within a short time by units attacking from the East; moreover, Warsaw Pact forces advancing rapidly on Western Europe would soon eliminate the land-based FBS bases of operation.

Also at the TNF level has the Soviet leadership made preparations to counter the threat posed by the FBS's.[6] Beginning in 1976-1977, the USSR began to convert from the SS-4 and SS-5 Eurostrategic missiles to the modern SS-20 model. To begin with, this signified a substantial increase in the number of warheads aimed at Western Europe: The new missile has three warheads instead of only one; moreover, for the first time the delivery systems can be reloaded.

Even more important are the qualitative changes: The launching devices are mobile and can evade the enemy's target detection system; accuracy has been increased sixfold and threefold, respectively, compared to the former models. The SS-20 can be used to interdict "entrenched" military targets.[7] Consequently, in the degree to which the new type of missile is being deployed in the USSR, for the first time a crippling Soviet first strike is conceivable against all of the approximately 500 nuclear targets in Western Europe. An "anticipatory" nuclear strike, with which the USSR would protect against the threat posed by the FBS's, appears to be drawing within the realm of the possible.

SALT I as a Political Lever

The Soviet leaders did not put all their eggs in the SS-20 armament basket, which was accompanied by the buildup of Backfire squadrons and shorter-range missile systems (SS-21 through 24). It sought to use SALT as a political and diplomatic lever against the FBS's. At the start of SALT I, and again on the occasion of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting in 1974, the Soviet leadership put forward the demand that strategic parity for the American side would have to take in all the nuclear weapons aimed at the USSR, regardless of their range, while in the case of the Soviet Union only the

intercontinental systems should be counted. Moscow categorically rejected the inclusion of Soviet intermediate-range weapons.[8]

The U.S. government was reluctant to accede to this definition of strategic parity. The USSR, however, pushed through a noncircumvention clause which obligated the United States to refrain from undercutting the agreed-upon strategic balance of forces with a buildup of its forward-based systems. The USSR subjected itself to no such analogous restriction with regard to its TNF delivery systems.[9] As Soviet statements have meanwhile made clear, Moscow interpreted the agreement that was reached as a standstill agreement unilaterally binding upon the United States. It was apparently expected that on this basis the SS-20 buildup would not bring about a corresponding countereffort by NATO.[10]

SALT II and the Cruise Missiles

In the case of SALT II, the Soviet negotiators sought to link even more far-reaching demands to the principle of noncircumvention. The United States was to agree to strictly abstain from transferring component parts and design manuals for strategic weapons, whereby it was tacitly understood that the use of American technology would be prohibited for the conventional arms of its allies. The Soviet leaders wanted above all to prevent employment of the newly developed American cruise missile technology. The Soviet demand met with decided resistance. Nevertheless, the USSR's negotiators succeeded in getting the United States to make partial unilateral TNF concessions. Reckoned against Soviet global capacities were four Poseidon-equipped submarines, which function as part of the nuclear balance in Europe by virtue of their assignment to NATO. In the SALT II protocol which runs until the end of 1981, the United States agreed that its land- and sea-based cruise missiles would be permitted a maximum range of 600 km.[11]

With this prohibition, the Soviet leadership believed it had neutralized a technology which might be used in the future as a TNF counterbalance to the SS-20 buildup.[12] The time limitation on the protocol, which in the American view precludes the continued validity of the obligations contained therein, does not contradict this according to the Soviets. They say that the purport of the provisional agreement is to make it possible to iron out details that have not yet been decided.[13]

The TNF restrictions on the United States — which constitute a central element of the SALT II treaty according to the Moscow thesis -- are in sharp contrast to the successful effort by the Soviets to exclude from the treaty their heavy Backfire bomber with a maximum range of 5,000 km. The Kremlin view is that the disparate treatment of the intermediate-range potential of the two sides is justified because the FBS's, coupled with the global capacities of the United States, represent an intolerable threat to the USSR.[14] It appears that the Soviet leadership has concluded from the way the Americans acted on SALT that the other superpower is prepared to tacitly acknowledge the justification of this position.

Challenges for NATO

The superiority which the USSR has begun to acquire on the TNF level has aroused concern among the NATO states. The Soviet Union might seek to take political or military advantage of its preeminence in the European theater. When Moscow also uses

the impression of military strength in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals, or even (as in the case of Afghanistan) uses military force instead of striving for political influence, this necessarily increases suspicions.

There has been an increasing awareness within NATO since the mid-1970's that Western Europe is exposed to a massive Soviet threat. In a conventional sense it fears that the Warsaw Pact could gradually acquire the capability for a surprise attack as well as one that promised success. The opinion is widely held that the USSR's TNF force is the source of the growing danger of a first strike that would cripple the West European nuclear defense system. As a response to these challenges, NATO in May 1978 formulated a long-range military program calling for a 3-percent annual increase in the defense budget. Following this in December 1979 was the TNF modernization plan under which, beginning in 1983, 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles with ranges of 1,800 and 2,500 km are to be put in place in Western Europe.

The modernization resolution was designed chiefly to give political emphasis to the link between the European theater and the worldwide strategic capacities of the United States. The idea behind the deployment of a not inconsiderable nuclear weapons potential on West European soil was to achieve a greater degree of physical involvement in Europe than before on the part of the leading Western power. Militarily speaking, the planned intermediate-range systems can scarcely be thought of as weapons to combat the Soviet TNF potential. NATO had consciously avoided this so as not to fuel the impression in Moscow that its intention was to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability against the USSR. Emphasis was intentionally placed upon the procurement of cruise missiles, since their slower air speed still gives the opponent time to launch his missiles once he discovers that the cruise missiles are under way. NATO's planned medium-range potential was assigned the military task of destroying rear echelon conventional Warsaw Pact bases, thus countering a successful offensive battlefield strategy on the part of the East.[15]

Premises Underlying Western Assessments

Has NATO identified the Eastern challenge correctly and come up with an appropriate response? The Western assessment of the situation is based on two premises. First, the real danger appears to be an Eastern attack carried out with conventional means, one which allows NATO to counter with the threat or use of a regional nuclear escalation designed as a preventive deterrent as well as a retaliatory defense. Second, it is assumed that a war in Europe, if one should break out, would be the result of a Soviet decision to take over Western Europe. The second premise simultaneously supports the first: If the primary goal of the Soviet leadership's attack is that of bringing the West European countries under its domination, then this undertaking makes sense only if there is no nuclear war involving the USSR, one that would destroy the value of the territory to be taken over.

NATO's premises rest on extremely shaky ground. The objection has been made, and rightly so, that in the event of war the Soviet leadership would scarcely withhold its nuclear weapons "in the extremely speculative hope of avoiding an escalation with corresponding NATO counterattacks against Soviet territory." This would be in striking contrast to the regularly observable Soviet practice of deciding a military conflict — if it appears necessary or unavoidable — in its own favor as swiftly as possible at the very beginning through the massive employment of all suitable means, thus eliminating insofar as possible the risks involved in lengthy resistance by the

enemy. The USSR literature on military theory — occasionally cited by American authors — does not permit the conclusion that an effort would be made to restrict military action to the conventional realm in the event of a war against NATO.[16] Moreover, the logic of offensive battlefield strategy requires the strongest possible surprise attack which would paralyze the enemy's resistance and leave the United States no time to mobilize its backup resources, which are thought to be superior. The nuclear option is best suited to this kind of attack.[17]

On the other hand, it can be maintained that the existence of the sea-based TNF delivery systems belonging to the United States and France make any Soviet hopes of a crippling nuclear first strike to open its conquest of Western Europe appear illusory. Brezhnev has categorically denied any possible intention to carry out such a first strike.[18] The element of truth in these objections is that, as long as NATO maintains its strength and cohesion and, moreover, can rely on a massive U.S. military presence in Europe, intentional aggression can scarcely be Moscow's design or in its interest.[19] NATO's second assumption regarding the Soviet threat is also tenuous.

To be sure, one cannot conclude in agreement with Soviet propaganda that the NATO states have not been provoked at all in the area of security policy. The continued intensive arms buildup by the USSR in all areas constitutes an unequivocal argument against this view. All declarations of the renunciation of force to the contrary, the possibility of war between East and West cannot be considered put to rest for good and all. Both sides still contemplate it, as was demonstrated more than clearly by the difficulties encountered in the East-West negotiations on arms limitation. The only improbability is that the outbreak of war will come solely as the result of a Kremlin decision traceable to a desire for conquest.

East-West Conflicts in the Third World

If a will to aggression in the Hitler mold is ruled out, then the question of blundering into crisis and war enters the picture (as the historians have determined to be the typical image for the year of catastrophe, 1914). It is mainly the tensions in the Third World and the still wholly unresolved East-West conflicts in this region that are cause to fear the development of crises which could become the starting point for a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In specific terms: The widespread East-West practice of crisis prevention by means of detente is not to be relied upon, at least outside the European/Atlantic region; measures that guarantee control in the event of a crisis are becoming an urgent necessity. Military stability is the guiding principle here. Accordingly, reciprocal relations should be such that, in the event of a crisis, neither side can expect any kind of advantage from a head start on military preparations and actions if war breaks out. If this is guaranteed, judging by human standards the possibility of a self-induced escalation to war resulting from nervousness and precautions on both sides can be considered eliminated.

The Soviet SS-20 buildup has a destabilizing effect on the European situation because, in the event of a crisis, the USSR, by using its TNF weapons first, could perhaps expect that the land-based nuclear potential in Western Europe would be neutralized — thus decisively weakening the TNF second strike against the USSR as well as destroying crucial components of the NATO defense.

Carrying no weight in such a situation would be the argument that the Soviet aggressor would have to be interested in taking over the West European countries in as undamaged a state as possible. In such a case the Soviet leadership would have looked primarily not toward conquest but toward the anticipation of an outbreak of war perceived as imminent, thus saving its country from as much damage as possible in the military clash viewed as unavoidable and gaining the best possible prospects for success in the course of combat operations. This kind of action might then appear expedient to Moscow chiefly if there were plausible indications that Washington, following the lightning-fast obliteration of Western Europe, would think twice about drawing its own country into the holocaust of a global nuclear confrontation.

NATO's resolution to modernize its forces offers no solution to this complex of security policy problems. The principle of military stability ought to have made the invulnerability of the FBS's — and particularly the new systems — appear the primary concern. The advances promised by the NATO resolution tend to be rather modest in this regard. In the narrow, densely populated and socially distinct territory of Western Europe, the planned mobility alone provides only minimal protection, especially since the total number of bases involved in an emplacement remains relatively small.

The New Technologies

It is a serious matter that the TNF modernization by the West is simultaneously signaling to the USSR a qualitative heightening of the FBS threat. Influential officials have accused the United States of using the planned expansion of its nuclear systems in Western Europe to acquire the ability to escape any consequences of a first strike against the Soviet Union. They go on to say that, unlike the USSR's TNF delivery systems, those planned by NATO represent a completely different technology and entail a fundamental change in the previous, mutually accepted balance of forces.[20] The actual essence of the Soviet charges is that, for the first time since the early 1960's, an American missile — the Pershing II — is capable of reaching large sections of the Soviet Union from West European soil. Because of its high level of accuracy, it would constitute a threat to "hard" military targets. This development would rob the USSR of the fruits of its air defense efforts, which are making it increasingly impossible for the American FBS bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace. Constituting a particularly serious provocation from the Soviet point of view are the planned cruise missiles: So far there is not the slightest possibility of a defense against them, and any move in that direction would have to cost unimaginable sums.

According to Soviet expectations concerning NATO's planned modernization measures, they threaten to further diminish military stability in Europe. The USSR could perceive a crisis as an increased incentive to launch a first strike in order to avert in time the heightened risk of an anticipated outbreak of war. Since NATO is at the same time doing little to add to the invulnerability of the FBS's, nothing is being done to undermine this kind of peace-threatening speculation in the Kremlin in the event that it should come to a time of crisis.

Genuine Fears and Instrumental Justification

The NATO resolution appears not to be adequately attuned to the situation it is designed to deal with. A decisive reason is that NATO is not interpreting the Soviet

challenge correctly: it is assuming that a war in Europe will be a conventional one (instead of nuclear); deterrence and defense are keyed to the eventuality of a Soviet campaign to gain territory (instead of an attack resulting from an escalating crisis). No consideration is being given to the fact that the USSR views the FBS's as a menacing "twofold potential" which, under certain circumstances, gives the United States a unilateral warfare option that can be used to political as well as military advantage.

It can be said against the reference to the Soviet FBS thesis that Moscow's declared concerns need not be real, but are perhaps being played out merely with a purpose in mind. Ultimately, however, it is not crucial to determine where the genuine fears cease and the instrumental justifications begin. In any event, the official Moscow theses delineate the positions which Soviet policy holds vis-a-vis the Western countries. On the basis of general experience it can be supposed that both the expression of real concern as well as ulterior motives are involved in statements such as these. Outsiders generally underestimate the power of autosuggestion that comes with constant repetition.

Outlines for a Possible Settlement

Even if the Soviet theses should be basically instrumental for the most part, NATO would be well-advised to study them. Though no fears may be put to rest in this way, the credibility of hollow justifications would be destroyed all the same, and from that point on the Western states would be better able to assess where Moscow's true concerns lie and where not. To be sure, it could turn out — as was the case in 1969-1970 with the bilateral FRG-Soviet talks — that the Soviets seem to have been given many more different causes for a lack of trust than we may be able to imagine.

There is suspicion in Moscow over the fact that NATO has not acceded to Brezhnev's proposal to renounce the military first-strike doctrine, even though the USSR has since 2 March 1977 repeatedly made known its willingness to include the conventional factor as well. The USSR says it has thus answered the Western objection that the nuclear initiative option should not be the only one to be eliminated. This does in fact remove the grounds for concern rooted in Western thinking on deterrence, which sees the USSR as planning to take away NATO's right to nuclear retaliation so that it may one day launch a conventional attack on Western Europe with no fear of a nuclear counterthreat. Since the Western governments still did not accede to the Soviet proposal, new fuel was added to Moscow's suspicions that NATO is planning to reserve its nuclear war option for purposes other than those of deterrence and/or defense against conventional attacks. This appeared to confirm the declared Soviet concern that the United States could operate with a nuclear conflict limited to Europe.

Renunciation of First-Strike Use of Nuclear and Conventional Weapons

If NATO were prepared to discuss a first-strike renunciation, this would have the effect in Moscow of a political confidence-building measure of the greatest importance. Occasionally expressed fears that the Western deterrence concept could be infringed despite inclusion of the conventional factor are ungrounded. The opposite is more likely to be true. The reciprocal pledge not to strike first could be formulated in such a way that — following an introductory pledge to forgo military initiatives in any form — the promise not to be the first to use nuclear force would be made contingent upon the opposite side's promise not to be the first to use

conventional forces, and vice-versa. NATO would consequently reserve the express right to react with nuclear counterstrikes to the feared conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. The threat of retaliation, which makes any military advance upon Western Europe an unacceptable risk, would thus remain intact. At the same time, the Soviet Union would receive Western assurances that, outside of a previously begun East-West war, no nuclear attacks would be launched against its territory.

The negotiation of this kind of contractual arrangement would of course have little value if specific military proportions were not also settled at the same time, a settlement that would establish in the existing defense structures a real basis for the agreed-upon principles of preventing war. The talks on renouncing the first-strike policy would consequently have to be synchronized with negotiations on measures to assure a reciprocal nonaggression pledge in both the conventional and nuclear sectors.

Military stability between East and West in the European theater would enter into the picture as the guiding principle in preventing war, one which would have to be accepted as determining for all the details involved in the discussion of military matters. This would mean that neither side would be allowed to possess military capacities which could be dispatched from its own deployment area for a massive surprise attack having the probable effect of swiftly eliminating substantial numbers of enemy forces. Accordingly, those military capacities in the respective military arsenals that are objectively designed for a totally or partially crippling first strike would have to either be removed or be assigned a rear guard position (one which it would take a sufficiently long period of time to move out of again). Such "rules of mutual restraint" further need to be backed up by an existing overall military parity. Parity here would be defined as equivalence not so much in terms of personnel and weapons but of options: Neither side may possess a warfare option that cannot be canceled out by the other with the capacity to inflict totally unacceptable damage.

The concerns of the two sides apply to different military levels. NATO fears an Eastern attack in the European theater, pointing to the considerable offensive capacities of the Warsaw Pact troops which make an attempt to break through the Western system of defenses with a sudden thrust appear conceivable. To the USSR, however, this military threat to Western Europe is necessary because it fosters the hope that it has something with which to oppose the alleged U.S. TNF threat posed by the FBS's.

In light of this state of affairs, offhand there seems to be little promise of success for any effort at clearing away the mutual security fears by means of settlements on any one military level, thus gradually establishing a balance of forces in Europe that would serve to assure peace. This has been made more than clear by the difficulties encountered at the MBFR negotiations. The Soviet leadership will not be willing to make serious cuts in the military superiority it can bring to bear vis-a-vis NATO in Central Europe unless it is at the same time relieved of the acute pressure which it thinks it feels from the FBS's. Although this perception should not cause the Western alliance to relinquish a physical pawn in the security policy link between the United States and Western Europe, it should nevertheless prompt it to reflect upon what structural changes could erase the USSR's concerns about an American initiative toward war at the TNF level without denuclearizing NATO's European

sector. The indispensable precondition for this would be a Soviet willingness to discuss trimming its offensive capacities in the European theater.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf, among others, V. V. Zhurkin: "Strategiya SSHA v mezhdunarodno-politicheskikh krizakh--evolyutsiya doktrin, mekhanizma, vneshnepoliticheskoy praktiki," [U.S. Strategy in International Political Crises, Evolution of Doctrines, Mechanism, Foreign Policy Practice," Akademiya Nauk SSSR, IMEMO, Moscow, 1975, pp 12,15, 17,19,36f,46f; G.A. Trofimenko, SSA: POLITIKA, VOYNA, IDEOLOGIYA, Moscow, 1976, pp 322-330.

2. Especially V. Falin: "Budushcheye Evropy--v mirnom sotrudnichestve" [The Future of Europe--in Peaceful Cooperation] in IZVESTIYA, 22 November 1979; A.A. Gromyko press conference in Bonn, IZVESTIYA, 25 November 1979.

3. Yu. V. Katasonov, "Voyenno-politicheskaya strategiya SSHA na rubezhe 70-80 ch godov" [U.S. Military Policy Strategy in the 1970s and 1980s],in SSHA, Vol 2, 1980, p 14f.

4. V. Falin in a SPIEGEL interview, DER SPIEGEL, 5 November 1979, p 52; Lt Gen N. Petrov, "Besperspektivniy kurs" [Course Without a Future], PRAVDA, 16 June 1980; A. Arbatov," "Trebovaniye vremeni" [A Matter of Time], in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 June 1980.

5. V. Falin: "Voyennaya razryadka vozmozhna--otvet za zapadom" [Disarmament Is Possible--A Response to the West], PRAVDA, 19 September 1979.

6. V. Zagladin in a SPIEGEL interview, DER SPIEGEL, 5 November 1979, p 45.

7. Cf "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons. Modernization and Arms Control. Texts, Materials and Arguments on the NATO Resolution, 12 December 1979," published by FRG Minister of Defense/Planning Staff, Bonn, April 1980, p 38.

8. John Borawski, "Towards a Theater Nuclear Arms Control?", THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, III, Vol 1 (Winter 1980), p 85; Lothar Ruehl, "The Salt II Negotiation: Interim Assessment," EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE, Vol 2, 1977, p 57.

9. "SALT and the NATO Allies," a staff report to the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., October 1979, pp 11 f, 29 f.

10. Cf the corresponding Soviet charges in connection with NATO's defense modernization plans: Craig Whitney, "Soviet Leader Seeks Talks on Force Cuts," WASHINGTON POST, 6 November 1979; A. Arbatov," "Trebovaniye vremeni" [A Matter of Time] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 June 1980.

11. "SALT and the NATO Allies," loc cit, pp 11 f, 13-15, 30-34.

12. Leonid Zamyatin, "Miru nuzhna voyennaya razryadka" [The World Needs Disarmament], LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 26 December 1979.

13. A. Arbatov, "Trebovaniye vremeni" [A Matter of Time] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 June 1980.

14. On the occasion of FRG Chancellor Schmidt's Moscow visit from 30 June to 1 July 1980, Brezhnev made it unmistakeably clear that with SALT III all FBS's would have to be up for disposition; he did not, however, commit himself to the number of intermediate-range systems to be proposed by the Soviets (unofficial excerpts from protocol, published in DIE WELT, 7 July 1980; "Radi bezopasnosti narodov" [Towards the Security of Nations], PRAVDA, 15 July 1980).

15. Lothar, Ruehl, "The NATO Resolution on Introducing Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons," EUROPA-ARCHIV, Vol 4, 1980, pp 101-106.

16. Eberhard Schulz, "Characteristics of Soviet Policy Toward the West and Its Effects on Detente," "The End of Detente?," Josef Fuellenbach and Eberhard Schulz, Munich, 1980, p 240f.

17. Cf, among others, Pierre Gallois, "The Defense of Europe Vis-a-Vis the Warsaw Pact," LE MONDE DE CONFLICTS, No 2 (November-December 1978) pp 1-19.

18. Cf the unofficial protocol excerpts, DIE WELT, 7 July 1980.

19. Similarly, the opinion of Eberhard Schulz, loc cit, p 242. This view is also supported by analogous theoretical reflections by John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions," WORLD POLITICS, January 1976, pp 223-245; Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Winter 1979-80, pp 631-633. On the part of the Soviet leadership there is traditionally also an especially pronounced caution in dealing with security policy risks.

20. Cf., among others, "V interesakh razryadki, v interesakh narodov mira" [In the Interest of Detente, in the Interest of the Peace of Nations], PRAVDA, 18 November 1979; V. Falin: "Budushcheye Evropy--v mirnom sotrudnichestve" [The Future of Europe--In Peaceful Cooperation] in IZVESTIYA, 22 November 1979; V. Falin in a discussion on Soviet television, reproduced in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16 October 1979; D. Ustinov, "Voyennaya razryadka--veleniye vremeni" [Disarmament--The Time Is Now], PRAVDA, 25 October 1979; V. Zagladin in a SPIEGEL interview, DER SPIEGEL, 5 November 1979, p 45. Especially informative in terms of argument and detail is Col Yu. Chaplygin: "Za fasadom modernizatsii" [Behind the Facade of Modernization], PRAVDA, 4 January 1980.

7458
CSO: 3103

SPD MAGAZINE CRITICIZES PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59

Bonn DIE NEUE GESELLSCHAFT in German Oct 80 pp 866-867

[Article by Christian Krause: "New U.S. Strategic Target Planning"]

[Text] With Directive 59, which was issued by President Carter in August of this year, the then current target planning for strategic weapons of the United States was changed. Until now only area targets were envisioned for an American counter-attack against a Soviet nuclear attack, but in the future point targets are supposed to be attacked. The consequences of the directive are more drastic than one supposes at first. For point targets are understood to mean also underground silos of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and bunkered operations centers, which until now could not be engaged and according to the prevailing strategic concept should not be engaged. American nuclear strategy, which was orginally planned as a purely retaliatory strategy against industry and cities, now has an element of military character which makes possible "selective strike options" against enemy armed forces.

The innovation has become possible because the United States has systematically improved its land-based ICBM. The launch ramps have been placed in bunkers to enhance their survivability. Further, the accuracy of the projectiles has been perfected and a special technique for engaging hardened (in bunkers) point targets has been developed. At the same time, the number of nuclear devices was multiplied by building multiple warheads. New strategic weapons such as the Trident submarine, the MX missile, and the Cruise missile will further enhance the U.S. strategic capabilities. The new target planning is being justified not so much by a growing threat, but rather American nuclear strategy is supposed to become more flexible and contain options which lie between surrender and total destruction.

Until now the nuclear balance was based on "mutual assured destruction." This meant that each of the two world powers was capable of inflicting unacceptable damages on the other even from a "post-strike posture." This stalemate statement was aptly depicted in the phrase: "He who shoots first, dies second." In target planning for this type strategy one depended less on whether certain targets are destroyed than on causing the greatest possible damage.

A prerequisite for "mutual assured destruction" was that both sides had available weapons systems which could survive intact a nuclear strike, the so-called "second strike capability." With the Americans this was embodied primarily in the nuclear

submarines. As long as they were submerged at sea, they could be neither located nor hit. On the other hand, they were armed with ballistic missiles that could reach deep into the Soviet Union. However the older boats could not cover central Siberia. Besides, the explosive devices had a ballistic dispersion which precluded the engaging of point targets. With the accuracy and range of the new Trident missiles, these limitations no longer apply.

Despite the growing submarine fleet, the United States retained the strategic bombers and the land-based ICBM. This was justified, among other things, by the technical shortcomings of the older submarines. A portion of the ICBM was also meant to be a reserve for NATO strategy and in the event of a large scale Soviet attack in Europe should be available as an escalation resource. Finally, however, interservice rivalry also played a role as the Air Force did not want to relinquish to the Navy its status as the most important mainstay of American nuclear power.

The strategy of "assured destruction" emerged in the United States as a response to the rise of the Soviet Union as a strategic nuclear power--an intelligent strategy because it not only relegated into the absurd any thought the Soviets might have of a nuclear first strike against the United States but also made a contest of strategic offensive weapons senseless. For the most important element of the strategy was the defensive missile submarines.

With the Soviets things were different. They also decided in favor of "assured destruction." But because of the shortage of ice-free seaports, they could not rely primarily on a naval weapons system as the United States did. Also, the complex technology of the missile-carrying, nuclear submarine presents them with difficulties even today. That may have been the reason that they attempted to give the ICBM, in addition to the submarine, a second-strike capability. They improved their survivability and increased the quantity. Today two-thirds of the Soviet nuclear explosive devices are located in the warheads of the ICBM, while in the United States the number is no more than one-fifth.

These different points of emphasis have led the Americans for some time to ponderings on whether the strategic balance had been disturbed. Even though their second-strike capability was not threatened by the Soviet missiles and without this question having been explicitly answered, they began in 1974 to move ahead with nuclear armament on two tracks. On the one hand they improved the capabilities of their submarines; on the other they further developed the ICBM. Thus, a break in their strategy occurred. It was no longer quite clear whether they were only for a deterrent and for defense or whether they wanted to provide themselves with a first-strike capability. This suspicion is given new nourishment by Directive No 59. The United States maintains that it continues to reject a first-strike capacity. Still, they are aspiring to the capability to destroy, even from a post-strike posture, so many Soviet missile silos that the power of the Soviets for further escalation would be broken. But what the United States could achieve from a post-strike posture would be even more attainable, naturally, if the United States started firing first. One cannot yet predict what consequences for arms control arise from this, since the basis of negotiating is the principle of parity. The building of a first-strike capability by the United States would violate this principle.

It is also feared that the new directive would upset the strategic stability between the world powers. But nuclear strategy is a very abstract area. For even with limited nuclear strikes the damage would be so great that for a long time the United States and the USSR would drop from the ranks of worl powers. Moreover, there is indeed no guarantee that the damage will really stay limited, for the Soviets could, contrary to expectations, fight to the very last. Strategic nuclear war remains as before an incalculable and unacceptable risk.

Probably the United States also wants to use its technological advantage in weaponry to make the Soviets tractable. But experience has shown that neither of the two world powers is capable, relying upon available but non-usable weapons systems, of gaining ascendancy over the other. So, for the West no increase in security emerges but rather concern as to how the Soviets over the long term will react to the American move.

9728
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FUTURE OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS

Rome RIVISTA AERONAUTICA in Italian Sep-Oct 80 pp 30-35

[Article by Gen Giulio Macri: "The New Direction of the Air-Ground Battle"]

[Excerpts] The Air-Ground Battle

Recent progress in protection by means of special armor against guided missiles will probably require study and designing of heavier missiles. If ground units are to put a kind of very mobile and sudden defense against an enormous numerical superiority of armored vehicles in operation, mobility will be the essence of success. Therefore, it seems inevitable that a mobile system of antitank missile with a very low profile should be studied and developed. This vehicle will be defensive in nature, but will be less expensive than present tanks and tanks to go on line in the near future and, therefore, it could be produced in a larger quantity. In the short term, at least, that will not make the tank superfluous. It will still be essential for counterattacking, but the threat made against a possible offensive drive by a good number of fast armored vehicles equipped with antitank missiles, well designed to survive both on the conventional and on the nuclear battlefield, would considerably improve the deterrent value of the units on the defensive. It is barely necessary to note, among other things, that a nation that first builds this kind of vehicle will also create a rich market in terms of orders from other countries.

Other important technological progress is connected with guided weapons. Electronic warfare has been extended inevitably beyond radio communications to include also military applications of radar. At present, these applications include location, determination, constant control, jamming or deception of enemy radars while they protect their own. Operations like these all over the spectrum of telecommunications and radar might prove to be decisive, in the future, for the success or failure of a battle. It is interesting to note that the large Warsaw Pact units have been equipped for some time now with a complete series of systems and devices for electronic warfare.

NATO units are now remedying these omissions and will, perhaps, have the advantage of the most recent technology in equipping themselves with these devices. On the other hand, they will not have the practical experience in tactical and technical employment enjoyed up to now by commanders, by the staffs and by the specialists of a potential adversary.

In this regard, then, progress in optoelectronics must not be overlooked. Stated more simply, aiming systems and sighting devices have been gradually improved in these last 40 years. The laser telemeter has contributed materially to an improvement in tank firing. Intensification of low and very low luminosity level has provided the passive, compact means for observation at night or under very poor atmospheric conditions to all fighting men, from the individual soldier equipped with binoculars to the specialized artillery groups, to the tank units, to air units. "Thermal cameras," based on the principle of emission of heat instead of light, developed those devices, subsequently, to the point of being able to distinguish even through masking and camouflage. It is obvious, that, in the future, troops in the combat zone will have to pay as much attention at night as by day to the use of tactical devices. Smoke and artificial fog are losing their value as a means for concealing movement. White light as a means for illuminating the battlefield will probably be necessary for only a few more years.

There are positive indications that progress in air defense methods is requiring some changes in means with which to attack the enemy "from the other side of the hill." While it is rather likely that devices will be studied and developed for enabling piloted aircraft to operate far beyond the line of contact of the ground units and to penetrate also into "dense" air defense systems, it is at least problematic to determine whether it will be advisable from the cost/effectiveness point of view to continue to perform reconnaissance and interdiction missions. This does not mean that there no longer is a place for the piloted aircraft on the future air-ground battlefield. Air interception and attack on the ground in the sky of the defensive position are only two of the essential roles that cannot be abandoned. Moreoever, if tactical air units cannot truly locate and strike the enemy on the "hill" or on the other side of it, how will these important task be performed?

In the area of closein interdiction, remote-controlled pilotless aircraft, the so-called RPV [Remotely Piloted Vehicle], with fixed or rotating wing, seem to be sufficiently effective or, at least, capable of surviving in spite of the effectiveness of air defense weapons and radars. This kind of air vehicle is already capable of operating equipped with television recording devices or target indicators by means of laser beams. As the art of accurate control is improved, it will be possible for advanced artillery or aircraft observers to direct fire on targets that they can see and follow on a television screen. However, it is unlikely, in this century, that the conventional type cannon, howitzer or multiple rocket launcher will be able to hit precise targets like radar sites, command posts or bridges, with conventional shells. Laser terminal guided projectiles have demonstrated that "intelligent" weapons already have those capabilities, but, conversely, they depend on very expensive target acquisition and control systems. Development of the guided projectile, called CLGP [Cannon Launched Guided Projectile], launched by a howitzer or by a 155-millimeter conventional gun, is already offering means for hitting a precise target, illuminated by a special laser device, at the first shot.

Closein air reconnaissance and effective artillery preparation on targets up to 20-30 kilometers beyond the resistance position are, therefore, feasible in a very near future. Remote control of pilotless aircraft (RPV) is already in the capabilities of the producing industries, although firing action by means of CLGP ammunition will always be limited by the weather factor of a possible low cloud cover. The projectile may be "intelligent," but it must have time to see the illuminated target, in order to make course corrections after coming out of the cloud cover.

It is also limited by the effective range of the gun and of the ammunition, about 30 kilometers at present, and by the fact that the laser indicator must be in direct line of sight with the target. None of these limitations is likely to be overcome in this century.

Beyond 30 kilometers, reconnaissance can be extended very well by means of RPV controlled by in-flight control at adequate altitudes on this side of the contact line, over friendly territory. Obviously, that airborne control must be protected by piloted fighter aircraft and by effective electronic countermeasures. Reconnaissance of the battle area -- at perhaps about 400 kilometers from the most advanced line -- and distant interdiction firing action against ground targets beyond the effective eranges of artillery and up to the above-mentioned limit will probably be the prerogative of artificial satellites.

It is interesting to note that, in contrast with the extraordinary versatility already demonstrated by the first prototypes of the so-called cruise missiles,* surface-to-surface and air-to-surface, criticisms have already been heard according to which the systems of this type will be a failure, because they are too complex, insufficiently responsive to tactical requirements, not accurate in firing because of their intrinsic makeup and not suitable for use with a conventional explosive. Some of these arguments can be demonstrated to be partially valid, but it would be surprising if they proved to be decisive, in view of the fact that these systems use a technology that has already been developed and translated into real, material terms. For example, it is already possible to direct a cruise missile on the target with a probable error not greater than a few meters at a distance of about 800 kilometers. Likewise, there are no reasons why it cannot be made to explode by means of ground or air launching. Moreover, if necessary, it can, as a reconnaissance vehicle, transmit second by second the photographs that its television recording equipment takes and, therefore, it might also be programed to return to the launching position.

Naturally, there can be no guarantee of invulnerability against all forms of attack, but it seems likely that the cruise missile will have greater survival capabilities than piloted aircraft and it is considerably less expensive to produce, store, maintain and use.

As already mentioned however, the piloted aircraft still has an important role in a foreseeable future. Fighter aircraft for ground attack might no longer be suitable to use in the sky over the numerous enemy units equipped with sophisticated air defense systems, but they certainly will be able to cruise in the sky over friendly troops and they are also capable of giving a more rapid reply than any reserves using direct aim fire. Laser guidance makes it possible to hit point targets on the first shot, like tanks, as is shown by the American A-10. It is also likely that it is possible and capable of operating effectively at night and under almost any weather conditions.

Helicopters began to show their effectiveness in the Korean War and they are now regarded as essential to the formations of tactical groups in air-ground battles. Nevertheless, the appearance of the ZSU-23-4 (four 23-millimeter guns) with their

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* In this connection, see "Cruise Missiles," by P. Corsini, in RIVISTA AERONAUTICA, numbers 3 and 4, 1980.

equipment for aiming and firing at armed helicopters, the ability of helicopters to fly very low over the terrain, to aim and -- with the development of fire and forget missiles -- to fire and hit within a few seconds, leads to the belief that this system will be valid and effective in the battle area. Command, control and liaison tasks assigned to helicopters seem likely to become more important, rather than diminish in validity, with pilots tending to specialize in more exacting roles.

In the field of logistics, the medium transport helicopter is now accepted as an important vehicle in the framework of the army corps, because it puts in the hands of the commander an ideal means for moving units and equipment rapidly. With numerical superiority so much out of balance in favor of attack, it is inevitable that some advanced units will be cut off from supply and, under these conditions, the transport helicopter may become the only means -- during short critical periods -- of transporting ammunition and supplies and of removing the wounded from units that are surrounded. It has also been believed that helicopters might become the main means for delivering nuclear ammunition to artillery batteries or nuclear mines to engineering units, lifting them directly from their storage sites.

The use of nuclear devices is still probable. The so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons (rockets, missiles, field artillery) seem to have reached the limit of development of the cost/effectiveness ratio, at least for the immediate future. Longer effective firing ranges will be attained as a result of the present status of the art, but their extension in depth will not change the present imbalance much. At any rate, greater accuracy will decrease the indiscriminate nature of explosion and therefore, also reduce the collateral effects.

In summary, it is very probable that deterrence will not cause wars in this last quarter century both because (or perhaps, rather, by merit) of conventional weapons and means and of nuclear devices. During this period, and provided it can be protected adequately from air attack, the tank will still be a very important item of war equipment, although it is likely that, with progress in guided weapons, the models coming in service in the next 10 years will be the last of their kind, in spite of "spaced" armor-plating.

The armored weapon must now move in the direction of a more mobile armored hull, in order to carry out its own mission. Perhaps the aircushion vehicle, offering wide margins to future development, will provide a flexible form of propulsion for a new armored hull.

The effect of nighttime and of poor weather conditions, which tended to reduce the periods available for battle, will probably be much less binding in the future as means of surveillance and observation (RPV, satellites, electronic and optoelectronic devices, and so on) continue to progress. Moreover, as the capability of missiles with a self-seeking warhead improves, with all the the advantages that this feature carries with it for a defense overcome by the numerical factor, the demand for air attack missions in the area beyond direct observation will continue to increase in such a way as to reduce the number of artillery batteries required for the special firing actions of that branch. It is not likely that this will affect the final outcome of the battle, owing to the increased accuracy of the fire power of direct fire weapons. Tactical aircraft will also be able to intervene more effectively on the line of contact of the enemy arrays.

The requisites and the means for meeting the requirements of tactical reconnaissance and interdiction need study, in order to determine which of the many options offers the best cost/effectiveness ratio. For the present, it does not seem likely that this option can be expensive aircraft piloted by accurately selected and highly trained personnel that cannot be replaced rapidly.

Nevertheless, it seems probable that man will remain as always the prime factor in success on the battlefield, even though the weapons and the means that he will use will be progressively capable of performing constantly more complex tasks automatically with very wide possibilities, as, for example, in the sector of interception.

The Air-tactical Battle in Perspective

Any attempt to shape the future features of a possible conflict runs up against at least four difficulties. The first one is that future prospects will depend in part on the progress made by military technology. Although this progress can be specified right now for some sectors, it is much less definite for others. This is especially true with regard to the air battle, owing to the diversity of the technologies involved, several of which are at the limits of knowledge.

The second difficulty lies in the fact that, even when a new field of knowledge is opened up, we are never certain about what the subsequent development will be. Experience suggests that forecasts are generally too optimistic.

The third problem is that often the consequences of technological changes do not appear to be clear immediately. Rather, most often, they are obscure. That is extensively due to the fact that these consequences are drawn from presuppositions of incomplete operational experience.

The fourth difficulty is compound. On the one hand, technology proper and operational doctrine interact. On the other hand, they have to absorb and counter similar developments by a potential enemy.

The general trends of present-day conflicts are quite clear. The first one is represented by the relatively recent phenomenon of "low intensity" operations for which the specializations implicit in this kind of conflict take on special importance. On the other hand, on another level of operations, conventional warfare on a large scale, there is a thread of historical continuity strong enough to justify a reliable extrapolation. During this century, it has been observed how the mobility essential to military operations has been exalted beyond any prediction, first in land battles and then, in a revolutionary manner, in air battles.

Fire power, another basic principle, has made still more amazing progress. For many generations, distribution of fire surely and accurately, except at very closein ranges, has been impossible. The effectiveness of fire power then meant fire hammering. But with the possibility of using modern aiming and computing devices an important error source has been gradually eliminated, that is to say, inaccuracy at the beginning of the trajectory. Although there still are inaccuracies along the course of the trajectory and although they might be corrected only with concentrated fire or by shortening distances, fire power had already become much more effective.

The next stage in progress -- controlling and directing the weapons also along the trajectory -- gradually led to subsequent improvements in firing effectiveness. On the other hand, the technique that makes it possible, at present, to direct fire all the way to the target has been achieved only recently. This technique is still imperfect, but it is now evident that the associated problems are technologically solvable. Therefore, it seems that we are on the threshold of a change that will have profound effects on almost every aspect of the art of warfare including the conduct of aerial warfare. Fire power will become constantly more effective and some resources, that devolved, in the past, on a search for accuracy in the launch phase might prove to be no longer necessary.

This considerations stems primarily from the success of recent developments in the field of electronics and in particular in the sector of microminiaturization. The result of the new technologies may be expressed, in short, in four essential points: first, the dimensions of the components of the computers in the weapon systems are becoming extremely minute and the sensors, in turn, are becoming much smaller; second, when these miniturized systems are combined with extreme accuracy and with new methods of target acquisition, like visual display by heat contrast and high-discrimination radars, the accuracy of these weapons will no longer depend on distance; third, if methods are used like, for example, solid state circuits, the reliability of these new components and, therefore, of the weapons themselves will be very high; fourth, electronic miniturization in general will have so many of those applications, military and nonmilitary, that there will always be a wider choice of components by means of which equipment and means can be produced and developed.

The overall effect of all this progress in electronics can only lead to new weapon systems that, although no less costly than the preceding ones, will be much more suitable from the point of view of cost/effectiveness and, therefore, can be affordable.

It has already been pointed out that this trend toward sophisticated weapons may lead to a change in balance between warfare devices and their distributors or launching platforms (aircraft, missiles, ships, tanks). This restates in today's terms the eternal conflict between projectile and gun, bomb and aircraft, missile and launcher. Moreover, it is also possible that this trend will succeed in stopping or even reversing the historical spiral on the basis of which the complexity of weapons leads to an increase in costs, high costs bring about a reduction in the number of weapons, this reduction leads to increasing their operational capability, returning, therefore, to the point of departure of the complexity. If this trend were stopped, the new miniturizations would provide the designer with several options for future weapon systems. They might, for example, produce smaller weapons, thus enabling the launching systems to carry a larger number of them. Or else they might increase the destructive power or the effective action radius of a specific weapon. Or else they might design a smaller total system, with definite advantages for an equal amount of available resources.

In particular, these new degrees of accuracy will change the nature of air operations both with regard to the positive characteristics of attack and, definitely, with regard to the imperative needs of defense themselves. Assuming that the pertinent technologies will become available to both opponents, these remarks will be applicable to both kinds of war conflict. But, because one of the opponents must be

ready to absorb the first strike, that is to say to undergo attack initially -- preventive, surprise, or more or less expected -- the effects on defense will be especially important in the field of the air forces to the immediate counteroffensive. Hence, the greater importance given, in aircraft design, to survival of the defender's reaction capability.

There are at least four main measures that can be taken by defense. The first one is preventive attack, a disarming attack on the enemy as was made during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when the Arab air units were neutralized or destroyed on the ground.

The second measure is to give the new offensive weapons a target system as dispersed as possible.

The problems of operational and logistic command and control associated with dispersion are certainly capable of solution. On the other hand, the problem of dispersion of aircraft with regard to operational runways and airports is much more serious.

It seems certain that something will be done in this sector, both owing to motorized technology and by means of using so-called "composite" equipment that reduces the weight of the aircraft's structure and thus improves the power/weight ratio. In the meantime, several types of aircraft being used at present all over the world still need long runways for takeoff and landing. And, although it may be believed that future generations of aircraft will be capable of operating from shorter runways, it seems virtually certain that the basic characteristic of those kinds of aircraft, like strategic stransports, require the use of rather long takeoff and landing runways. Therefore, dispersion may remedy the vulnerability of some aircraft on the ground, especially in the rearguard area, but not all of them. Other methods are needed, therefore.

The third measure for survival is to go underground or to build shelters that not only afford physical protection but may, at times, mask the value of the target. With regard to runways, for which, obviously, it is impossible to go underground, it will be necessary to provide for their "resilience." Very intensive training will be needed in clearing away debris and in repairing. In spite of the fact that it may prove to be expensive in absolute terms, its value to units depending on runways to operate will be immense. Therefore, it is more than likely that the consequence or direct result of a high level of war technology that is emerging will be increased research in certain sectors of building engineering.

A fourth and more critical measure, finally, will be active defense of aeronautical infrastructures. The technologies that are making it possible to use new air-to-surface weapons are also making antiaircraft weapons considerably more effective. Missiles, in particular, for defense of specific targets are already compelling the attacking units to adopt new methods of tactical employment. One of these is, for example, to assign to a wave of attacking aircraft or to a phase of the attack itself the mission of destroying or neutralizing those defenses. Consequently, it is obvious that defense will still be able to carry out its mission to the limits within which it may be capable of driving back or of containing this wave.

Another employment method will be to adopt a method of attack by remaining outside the effective range of the defense weapons, at least in the initial stage, after which it is likely that the loss of coherence by the defense will make direct and more effective air attacks possible.

Moreover, this method of employment from a distance (stand-off mode) means that defense must seek to intercept the vehicle in flight, pushing ahead and changing nature. This kind of method is vital to defense in depth and is a concept already accepted. But, in the more advanced areas, opportunities for formalized interception will probably fluctuate. This justifies the present trend toward light combat aircraft, very maneuverable and capable of making an effective defense of the vital zones rich in targets and, at the same time, capable of air-ground offensive action.

Other changes in the concepts of offensive air operations are also foreseeable. Against a technologically sophisticated extensive air defense the attack will do its best to penetrate the defended areas by using tactical courses and electronic countermeasures, instead of sacrificing part of its own forces against secondary targets. Therefore, missiles with a very high degree of accuracy could be launched against the array of targets from the limits of the enemy's terminal defenses, the defenses around the main airports, for example. If the concept of the "stand-off mode" is extended behind the terminal defenses, then the appropriate weapons might be a cruise missile. This option stems from the possibilities offered by the new technologies.

The real significance of the cruise missile, and of any weapon system not piloted by man, is not the fact that it replaces conventional aircraft, but, rather, that it makes them available for missions more appropriate to their characteristics. Because cruise missiles are automated systems, their employment will be limited to certain fixed, vital targets, that is to say to arrays that are very likely to be strongly defended and, therefore, it would be more "expensive" to attack them with piloted aircraft.

It seems unlikely that cruise missiles can be the answer to any operational problem, even against fixed arrays. In fact, once they have been launched, these missiles follow a trajectory beyond the limits within which man can act to adjust the trajectory constantly. Moreover, the missile is incapable of responding to specific threats and, although it is a device difficult for the enemy defense to acquire in flight, once it has been caught it becomes more vulnerable than any other piloted system.

One of the foreseeable difficulties of the air-tactical forces will, therefore, be to decide at what level man's intervention can be eliminated. A promising solution might be to combine the very high degree of versatility of the piloted aircraft during the penetration phase with the missile's very low exposure to risk during the closer in attack phase.

It is interesting to note that this combination seems to offer useful advantages for survival already in the phase preceding the device launch phase. Aside from missiles launched by submarines, which are, perhaps, more suitable for strategic deterrence than for operations on the zone or theater level, choice of the attack method is made by using ground or airborne systems.

On the other hand, if the ground systems are fixed, they also will be considerably vulnerable to preventive air attacks or even to seizure by means of vertical encirclement by simple airborne units. Moreover, a very high degree of mobility would involve command and control problems on the one hand and risks of sabotage and political protests on the other. In order to avoid all that, the missiles

would be deployed only on an alarm, but, in this case, if the deployment should occur too soon, it would be an undesired provocation. If it should occur too late, it might prove to be ineffective.

Although, the most sophisticated weapon systems for launching outside the range of defense (like cruise missiles) seem suitable only for use against fixed targets, there is no doubt that other systems of the stand-off type will be possible solutions, in the future, also against mobile targets.

Difficulties in acquiring those targets might be overcome with tracking and following methods both from the ground and from the air or from space in cooperation with artificial surveillance and signaling satellites (the so-called spy satellites) or with reconnaissance aircraft at very high altitudes by means of a chain of control data (the so-called data link) or else by remaining outside the defense range at such a distance that the target cannot be presumed to be subject to attack, at least during the acquisition phase. In some cases, like, for example, in attack action against second-echelon enemy units, it might happen that the assembly areas or the areas for awaiting attack are located and, therefore, the missiles can be given automated terminal guidance. The methods required for this guidance may stem from constant progress in the sectors of optical, electronic, thermal, LLLTV, IF, IR vision.

There are many other sectors of air warfare in which considerable progress in the next decade now appears to be certain.

The greatest difficulty lies, as already stated, in foreseeing the consequences.

Once the process of research has been started, it may become fascinating or, at most, it may cancel itself out, but after a rapid reflection, it can be deduced with reasonable reliability that even in one single sector of future progress, the electronics sector, the technology that is emerging can do for fire power what the internal combustion engine has done for mobility on the battlefield. If that happens, this fact might imply a revolution capable of banishing part of the present operational thinking from the realm of military doctrine into the real of military history.

10,042
CSO: 3104

LATEST OIL FINDS CAN ALTER COURSE OF ACTIVITY

Oslo NORWEGIAN JOURNAL OF SHIPPING AND COMMERCE in English 14 Nov 80 p 25

[Text]

New finds of oil can alter prospects for future activity on the Norwegian shelf south of the 62nd parallel. Up to the present activities have been based on the probable dominance of gas production in the next decade. The latest finds indicate that the petroleum can swing back to oil production again.

The three finds were made on 35/3, on 35/8, south-west of the town Florø, and on 30/3 where the state oil company Statoil is drilling with the rig «Deep Sea Saga».

Drilling is not yet completed on 30/3, where a 100 m thick oil bearing stratum has been discovered. In Statoil's opinion this is the most promising find ever made on the blocks on which the company has served as operator. Amounts of oil equal to, or even greater than, those on the famous «Gold Block» (34/10) have been hinted at. The Gold Block is assumed to contain more than 1000 million barrels of oil. The Petroleum Directorate stresses, however, that the find on 30/3 has not yet been logged or tested.

The Discoveries on this block were most surprising, as experts had estimated that this would be a gas block. Oil was struck at a water depth of 185 m.

Statoil, the operator, has a 50 per cent share in 30/3. Other shareholders are the American concern Union Oil which is acting as technical assistant, and holds a 30 per cent interest, Norsk Hydro with 10 per cent and Petronord A/S and the German company Deminex with 5 per cent each. This is the block in which the Swedish Volvo concern was to have a 10 per cent share, as part of the Volvo agreement. But the Swedes rejected the offer.

The Petroleum Directorate has also confirmed that traces of hydrocarbons have been found on 35/8, but that logging has only just begun. This find consists of a very light oil. The structure is described as relatively thick, and here too there may be considerable reserves. The water depth at this location is 350 m. It may thus be more difficult to start production here than on 30/3. The operator on 35/8 is Gulf, while another American concern, Getty Oil, and Statoil hold the remaining shares.

Saga's gas finds on 35/3 are probably even more promising. This block is one of the so-called Måløy blocks. The find was made only 40 kilometres from land due west of Måløy in West Norway.

CSO: 3120

NEW BLOCKS OFF NORTH NORWAY

Oslo NORWEGIAN JOURNAL OF SHIPPING AND COMMERCE in English 18 Nov 80 p 19

(Text)

Drilling for oil on Traenabanken offshore Helgeland in north Norway will not be underway before 1982 at the earliest, says Mr. Egil Helle, information officer at the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.

It has previously been rumoured that drilling would start in his area next year, but it is now clear that this is not so. Egil Helle states that concessions for blocks offshore Helgeland will be assessed in connection with remaining oil activities in north and mid Norway and also on other parts of the Norwegian continental shelf.

During this autumn and winter the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is to decide whether new blocks are to be allocated prior to the next drilling season. The allocation of new blocks will also be considered, and Traenabanken is of particular interest in this connection. It is also probable that before Christmas the government will allocate a new block on the Halten-banken offshore Trondelag in mid Norway. Parallel to this the Government will also decide whether exploratory drilling in this area is to be carried out all year, from next year onwards. Even more blocks may be allocated on the Halten-banken, if the Government so decides.

CSO: 3120

STATOIL'S SURPLUS TO BE REINVESTED IN COMPANY

Oslo NORWEGIAN JOURNAL OF SHIPPING AND COMMERCE in English 13 Nov 80 p 31

[Text] Statoil's aggregate surplus for the next few years will be kept within the concern and not transferred back to the state.

The government considers this to be advisable as a transfer would increase the company's need for loans. It was stated in a White Paper on Statoil's planned activity in 1981. The White Paper has been submitted to the Council of State.

Statoil's capital requirements in the 1980s will probably be considerably greater than the inflow of capital from operations, even if the entire surplus was to be held back.

This year Statoil is reckoning on a surplus of 240 million NOK, while next year's surplus is estimated at 1 160 million NOK.

Statoil has calculated that its external capital requirements for 1981 will be 840 million NOK. The Government accepts this estimate, and it is proposed that Statoil should cover this amount by raising a loan abroad, with a guarantee provided by the state. The company has not requested any new shares capital in 1981, and the Government shares this view.

Statoil calculates that the accrued deficit will be covered by retaining the 1980 and 1981 surpluses, and that it will therefore be possible to issue dividends from and including 1981. On the basis of the Companies' Act the dividend will be a good 440 million NOK. This corresponds to about 15 per cent of the shares capital. Equity capital is increasing by about 700 million NOK, 500 million of which will go to cover previous deficits. The remaining 200 will go to a reserves fund.

Statoil's investments for 1981 are estimated at 3 000 million NOK.

CSO: 3120

FRENCH-SPANISH COOPERATION ON BASQUE TERRORIST PROBLEM

Political Asylum in France

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 1 Oct 80 p 7

[Interview with French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, by Feliciano Fidalgo in Strasbourg on 1 October 1980]

[Excerpt] Paris--After his speech before the Council of Europe, French Prime Minister Raymond Barre told EL PAIS yesterday: "The French courts cannot consider Basques from southern Euskadi residing in France as terrorists unless the Madrid government shows them to be such on a case by case basis." In his speech to the members of the Council of Europe he said he did not feel that Giscard's "punctiliousness" will generate an anti-European climate in Spain.

Barre, on the floor at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg yesterday morning, was questioned by the Spanish parliamentarian of the UCD [Democratic Center Union], Carlos Dalatayud, about the possibilities of political asylum in France for anti-Jewish extremists. By extension, Calatayud wanted to obtain a reply from Barre which would encompass all extremists, including Spanish Basques. However, the "delicacy" of the question blurred the final meaning of the dialogue. Questioned off the floor, the prime minister insisted that nationalists of southern Euskadi are covered in France by the already known statute on political asylum.

Barre spoke at the current session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by special invitation. He noted that the present international situation will weigh heavily upon the Madrid Conference but that the 35 delegations "should avoid a sterile confrontation of ideologies or of political and social systems and should not accept false appearances."

ETA Sanctuaries in France

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Oct 80 p 16

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Excerpts] Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, Spanish minister of foreign affairs, as acting president of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, took

part yesterday "in another debate" of this organization, according to his own words. In any event, his speech and his dialog on the floor with parliamentarians and a press conference he held for Spanish newsmen gave him the opportunity to express himself on problems of Spanish-European interest. The future of Spanish membership in the EEC [European Economic Community] and French-Spanish cooperation against the /sanctuary/ [in italics] of Military ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] in northern Euskadi, were analyzed by the minister with a certain amount of optimism.

Spanish socialist Luis Yanez asked him specifically about "the cooperation with France in the fight against terrorism," and more precisely against the ETA. The minister replied: "We are counting on French political willingness; however, there are problems in the area of implementation. We have the impression that French territory is being used by the ETA, and we also have the impression that France is taking steps to put an end to this. This matter should be clarified once and for all, and we need a bilateral instrument for this purpose."

8143
CSO: 3110

FINNISH, NORWEGIAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

Oslo NORWEGIAN JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND SHIPPING in English 18 Nov 80 p 19

[Text]

Finnish industry has made its mark as supplier of equipment directly to oil activity and related activity in Norway. In the time ahead, Finnish industry should become more prominent as a partner for Norwegian concerns in the special economic climate which will characterize Norwegian economy in the 1980's, said Mr. Einar Magnussen, director in the Export Council of Norway at a Norwegian/Finnish seminar in Helsinki recently.

While Finnish exports to Norway in recent years have shown a continuous expansion, the Norwegian exports to Finland have stagnated. Today, the Norwegian exports equate about one half of what Norway imports from Finland. In the first six months of 1980 Norwegian exports to Finland reached a value of 723 million NOK while in the same period Norway imported Finnish goods to the value of 1 417 million NOK.

Norway has singled out 15 sectors where Norwegian enterprise can increase its impact on the Finnish market and these include environment technology, fish farming, home building research and energy economizing. Mr Magnussen pointed out that the continuously more comprehensive oil activity and developments in this sector, should make the country more interesting for Finnish commercial interests. Oil has made it possible to maintain a high level of activity in the Norwegian economy, he said.

CSO: 3120

REASONS FOR FAILURE OF TRIPARTITE SYSTEM EXPLAINED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 8 Oct 80 pp 22-23

[Commentary: "A Three Party Coalition Must Always Include a Traitor"]

[Text] Last Friday, the Martens III administration had to throw in the towel and request royal consultations, due to the fact that the possibilities for harmony are limited. Up to now, the coalition of the three political "families" corresponded more or less to what had been intended: to complete the state reform without an arrangement for Brussels, and to guarantee the continuity of the budgetary work, to knit more or less together a few government plans for industrial reconversion (such as in the textile sector) without too obvious a nationalization, to support the exchange value of the Belgian franc through the image of national union, to put the school policy back afloat by combining a rationalization plan with an expansion plan, and to formulate NATO policy more subtly. Generally speaking, the hexagonal cabinet of "the man for the job" did not, in fact, score badly abroad and in its small diplomacies. However, everyone knew and anticipated that the moment of truth would have to be faced in the social arena within the country. Following the necessary ups and downs in the social debate -- with the 2 percent measure which has once again been swallowed up, and the taxation of pigeon raising (in an emergency, ministers will do strange things) which was also rescinded later on -- the moment inevitably approached when a decision would have to be made about a large sum of money, specifically 34 billion francs, which is lacking if the Belgian system of social benefits is to be maintained without any significant structural changes.

The government's solution in the matter is well known. It wanted, more or less, to produce savings amounting to half the social deficit, both by saving a small sum out of its own funds and through greater miserliness, strictness and haggling -- and to cover the other half through additional payments by those who have a job. The latter would see a slight reduction in their income because of the increase to 60 or 65,000 francs of the wage ceiling on which their contributions, and those of their employers, are calculated. They were very much opposed to this. According to information from the business world, an enterprise with 400 to 500 employees -- and that is after all the much praised Flemish KMO [expansion unknown] -- would lose on the order of 10 million francs per year with this operation. In many cases, although not in all cases, this was simply the straw that broke the camel's back, and thus the last fringe company profit with which something could have been tried during the next fiscal year.

It is not hard to understand the distaste for the government plans. The desire for somewhat cheaper labor, which would make everything so much more reassuring and would produce less alarming IMF reports (this year's July issue concerning the "World Economic Outlook" ranked Belgium with the real industrial problem countries), is really not alive exclusively in the hearts of socially malicious employers. Indeed, the liberal partner in the government considers that public desire for a cheaper social system is so generalized that it expects a substantial electoral advantage from it. This partner has the Thatcher precedent at hand to provide hope that there is a general willingness to "remit." In other words: the liberals postulate that people will vote, more than they used to, for a party, which later on will take 1000 francs or so per month away from them. And which exhorts them to take greater medical, welfare related and job related risks.

According to all the recent opinion polls, there is indeed a willingness among the people to get rid of the bother by remission. Following an already significant period of income moderation (actually, wages have not really increased since 1977), we are slowly finding ourselves in the period of the quietly accepted income reduction. Shipbuilding, some bank personnel and here and there a business have gotten that far, without black flags in the street.

Why is this solution not generally advocated and applied then? The difficulty lies in the fact that the business world, to the extent that it is able to calculate its own future and development in an open economy with internationally fluctuating currency values or Iranian-Iraqi fireworks, cannot set guarantees against the great income reduction. Once again in other words: it is thankful and overjoyed beforehand for possible savings, but cannot formulate a contractual equivalent in the form of promised export figures or job quotas.

Waters of the Jordan

Considering that the social debate has, for approximately 30 years now, taken the form of a domestic-diplomatic rite (and this has indeed resulted in all kinds of healthy habits and legal securities), it would be very difficult for this to work. As a matter of fact, the big unions do not like /unilateral/ [in italics] concessions; in this sense, they are just like ambassadors who do not succeed in allowing common sense to triumph with regard to the flow of the waters of the Jordan. Aside from the lack of a guaranteed equivalent on the part of the employers, there is also doubt about the figures. Tax figures, social figures, fraud figures. In these matters, everyone can stress whatever he wants to. As a matter of fact, countries like ours do not have a planned economy to speak of. They talk about a galaxy of partial figures and sub-statistics, all of which originated somewhere and in their own way. Strangely enough, these figures are very precise -- up to past the decimal point --, but economic reality exhibits a number of visible external signs which contradict them. Weekend traffic backed up for kilometers somehow gives the lie to the unbearableness of the oil prices and the scenes of idyllic strolling in our public parks would not suggest that the marginalization of our foreign workers has reached a socially alarming level. There is indeed a hidden counter-economy (from high to low, from rich to poor and from liberal profession to wage earner) which makes the public management a little ridiculous. Last week, Martens told us that during his interview with our weekly, and he rightly referred to this whole situation as "a defeat for the state."

However, he told us something more, and during the recent crisis days public opinion has not quite paid enough attention to this figure. Anyone asking for a thriftier state, for less government, should know what he is talking about. Well, he was talking about a budgetary mass of which four-fifths is fixed by law, like a concrete block that cannot be lifted. The whole public sector, with its legal measures, whether or not they involve savings, can only touch a budgetary sum of 255 billion francs. The remaining 940 billion francs must be served up before any representative steps on his train. In other words, the budgetary policy making of the executive branch, which is liable for the implementation of Belgian legislation, is limited to a marginal area within public financial policy.

Consequently, there is something painful about the performance surrounding "the cleaning up of public finances." Actually, this is possible in depth -- as is constantly demanded -- only after significant parliamentary interventions. Thus, after the adoption of new laws. This is precisely the way Martens played it following the king's request still to glue the pieces together again. He asked his semi-outgoing government partners once more to take a close look at the figures (during the weekend, he had put numerous dozens of them on paper) and then to take them to parliament. A word to the wise in this matter is enough. With the existing Belgian social and legally fixed system, an executive branch cannot simply achieve a Great Reform. That legal fabric is too old, and it is derived from too many different economic eras, to be flexibly applicable to the needs of the day. Indeed, this flexibility is lacking for 80 percent of the national budget.

Fertile

It has been the role of the liberals to focus on the last fifth. Not in their own departments, such as the Ministries of Defense, Justice and RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration], because there alas they found themselves compelled to spend more than the other average ministers, but in those of others. The fact that they chose the Ministry of Social Welfare is obvious to anyone who really takes the popular willingness to reduce incomes seriously. The fact that they acted in a particularly polemic manner during the weekend is a little surprising for anyone who has read all the recent statements made by Presidents De Clercq and Gol. As a matter of fact, until recently they industriously pointed out that the liberal presence in the cabinet had borne fruit: a reduction of the tax burden, a reasonable coming to grips with the "leveling off" of the manifestly large retirement benefits, and the best possible safeguarding of our military duties. PTT [Posts, Telephone and Telegraph] Minister Herman De Croo even had to bell all kinds of cats in order to bring attempts for a partial return to private enterprise of his public service before the council of ministers. Maybe so, maybe not, bit it was still possible. The attempt to reach a consensus, to put water in the wine, to reach that mysterious Belgian will to survive, was there.

Why then the unexpected knocking on the door in Laken, with the question of what to do next? There are indications that the De Clercq-Gol duo would have liked to get in the government themselves via the request for a restructuring of the administration with the admission of "ministers without portfolio." There are indications that Martens' refusal to get to work on something like that, was not well received. There are also indications that the liberal ministers /within/ [in italics] the government council could accept the logic of the government proposals, but that their party presidents (aroused by new and favorable opinion polls) wanted to fight out the matter to the very end.

Whatever may happen further with the Martens III administration, the three party coalition which was desired in the spring by the non-ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] wing within the CVP [Social Christian Party] to rid the upcoming crisis decisions of a too specifically working class character, will have brought Belgium a small step closer to social polarization. Older ideologues would call this a "class struggle," but a modern citizen no longer does this. And yet, we did witness a rather open body to body struggle between the proponents and the opponents of what had been built up earlier in the welfare state. Once in a while, such a debate will do no harm; then we know at least what a political system is worth to us.

8463
CSO: 3105

POLITICAL SCENE MARKED BY RIGHT, LEFT RADICALIZATION

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 8 Oct 80 pp 26-29

[Article by J.S.: "Six of Them in the Crab Basket"]

> [Text] On Monday, in the late afternoon, still working with three parties, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens tried to create a new consensus in his already resigning three party coalition with an elaborate billion franc plan. However, during the past 5 months the participating parties in this coalition have one by one experienced a diverging development. This development did not take place in the sense of a reduction of radicalization within the limits of their own ideology, rather the opposite. On both sides of the silence of the Christian democrats, the right and the left have become clearly crystallized. This government formula appears to produce exactly the opposite of what its promoters intended.

What is the use of a three party coalition? If the three party coalition is also a hexagon it is even less likely to produce results. Thus, things do not work with such a team. Just as Friday afternoon's generalized Martens plan was more geared toward principles (what SP [Socialist Party] President Andre Cools referred to the next day as the large national axes) than toward concrete billions of francs, on Saturday afternoon the Flemish and Walloon liberals clearly did not intend to be difficult about nothing more than the unsightly figure of 1.5 billion francs. It was clear that more was at stake, and actually no less than a basic analysis of the course of action to be followed by a Belgian administration during this crisis year of 1980.

Officially, the administration was divided at the beginning of the weekend about the financing of 1.5 billion francs for favors for small and medium sized enterprises. The Christian democrats and the socialists did not think that all of the already socially affected workers should have to pay this amount, but the liberals did. All the driving back and forth done by CVP [Social Christian Party] Prime Minister Wilfried Martens between the Rue de la Loi and the king's palace which followed must be seen in the light of a question which is only important from an electoral point of view. Could he dismiss the liberal ministers ex officio -- as his predecessor Tindemans once did in 1976 with the government members belonging to the RW [Walloon Rally], and as he himself had done on 16 January with his three FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] members -- or did the whole three party coalition have to resign too?

The latter is what finally took place then, after which all the pent-up political discord exploded in a particularly nasty manner in national broadcasts. Among the party presidents -- some of whom even accused others of being either too young or too old -- the most conspicuous was Paul Vanden Boeynants of the PSC [Christian Social Party]. The accusation of intellectual dishonesty, which he leveled at PRL [Party of Liberty and Wal'oon Reform] President Jean Gol strikingly expressed his disappointment about the fact that in a cabinet Christian democracy without the liberal wing would inevitably lose its vital, electoral margin on its right. God only knows how much Leo Tindemans and Paul Vanden Boeynants angled for this margin during the spring. The fact that a three party coalition could thus end up in an atmosphere of electoral accounting on the right, speaks volumes about the degree of unspoken mutual deceit which is apparently necessary for such a formula to be able to come into existence.

Following the instructive events of the month of September, when SP President Karel van Miert -- to the surprise of all of Western Europe and possibly also himself -- compelled the NATO lobby to give way as a real paper tiger, last Sunday's congress of the Flemish socialists was completed at a run -- what we only used to see with the CVP in the past -- and was reduced to a mere confirmation of the leadership of the party leaders. Indeed, Willy Claes, Louis Tobback and Karel van Miert were so comfortable because they had always said: why do you need to include the liberals? Of course, you only need the liberals if you are the CVP and you are looking for voters in all directions at once. According to SP Minister of Economic Affairs Willy Claes, it came down to the fact that he and his colleagues were quite willing to pay 8 billion francs into the account of CVP Minister of Social Welfare Luc Dhoore, and up to 5 billion francs for their colleague De Wulf in the Ministry of Employment and Labor, but not if PRL Minister of Finance Paul Hatry did not even take action on assessments on luxury items which had long been decided on and while there is continued insistence on brutally cutting off up to 50,000 jobless people from unemployment benefits. If there is one firm point that Willy Claes made for his party, with the message that the SP never takes the role of apologist for a non-selective savings policy, then it is the intrinsic good sense of leftist participation in the government, /especially/ [in italics] when it is a three party coalition.

Since the crisis can be felt here, the Belgian establishment should have slowly come to a believable analysis. It is all too evident that Wilfried Martens' third administration, even with the liberals in its lap, did not prove capable of this. When the doctors cannot agree about what illness the patient should be cured of, then he does not get any better. CVP President Leo Tindemans was the first to have openly asked for a three party coalition as the ultimate means of salvation, while personalities such as Walloon socialist former Prime Minister Edmond Leburton also pleaded for it in the background. Over a period of 5 summer months, this country, with its untold problems, has apparently only lost valuable time. The lowering of direct taxation, which was the electoral ransom for the liberal partner, and which some people immediately branded as an anti-social popular favor, has done nothing but further unsettle public finances, which were already in such bad shape. As a result, CVP Minister of the Budget Gaston Geens had to prepare such a bad and worthless budget that he became physically ill. The only thing that the three party coalition actually managed to accomplish has been the expansion of the port of Zeebrugge, partly also because it was a good thing for NATO. The state reform was pushed through parliament, but after all those years it was also the least that could be expected of a two-thirds majority.

The failure of the three party coalition that was desired by Leo Tindemans and others was due primarily to the fact that the formula did not prevent the political process from being radicalized anyhow, even though its major intent had been to prevent this. It was not Karel van Miert, with his flamboyant comeback on 29 August in HET BELANG VAN LIMBURG, who provoked this three party coalition to pieces, because he only insisted on maintaining the terms of the government agreement, but rather Willy De Clercq and Jean Gol themselves. In fact, the three party coalition never got over the government's blunder of 9 August, because the liberal presidents consciously wanted to go further than the compromise of Christian democrats and socialists, which they had co-signed in exchange for their tax reduction. The liberal partners attempted to test the socialists by going somewhat too far, in order to get a feel of how much too far they could really go. The original statements of their Minister of Finance Robert Henrion -- who has since been transferred out --, who proposed a few paths which the government did not want to follow, were a very early provocation; this was followed by the transfer of Matry himself from the most purely private sector to the administration. When the leftist side of the majority -- which did not naturally even think of appointing someone like Georges Debunne, for example, as minister of employment and labor --, had had a hard time digesting this, Baron Poswick came forward with Zaire, with nuclear missiles and with more money for the army.

According to Willy Claes, the socialists on both sides of the language border had agreed to a three party coalition because the nation was faced with two challenges: the community and the budget. Now that, after so many years, the community question no longer seems to be important, and a matter like Komen even appears to get settled all at once by daybreak, decisions on the large budgetary options have become the main stumbling blocks of the three party coalition. This is why the country did not go through a surrealistic crisis, as it did last Easter. For his congress, Willy Claes outlined the situation in his well known somber manner, as follows. With a growing number of at least 350,000 unemployed, 200 billion francs too little are being saved to be able to cover the capital needs of the economy. By 1985, the social security system will be faced with a deficit of more than 100 billion francs. The main question in all of this remains whether the private sector is still willing to take risks -- which, according to Willy Claes, is its mission -- and to participate in the revival. There is a fiscal, and even a social fraud, which is structural. In the face of all this it now appears that the three party coalition was so inefficient because its liberal partner proceeded on the basis of a completely different analysis. Willy De Clercq put it into words Saturday, as explicitly as possible: the fault for the crisis lies with the unions; Debunne and Houthuys dominate the SP and the CVP. It is rather obvious that no government is capable of agreeing on a distribution of the costs, which are to be carried by the various population classes, when one of its components thus one-sidedly assumes that even more must be paid by those who are already paying.

Opposite the axes, which Andre Cools spoke about, there is Jean Gol's statement that actions that cut deep into the problem must be taken, but how deep does Gol really want to go? Actually, things were already wrong with the three party coalition on 27 June, when the Liberal Party presidents approached the prime minister and insisted on more, and even more, and always more savings in the social sector. In the wake of Karel van Miert, the labor world at that time made it rather clear that any policy could be given consideration, except for a policy of faits accomplis. Unlike Leo Tindemans, who after Saturday's 7 minute council of ministers meeting still felt that the government had been within a /hair/ [in italics] of finding a solution, KP [Communist Party] President Louis Van Geyt pointed to the attitudinal and

political abyss between the positions within the three party coalition. It is so deep, that it is actually a question of whether the government divisions will be subject to any kind of social debate. It is a well known fact that any right wing will try to put a break on government spending, to cut down on social security and to take money out of it to make it available to the economy, but it is a new twist to demand, as the liberals now did, that this be implemented authoritatively by the government, while ignoring the undesirable union spectators. It is known that, in the political sense of the word, Wilfried Martens is not related to Mrs Thatcher. If the Belgian cabinet will have to go on this week without the liberals, then this would mean that the hour of the Thatchers has not yet come in our country.

On Monday, the figures of an electoral opinion poll seeped out. Along with the People's Union and the SP, which made progress in the Flemish territory, and in contrast to the CVP which lost no less than 3 percent, the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] even scored an increase of 3.4 percent in voter preferences. However, public opinion did not even need these figures to have noted already that the socialists did not want elections, and the Christian democrats if possible even less, while the liberals now zealously looked for the breaking point with the greatest possible electoral advantage. It was also evident that during the weekend, the palace did its utmost to help glue the pieces together. By late Monday afternoon, Prime Minister Martens' plan, which was three pages long on Friday, had become more than a dozen pages, with figures added. With all these crises in one-and-a-half years -- two of which were started by his own party --, the man must slowly see the end of his own arithmetic, and of the progression of Roman figures next to his name. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the week there were already familiar sounds in the comments of his supporters: if we have to go back to yellow-red, then how are we going to keep the unions in check? Indeed, the Rue des deux Eglises does not have much faith in the center left, because it always turns out to be more left than center for its taste. The problem is that the center right does not enjoy a majority in the Walloon and French speaking institutions -- which goes against a principle which Leo Tindemans himself once laid down when he was prime minister --, while the addition of the FDF to obtain the two-thirds majority, which is still required for Brussels, is inherently simply /not acceptable/ [in italics] to the CVP.

The problem was a rather fundamental one: who has to pay what? It is amazing how everything in Belgium falls back into place again when such a thoroughly social option must be made. In recent days, the inner cabinet and the party presidents did not in the least take community positions, but rather took positions according to their political-philosophical families. They clearly stood where they should stand according to their ideology. In this context, the Christian democrats were in the least clear corner. This crisis seems to have ushered in the end of a message which rang out strongly throughout the seventies. Leo Tindemans was not allowed to preside himself over the three party coalition which he had desired for his party, because the other parties did not want that, and he was alas unable to provide inspiration for his formula. If SP Minister of National Education Willy Calewaert had not blundered in August in VRIJ NEDERLAND, his voice would not even have been heard at all throughout the summer. Last week, the CVP party newspaper ZEC took exception in a strange manner to the news services of the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television -- Dutch Service], as if they were boycotting the Flanders' majority party in their broadcasts. The CVP is one vote short of holding an absolute majority in the management board of this institution, and can appoint not only the general manager from its ranks, but also the administrative director for information, plus an overwhelming

number of other upper level positions with managerial and policy determining responsibility. Alas, these people apparently cannot help it either if all the CVP's social responsibility seems to be stagnating since the PDF was kicked out of the government. For months now, the country's largest party has not produced a sound; it has not made any news.

On the other hand, at least one Fleming out of five knows what he wants from this society, because Van Miert, Claes and Tobback set a plausible picture before his. Last week, during its congress in Brighton, the British Labor Party specifically referred to the /Flemish socialists/ [in italics]. What a small party on the European mainland is able to do, the mighty British should be able to do too. Even in Norway, the example of the Flemish socialists has aroused a following among party colleagues. Now, they also feel that their airfields should not without question serve America's cold war. The Flemish socialists accomplished this over a period of only 3 years of unobtrusive, but merciless truthfulness, originating from the nothing of the so-called translation-socialism.

No opponent would yet dare to use that term. One street away, CVP Minister of Development Cooperation Marc Eyskens let it be known how much the CVP would like to discuss its options and strategy together with the PSC. Regardless of what happens to Franz-Josef Strauss in the Federal Republic of Germany, with its inevitable consequences for the European People's Party, there is little here to increase the credibility of Christian democracy in general. Alas, the sad course of the three party Martens III administration will not have benefited the CVP's representativeness.

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YOUNG CVP MEMBERS SPEAK OUT ON POLITICAL, SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 15 Oct 80 pp 33-45

[Interview with Erik van Rompuy, Piet van Speybroeck and Gie Korthoudt, members of the young CVP, in Brussels at the editorial offices of KNACK, by Struye, Verleyen and Van Humbeeck: "Erik or the Little Insect Book"; date of interview not given]

[Text] It must be said that the youth sections of the Flemish political parties spend their stay in the antechamber of "real" power in an industrious, restless and clever manner. Freshly plucked from the campus, taken away from a better paying American bank to go work for a more modest salary and a time clock card at the Kredietbank and with the CVP [Social Christian Party] youth, since 1978 Erik van Rompuy (son of Vic and brother of Herman, who is struggling in the party council) has truly become a real political star. As a surprising and undoubtedly sincere mixture of James Dean and Kenneth Galbraith, he represents, at our forums, discussion evenings and political dog fight sessions, the well trained, well educated, mobile and nervous generation which was born around 1950. It is the first one to be able to permit itself to be concrete, with as its ultimate standard the question: what can I buy with it? Fair and direct in discussions, probably a good friend for their companions, perhaps grown lonely in the hurried world of consumption to which it is addicted, this generation contains the most divergent ingredients. A quasi brutal social individualism in the American way, a rather precocious knowledge about many things, in addition to the memory of hard and somewhat foggy instruction by very, very old teachers. For whom there is yet some respect.

Distrustful of large systems of ideas, anxious about a future with too little money, ready to organize meetings and small congresses in which every opinion from their own circle really can be expressed, very aggressive toward opponents from the cold nest of the non-Christians: Erik van Rompuy, and his comrades in arms Piet van Speybroeck and Gie Korthoudt talked to us in our editorial offices. In the name of 13,000 members, 64,000 European preferential votes and a rank and file which continues to believe very mildly in Tindemans.

[Question] It seems that you are irritated by your portrayal as the spoiled child from the professional Van Rompuy clan who can get to the top without any effort in a bank and in the party. Are you then rather a dissident within the CVP?

[Erik van Rompuy] My brother Herman and I were barely 20 years old when we joined the CVP youth in the mid-sixties. Those were the days of the amendments of the bishops, the year 1968 came into it. While the students in Louvain were fully occupied with making a revolution with the ideas of the left, we were meeting in the dark Broekstraat in Brussels. At that time, Wilfried Martens was president of the young CVP, and Jean-Luc Dehaene represented us for Brussels in the National Executive. At that time, that generation, whose members were already past the age of 30 years and were beginning their political careers in the administrations, launched the ideas of the progressive front formation, the pluralistic school and so forth. There were Ward Bosmans and Rita Jolie-Mulier. We felt immediately that this was not compatible with what the youth really felt, we did not believe these people. One heard that the CVP should be blown up as the class party, that Catholic education should be abolished, that a large workers party should be established. We split off then from the Brussels youth; my brother wrote a new issue of the Christmas program as an alternative. Dehaene and Martens thought in terms of structures; he was more concerned, in the spirit of personalism, with the social crisis the people had to contend with at that time. In 1969, because of his progressive opposition, Herman was elected to the National Executive at the age of 21 years. Three weeks later he had already resigned; he did not see anything in that milieu. For years after that, we remained persona non grata in the movement. We were extreme conservatives who did not see the big picture. It was only under Jan Huyghebaert, in 1973, that Herman was once again admitted in the Executive. The group still did not really accept him, but they wanted to /tolerate/ [in italics] a so-called rightist voice. At the 1974 congress, Herman introduced a text about the need for economic growth, which was completely contrary to the fashion of the Club of Rome, which was the rage at that time. The hall shuddered with dismay. If a single individual had shouted that that Van Rompuy did not belong with us, we would have been swept away. At that time, the need for growth and the need for a market economy were far from obvious; there was still the euphoria of a planned economy, which had been an ideological point in the sixties. We realized that this philosophy of a leftist economy must come to an end within the youth movement, that a more realistic understanding of economic facts must come about. At the spring 1975 congress on "Goals and Strategy" -- which had to be reviewed --, we then shot down the whole contents of the progressive front formation and all the rest. Herman van Rompuy's texts then became the basis for "Prosperity through Courage." In fact, it took 5 years of work to get to our new contents. I had already, instinctively and emotionally, taken a stand against Egmont, when I was finally elected president 2 years ago.

Indecision

[Question] It is also said that it irritates you to be considered the dummy of ventriloquist Tindemans.

[Erik van Rompuy] There was not any of our positions that did not come out of our own deliberations. But, because some of them are rather parallel with the points of view of Leo Tindemans, this has only increased our political capacity. And yet, there must be a number of our positions which the CVP president definitely does not support. I would not know; I really do not have that many contacts with him. Our

positions are not prescribed or censured. I play my role in the party, but I have no personal relationship with Tindemans.

[Question] Why are you so embittered against your predecessors from the sixties?

[Piet van Speybroeck] It seems that, at that time, there was a collective belief among young people, in the value of the state, in collectivism. They took a stand against prosperity, against boredom. There was no fear of the Soviet danger, there was no anxiety about the crisis. The people of that time, who now set the trend in the press, the unions and the parties, have often continued to live with that belief from the sixties. They continue to use the same terminology and the same concepts, as if there never had been any seventies. And yet, since then we have observed what the Soviet Union is worth: Ethiopia, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam...

[Question] Weren't each one of those liberations?

[Piet van Speybroeck] We have noticed the things which the state cannot handle: inflation, trade deficit, debts, unemployment. In the sixties, authority was challenged in families, in the state and in enterprises. Now, we are stuck with all that indecision in society. In spite of the exposure of the seventies, a certain establishment in DE MORGEN and in other publications still continues to reason in those terms. It had been thought that that generation would change society with rigid ideological diagrams, but it has suddenly returned there. It obstructs the political forum with outdated combat themes.

[Erik van Rompuy] If I understand the socialists, then the problem of public finances does not exist for them as a problem in and of itself, but as a problem of redistribution. I see and I saw that it is necessary to save, because otherwise both currency and employment would collapse, but this is not the way they see it. As far as they are concerned, if it does not result in a good social distribution, everything might as well collapse. A question such as that of the nuclear missiles is a theme from 10 years ago, which is coming back. What bothers me is their enormous intolerance.

[Question] Aren't you mindful of the fact that the people you accuse of fundamental intolerance are in a minority position with regard to the CVP, which continuously announces that with 48 percent of the votes it has the duty to speak for all of Flanders? Coupled with your theme of arrogance, the CVP thus reduces this part of the country to a single party society.

[Erik van Rompuy] Take the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television -- Dutch Service] ...

[Question] ... About which the CVP party newspaper ZEG published about the least objective article written in Belgium during the last 100 years.

[Erik van Rompuy] ... whose news service employs a number of people who do not agree with the CVP concept [illegible]iety.

[Question] Is it necessary to point out that they are reporters who broadcast /news/ [in italics]. It cannot be their fault that, since it became indignant about the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] in the cabinet, the CVP has no longer been heard of.

[Erik van Rompuy] Only Karel van Miert systematically gets a chance. Doesn't he have anything else to offer besides news?

[Question] The 2 percent has been withdrawn, there are no longer five people going to Zaire, the generals will not get an additional 750 million francs worth of gasoline, and the American missiles happen not to have been installed in our fields. Meanwhile, the British socialists as well as the British liberals and the Norwegian socialists have referred to the Flemish socialists by name in altering their positions in this respect. Isn't that news?

[Erik van Rompuy] We are also opposed to those missiles, but we do not believe that they are the problem of the day, as Louis Tobback claims, greater than the economic crisis. What use is Karel van Miert's /grand slam/ [in italics] to the Flemish youth and the Flemish workers with their half million lost jobs and their government debt? When that 2 percent suddenly showed that some savings could be achieved after all, I found it terrible that a single unilateral challenge was sufficient to cancel the measure again.

[Question] Didn't the Flemish youth and the Flemish workers benefit from that grand slam in that the government agreement, which is the most important contract which can be entered into in Belgium, will henceforth remain a watertight agreement?

[Erik van Rompuy] Within his party and via the media, Karel van Miert is trying to define his profile for the next elections, but from a social point of view he did not achieve anything in terms of employment, public finances, or industrial structures. Socialism in the Flanders is only interested in itself.

Devaluation

[Question] When it had not yet reached that point, you called it translation-socialism. Now ZEG must even come up with gossip from SPECIAL about money from Moscow. Does Karel van Miert keep the CVP awake at night?

[Piet van Speybroeck] He irritates us, but we are not afraid. What is bothering the people at this time? There is anxiety in the plants and in the offices. This anxiety is socio-economic. The people are very well aware of the fact that some measures are so obvious that anyone should be able to recognize them. However, Karel van Miert makes no reference to this, as a result of which he only manages to worsen the problems and slow down vital measures.

[Question] Do those obvious measures imply that the people are asked to take a step down in order to enable the economy to survive?

[Erik van Rompuy] A survey in the Netherlands showed that 85 percent of the people and 70 percent of the union members are willing to give up 1.5 percent of their purchasing power, because leftist economists there have also proven that going the other direction a wage increase of 1.5 percent results in a 0.7 percent loss of employment.

[Question] Are you asking us to reduce incomes without any guarantees concerning this increase in employment? As a matter of fact, we are already reducing incomes, but nobody sees anything going up. Do you trust industry?

[Erik van Rompuy] We are living with a balance of payments deficit of 200 billion francs, that is 5 percent of our GNP. That is an enormous amount. For the Germans it only amounts to 2 percent of their GNP; the same is true for the French, and for the Dutch it is only 1 percent. This year, we have doubled this deficit on the current account and on the balance of payments, and we may well not be able to do it for less next year. At the present time, we are holding our ground with gigantic interest rates, but if this continues for a few more years, we will end up completely in a British situation. In the sixties, they managed to maintain the pound this way, until it finally went down from 140 francs to 60 francs. It is inevitable that somebody will have to pay now, because a whole country cannot forever continue to live 5 percent beyond its means. It has only been possible for our incomes to remain this high up to now because the government absorbs the difference. We subsidize industry to the tune of 4.1 percent of our GNP, compared to 2.9 percent in the Netherlands, 1.7 percent in France, 1.5 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany, and only 0.3 percent in the United States. The same is true of social security, which also serves to counteract the crisis. The National Bank has clearly indicated that the exaggerated transfers from the government to enterprises and to families are the reason why the Belgian financing deficit has grown so sharply since 1974. If we do not urgently reduce these transfers, inflation will lead us within a few years into a staggering devaluation. This would result in wild income reductions prompted by the market laws themselves. The prime minister has wrongly accused us, as a youth organization, of concerning ourselves with short term matters, such as the budget and social security. Well, we are concerning ourselves precisely with this in the long term, in order to safeguard ourselves a little future 5 years from now.

[Question] You, yourself, have alleged that industry is sucking at the government udders at the rate of 150 billion francs, after which it doesn't even make good, but your reproach is directed toward the unions and the left.

[Erik van Rompuy] What we want is precisely to unmask the whole political, economic and social caste, the whole establishment. If the stone has to be thrown, then it does not bother me to cast the first one in the direction of the employers. The VEV [Flemish Economic Association] parades the greatest principles, but when 35 billion francs could be picked up through the textile plan, they were at hand. The Societe Generale is not averse to 104 billion francs for steel, while they themselves do not fulfil their commitment. We would definitely not describe the employers as the creative forces in society, but the market economy has proven that it is the most suitable system to create prosperity.

Remission

[Question] You want the workers to give up income in exchange for hypothetical employment from the employers.

[Erik van Rompuy] There are, alas, not a hundred solutions at hand to solve the crisis. Our industrial structures have collapsed; it is now a question of taking action. You may doubt our recipe, but something must be done in any case. We are precisely blaming the establishment for not doing anything, for once again betting on steel and textile. Our institutional positions originated from the same long term concern. We were considered to be unitaristic when we alleged that the Flanders were visibly better at managing their economy in Belgium, and that thus the Flemish

territory should have more say in unitary decision making. That was called Flemish arrogance, the imposition of our Flemish economic recipes. However, after a matter of months we saw that our Flemish ministers gave in. There followed the steel plan, and the reduction of working hours. We heard Guy Spitaels refer to our government as the most leftist in Europe, while he handled his budget as a fact of economic growth. The program bill met with a great deal of criticism in Wallonia, and with much less in the Flanders. The only thing we said then was that if the Walloons did not want any part of the economic policy we advocated, that we then no longer needed the Belgian state, that the Flanders should then look for a different structure to protect its own chances.

[Question] You want us to moderate ourselves in order to give enterprises new chances for life via strong social interventions. What is strange about your youth organization is that it no longer searches for large structural alternatives, that is does not play for high stakes with revolutionary projects, but simply accepts the machinery which is given to us, and which is capitalistic, with all its known tricks. The frauds, the tax paradises, the secret smuggling of its labor intensive activities to the poor countries. As youth you are not talking, for example, about the joy of labor, or the happiness of people in the systems, but only about the balance. This way, with your recipe, you are playing all the trump cards in the hands of the establishment, of which you yourself say that it fails in its parts. Should we give up all the way to the wage level of the Malayans?

[Erik van Rompuy] The influence of the new industrialized countries is real, but 70 percent of our textile losses originate from within the European Community. Your Malay remark may apply for monetarists and pure market economists, but we do not go that far. We only hold that if, for example, over a period of 3 years, we maintain the small effort of a real income freeze, whereby we are definitely not thinking solely in terms of wages, we could at once reduce the deficit of our balance of payments by a few percentage points. Our most profitable enterprises now make a 4.2 percent profit, as against 10.2 percent for bonds, while risk capital must usually pay 13 percent. We must urgently get back to a level which would be attractive for investments, although I will immediately admit that we will never again have full employment. Of course, lower interest rates and lower charges for enterprises are traditional solutions, but alas all other recipes have proven to be defective. I am in favor of public initiative, of the shortening of the work period and of the prevention of fraud, but even Freddy Willockx himself admits that the maximum he can get out of it is 15 billion francs. We do not insist on saving capitalism or the free economy, but simply on maintaining a few chances for the future of the Flanders. These traditional remedies do not necessarily have to be a-social. Levels could be set; there is no need to touch incomes below a half million francs. However, the union establishment puts forth its most vicious efforts for the wage brackets above this level.

[Question] What magnificent points from "Prosperity through Courage" have we missed so far in the government program?

[Erik van Rompuy] One of the most elementary points was that government expenditures are not allowed to increase more than the GNP, but that is not true for the 1981 budget. Also, the fiscal and para-fiscal charges could not increase any further either, but it is going up 20 billion francs next year. The coupling of social benefits to the income bracket, democratization of business management. The CVP ministers are dropping these principles without a word.

[Question] Because they are traitors?

[Erik van Rompuy] Because they put their ear too much to the ground with the coalition partners and with the pressure groups, and not more with the party program and the rank and file. Once again, the Martens plan does not conform to "Prosperity through Courage," just as the state reform was not that of the Heysel. On the other hand, the CVP does have a program, which cannot be said about everybody. The socialists certainly do not have an economic program. As far as public finances are concerned, I am not at all certain whether, for example, they want to limit the expenditures to the growth rate of the GNP, or whether or not they want to increase the tax pressure. When I consider the Flemish socialists, I am afraid that basically they are not convinced of the need for savings. They do not go any further than the desire to increase receipts in order not to have to reduce the package of government expenditures. What does Karel van Miert have to say about a solution to the crisis, about the economy? Only that he does not want to remit 2 percent; we have to guess about the rest. What do the liberals say? That they want to save, but their ministers' budgets were going up more quickly than the rest. It is true that people say that the CVP is a jelly-fish and that it is silent, but at least it knows what it wants. There is a program, but it is not implemented by our ministers. Therefore, our whole arrogance theme was /not even directed against the Walloons, but against our own leaders/ [in italics]. We do not proceed from what happens in Wallonia, but from what our people achieve. We have to exert more influence on decision making in the administration. While the gigantic transfers continue and the budget deficit is caused primarily in Wallonia, they allow the Walloon political leaders, the unions and the holding companies to create a situation which will heavily mortgage us, the Flemish, in the future. We are not in the least opposed to national solidarity, as long as the Walloon political leaders are willing to participate in the policy that we want, and not continually try to blackmail us. If they cause a 200 billion franc budgetary deficit which we filled up, why do they continue to exasperate the Flemish with trifles such as the Komen affair?

[Question] Could you for a moment imagine that Andre Cools might not be able to follow your policy, specifically for ideological reasons?

[Erik van Rompuy] I hear little about ideology from Cools. He talks about Komen, the steel industry and the so-called social gains. He is not concerned about the industrial future of his region, but about the pillars of his power. That does not irritate us alone; Cools loses ground with every election. He no longer enjoys the support of youth. Cools once told me that he would be only too glad to see 1,000 of my CVP youth appear in his party. People have long stopped believing in his so-called priorities, because they are not priorities. Why is the cleaning up of public finances not a priority for Cools?

Crucial Choice

[Question] Maybe that is for him as much a problem as the cleaning up of the Roman curia?

[Erik van Rompuy] Then he lacks objective economic knowledge. With our rising interest rates, we are creating uncontrolled impoverishment, whereby it will be precisely the weakest who will be hit in the deadliest manner.

[Question] Doesn't your greatest arrogance perhaps lie in the fact that the CVP youth present their analysis and their solution as a value free action?

[Erik van Rompuy] When we postulate that social benefits should not be paid out in addition to a family income of 700,000 francs, then Andre Cools accuses us of wanting to reduce social security to public assistance. However, that does not seem to us to be the problem. The question is much more what we should do first of all, in order to cause the least damage. The situation is too serious to let our principles be eliminated by clever arguments.

[Question] Is it a clever argument to say that you want to finance the solution of the crisis with income reductions for that part of the population which pays all the costs of the crisis?

[Piet van Speybroeck] We would not like anything better than to tax high incomes, and to have them return 5 percent rather than 1.5 percent. /We are against the secrecy of bank records and for property taxes./ [in italics]. They exist in the Netherlands and in the Federal Republic of Germany, where they do not cause the economy to go to pieces.

[Question] Isn't your social indignation focused on too narrow an area of human reality? Five years ago, when we asked leading members of the CVP about the seriousness of the economic situation, we were accused of wrongly limiting man to a homo-economicus, as the Marxists do. There was more to him. With clear pessimism you now refuse to go further than accounts of profits and losses.

[Erik van Rompuy] We have not the least ambition for grandiose plans; we are consciously limiting ourselves to what can technically be accomplished. We are well enough aware of the fact that, before our eyes, minds are filling up with ideas which deviate from all democratic tendencies. We want to prevent this, and we dare to say it aloud. Therefore, we hold the political caste as a whole responsible; the establishment of the day has bungled the matter. We are not the great leaders, the drafters of enlightened manifestos. What we do have, however, is a following. They know that we are not reading Emmanuel Mounier to pieces, to find out how bad things are. We are the only voice which clearly states that the Belgian politicians are faced with a critical choice. They must solve the crisis or the political crisis will swallow the political caste itself. This is the greatest danger yet to the social and democratic gains which are always being thrown up at us.

[Question] Don't you allow any point of light, a spark of optimism, to affect the development of your line of thought, which would not immediately represent a change of one interest rate or another?

[Erik van Rompuy] We are fighting against this establishment, which cannot manage the crisis. If we are allowed to fight the caste, which produced Egmont and all that mismanagement, for a few more years with the CVP youth, then it will really be exposed to the people. We do not want anything more. Neither do I. When my mandate has come to an end, I will very probably disappear from politics. Because it is not true that I am tactically climbing up to higher spheres. Later on, my great joy will lie in the fact that, as youth president, I said what I had to say.

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MARTENS IV GOVERNMENT FIGHTS RACISM, XENOPHOBIA

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/Text/ Under the title "welfare policy" of its governing agreement, the new Martens IV cabinet announces its intention to soon submit a bill "to combat acts inspired by racism or xenophobia." This paragraph in the chapter "a better world of justice" was included in the agreement with a striking unanimity, even for this government, after such a consensus appeared earlier during a meeting at the beginning of this month in the Janson auditorium of the ULB /Free University of Brussels/, where all party chairmen except Vic Anciaux expressed their aversion for the racism and fascism again emerging. The same general agreement also appeared at the antifascist demonstration last Monday in Brussels.

Now a bill by Ernest Glinne, PS /Socialist Party/ member of parliament has been up for consideration since 1966 which particularly aims to curb race hate and expressions of it legally. The proposal was submitted to the chamber year after year, however without it leading to the passage of a law.

Perhaps it was the continually closer signs of rightist terrorism--the Bologna Station, the Munich beer halls, rue Copernic street in Paris--which made the political leaders aware of the extreme right, which claimed responsibility for all these outrages and which, at the most, was considered peculiar, but not at all dangerous. That is why Glinne's bill took over 14 years to be taken seriously, at least as regards its intentions.

For a law is one thing, its application is another. However, the manner in which the laws in force, which can be applied in this matter, more definitely the law of 29 July 1934, are enforced, allows the greatest skepticism. Moreover, that law is not concerned about a pernicious body of thought not to be tolerated in a democratic society as such, but about the manner in which it can express itself, about the circles in which it can develop and be carried out. The VMO /Flemish Militant Order/ is naturally the most typical example of it, but it is only now, after years of smashing windows, molesting people and still worse outrages that the justice authorities intend to do

something about that. Complaints continued about VMO activities and related organizations, often without many results. The specific application of the law of 1934 and more definitely the designation of groups such as the VMO as private militia, were long in coming.

Collusion between extreme rightist groups and some authorities in the various jurisdictions in our country is a factor in that. No misunderstanding can exist about it; more still, there is no doubt that the extreme right has infiltrated the police and not vice versa. It is no secret that the extremists have often learned their fighting methods in the national police, army or police.

Scapegoats

The bolder and bolder activities of extreme rightists in recent years, with the antiforeign worker demonstration in Antwerp sometime ago as its latest "exploit" naturally have their reasons: historians of social attitudes and sociologists will not find it difficult to draw a parallel between the economic crisis and the appearance of extremist groups. An economic crisis makes people insecure and fearful, gives them the impression of having many enemies. A democratic system is perceived as "red," democratic decisions do not seem able to solve the crisis. Thus the need for a leader, who, if necessary, will be created out of nothing, if he does not exist. A second of its characteristics is the search for guilty parties, scapegoats. It seems simple with us: the guilty parties seem to be the unemployed, who are regarded as a combination of loafers and idle housewives signing on for the dole, who only cost money and milk the state treasury dry. However, scapegoats can be described all the more simply, if they are easy to recognize, for example, if they are of another race. In that climate, antisemitism could run wild before the last world war and in our contemporary variation it is the foreign workers, who have jobs here and/or come to benefit from our social security and/or make Brussels' streets and squares unsafe. The fact that foreign workers--7 million in the EC--are part and parcel of our economic system, the fact they have proportionally less unemployment and crime than the Belgians, seems a much too reasonable argument to use against the illogic of the extreme rightist position. For economic necessity confronts racial purity, justice, blood and native soil mysticism. Such a difference in scales of values does not allow any digressive speech.

If all those party chairmen are then going to join together in demonstrations, like the French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing who ordered the pupils in French schools to take a 1 hour antiracist course, then, on the other hand, we cannot help but notice a certain hypocrisy. Consequently it is not surprising that some speakers at the Janson auditorium, more especially Leo Tindemans and Paul Vanden Boeynants, were received coolly.

Not only has a certain political and economic establishment been rather indulgent towards fascist type groups, in a certain sense, they were also rather useful to them. Insinuations about everything which may be considered leftist and against foreign workers, fits in with this. We could read in the most respectable publications how Karel van Miert was "influenced" from the East Bloc to oppose atomic missiles and mayors even relate how foreign workers dirty the capital's streets and make it unsafe. In that sense, the VMO demonstration to kick all the foreign workers out of the country is no more than a logical result of that. If one mentions an internal enemy in some military circles, then that does not mean the same thing as that which the VMO and its supporters understand as the red rats who must pack up. And the notorious NATO Law of the former minister of internal affairs, Georges Gramme, PSC /Social Christian Party/ and Major General Robert Close, PRL /Party of Liberty and Reform/ has in itself no other aims.

Democratic Freedoms

It would be a mistake to suppose that it is enough to pass a law, which fines a cafe owner if he wants to keep foreigners out of his establishment. Racism and xenophobia are latent phenomena, which lift their heads in time of crisis, but which, moreover, always are inherent in a system of ideas which is no longer original. In that sense, it is typical that a VMO essentially has nothing more to do with one or the other form of justified Flemish demands, but has become exclusively a rightist, extremist group, in whose ideology an unwholesome kind of Flemish nationalism has found a place.

Whoever wants to do anything about the problem of racism, consequently must do it in the framework of an all encompassing political context. Xenophobia is not only something which can inconvenience Jews and foreign workers. It is the expression of a philosophy which questions the entire democratic system which is peculiar to this country and preferably wants to overthrow it. Consequently it is clear the Antwerps mayor, Mathilde Schroyens (SP) was wrong in allowing the VMO to demonstrate against foreign workers in the streets of her city: whoever attacks democracy does not have the right to claim democratic freedoms, (in this case the right to free expression of opinion). Or as Canon Herman Mertens said during the discussion which was printed this week in DOSSIER VLAANDEREN: "We must be intolerant with the intolerant." It is a luxury which we do not need and cannot allow ourselves.

With the irrational nature of phenomena such as racism, the inclination towards strong personalities and the like, we must not count on stopping them with intellectually convincing means. It would naturally be easy, departing from scientific explanations, to suggest the solution of the economic crisis as the only answer to the rightist, extremist movement. It is probably somewhat more realistic and practical to better distribute the economic crisis among the various population groups, so that social security is no longer immediately a real prospect for large population groups. Or it is a case of how social justice can save democracy. Is it now any easy task for Wilfried Martens to implement paragraph seven or chapter seven of the title "welfare policy" of his government program?

8490
CSO: 3105

WEAPONS SYSTEM OF LEOPARD 2 TANK DESCRIBED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Sep 80 pp 473-475

[Text] When making military demands--or, since 1972, tactical demands--on a weapons system, the first criterion is the degree of threat it poses. This applies of course also to the demands made on a main combat tank and was taken into consideration. But with the Leopard 2 tank, more than with other weapons systems, it was possible to use the tanks which had recently been introduced or are at present under development as a point of orientation. For example, the first troop field experiences with the Leopard I as well as findings from the German-American combat tank 70 development were available. An additional advantage was the fact that--building on the Leopard I in the so-called experimental development--components were further developed nationally, the result of which promised technological possibilities.

Findings

When military demands made on the Leopard 2 tank were finalized in 1970/71, the main tank in the Warsaw Pact states was the T-62 which had caused a stir when it first appeared, especially because of its 115 mm smooth-bore cannon. It was followed by another improved tank known as the T-64/72.

The Leopard 1 tank, with which experiences could be gathered in the field since 1965, confirmed expectations. A weapons system in which firing power, mobility and protection are coordinated--it was ahead of its time technologically. This applies especially to its mobility. In spite of this, further improvements were made in some areas.

Firing power could be improved with a new main weapon and appropriate ammunition; basic speed and maneuverability, especially in difficult terrain, could be improved, i.e. an increase in power reserves would be useful. Regarding protection, it had already been decided to add additional armor to the Leopard 1 and to use a welding turret. This was the result of the finding that increased protection--of course always in balanced proportion to mobility and weight--leads to a better chance for survival.

Both Germans and Americans learned much from the joint development of the combat tank 70. This development, which was ceased in 1970 for various reasons, is described elsewhere. Joint German/American demands on a combat tank,

which had been worked out in the mid-1960's, were the basis for this development. Very high demands were placed on the combat tank 70, which was to be equipped with a combination weapon (cannon-rockets): Based on the armament, the probability of hitting the target on the first round--both from a stationary position and while in motion, both in daytime and at night--as well as high mobility with a suspension system which would adapt to various forms of terrain, were of extreme importance. A 20-mm cannon, independent of the turret, was planned as secondary armament. Good armor and nuclear protection were a matter of course.

I cite only a few areas in order to show what sort of task had to be solved by the engineering teams of both nations. No matter how one looks at things, one must be filled with awe at how these engineers and technicians fulfilled their task. Excellent work was done in all technological areas, and pioneer work was done in many areas. This development had a decisive influence on our Leopard 2 tank for a different reason, however: We have recognized where the limits for the user are. Technology has shown what is possible and the soldier was able to notice that sometimes "less" is more. This has nothing to do with the fact that the technical achievements did not maintain full recognition. One of the reasons was that they had been achieved based on military requirements.

These briefly described experiences have now been taken into consideration when establishing military requirements for the Leopard 2. In concrete terms this means that after the tank 70 development was stopped, the high requirements which had been made on this tank were revised and became the initial basis for the national Leopard 2 tank development.

Without going into details, let us merely refer to those areas which were changed nationally from those requirements on the combat tank 70 or, one might say, where reductions were made, based on previous experiences.

Considering the difference in armament--combination weapon for combat tank 70, cannon for Leopard 2--in particular the requirements for the range of the main weapon were adapted to the capabilities of a cannon. Regarding the probability of hitting the target with the first round from a stationary position and while in motion, a differentiation was made between the gunner and the tank commander. Regarding mobility, adaptability to various terrain was relinquished; also, a self-stabilized 20 mm cannon which was independent of the turret was no longer required. While the change in requirements on the main weapon was due to the nature of the weapon, abandoning the latter requirements is due to the fact that the necessary additional costs were in no proportion to the possible increase in performance.

We are deliberately foregoing a detailed discussion of all requirements here. The areas discussed here are only to serve as examples.

Fulfilling the Demands

Now the demands--which were still very high in spite of the knowledge gained--were to be realized in the Leopard 2.

Fire Power

The 120-mm smooth-bore cannon, a result of national component research/experimental research, became the Leopard 2 tank's main weapon. Great penetration power is achieved even over great distances by using oversized, fin-stabilized projectiles, and further improvements are possible here. The demand for a second type of armor-piercing ammunition was met with the multipurpose ammunition on HL basis because of the 120-mm caliber. (However, this second requirement was more significant earlier, when one had to depend only on APDS projectiles as dynamic projectiles. It is possible that in the future there will be changes regarding this second type of ammunition.) It was also hoped that a greater tube rigidity could be achieved with the 120-mm barrel.

The good weapons and ammunition performance had to be combined with a filed-out fire guidance system in order to reach the desired probability of hitting. As described above, this was attempted by adding an optical telemeter with laser for the gunner and a self-stabilized sight for the commander. There are two reasons for this: The fire guidance system for the Leopard 1 was to be reloadable; and at that time it was believed that optical control of laser telemeters (multiple echo) was necessary.

Weight problems forced the elimination of the optical telemeter with wide base and thus led to a new fire guidance system. Ultimately the present guidance system was chosen. (Individual steps in the development are described elsewhere.)

The combination of the fire guidance system, the 120-mm weapon and the appropriate ammunition results in first hit performances--both from a stationary position and in motion--which meet present and even future demands.

Mobility

All mobility requirements are fully met. A large volume, 1,500 horse power engine with fully automatic gears and drive assembly based on the latest technological findings, along with an optimal suspension system, give the Leopard 2 high speed, very good maneuverability (even in extremely difficult terrain), great top speed and stability which can hardly be surpassed. Because this performance is more than satisfactory, no greater demands will be made on mobility even in the future, because there are limits as far as both ergonomy and tactical deployment are concerned.

Armored Protection

In contrast to the other areas, requirements for armored protection were even increased during the course of development. This was possible because technological progress in the area of armor was made at that time--the development of this was parallel to planning phase 3 of the tank--when the Leopard 2 was changed over to a new turret with different fire guidance system, primarily because of weight problems. The following question emerged: Either weight reduction without special modern armor, or accept increased weight (reaching

the MLC 60) by accepting the new protective components and thus improve protection to a degree which had not been thought possible until then?

Immediate investigations showed that the change-over from the MLC 50 to the MLC 60 meant some limitations, but that the marked improvement in armored protection justified certain limitations due to increased weight. The Leopard 2 thus received protection against KE as well as against HL ammunition which had not been attained until then.

If a temperature-entropy diagram is integrated in the fire guidance system in the second production of the Leopard 2, then the most recent technology will be used in this area also. This will make it possible to achieve the same hit results at the same distances even in poor visibility and at night. It can simultaneously be expected that discovery times could be reduced, which would further increase the tank's value in combat. The decisive factor is not reduced reaction time--as has often been assumed--but rather reduced discovery time.

Delivery of the First Tanks to the Troops

The fact that new technological findings--which of course often meant considerable technical changes--could be considered continuously during Leopard 2 development had of course also some disadvantages. The plans for basic materials used could not keep up with these modifications, although everyone involved used everything possible to keep bottlenecks at a minimum. Everyone responsible is making the effort to limit the measures allowed for transition during the introduction of the Leopard 2 step by step, through full supply capacity. It will be decisive in the next few years to gain full control of this weapons system through good training, in order to be able to fully utilize the technical performance this tank is capable of. The effort to recognize possible weak points early and thus to eliminate them immediately must continue. This can improve its reliability and its availability which is especially important in so complex a weapons system. Since an increase in the technical performance in individual areas of the combat tank can hardly be expected in the future, continuous improvement in its availability may possibly be the best way to increase its value for combat.

9328
CSO: 3103

ONLY FORTY-ONE PERCENT VOTE IN UNIVERSITY STUDENT ELECTIONS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 6 Nov 80 p 10

[Article: "Sleepers Won in University Elections"]

[Text] The percentage of people voting in this fall's student elections dropped off by 10 percent. The percentage of voters in the country's seven universities was approximately 41 percent.

The nonaligned factions did not increase their support in the representational elections on Monday and Tuesday. The general trend, instead, seemed to be that the political organizations increased the number of votes.

According to the Finnish University Student Union (SYL) it is, however, difficult to evaluate the results of the elections since many different types of factions were included in the elections.

The bourgeois factions increased the number of seats in the representations elected this fall. Among the leftwing groups the Social Democrats also did reasonably well. The nonaligned factions did the best in Kuopio and Turku.

The highest percentage of votes recorded was at the Lapland College in Rovaniemi where 84.8 percent of those eligible to vote voted.

The bottom of the wave was in Jyvaskyla where only 28.4 percent of those eligible to vote went to the polls.

Summary of Seven University Student Bodies

Voting percentage 40.3, number of eligible voters 15,937, number voting 6,415

	Ehdokkaita 1			Ääniä 2			%-osuus 3			Paikkoja 4		
	1979	1980	-/+	1979	1980	-/+	1979	1980	-/+	1979	1980	-/+
Sosialistinen opiskelijaliitto (SOL) 5	120	68	-41	946	804	-131	13,6	13,6	+0,4	20	20	-0
Riippumattomat demokraatit / vasemmisto 6	3	-	- 3	31	-	31	0,4	-	-0,4	1	-	-1
Kansandemokraattinen opiskelijajärjestö (KOJ) 7	68	51	-17	637	340	-297	9,2	5,8	-3,4	9	4	-5
Sosialidemokraattinen opiskelijaseurat hankkeessa (SONK) 8	100	88	-12	765	709	- 56	10,9	11,1	+1,1	12	22	+4
Liberaalinen opiskelijaliitto (LOL) 9	68	39	-17	389	316	- 73	5,6	5,1	-0,5	6	6	0
Keskustan opiskelijaliitto (KOL) 10	170	139	-31	1 282	1 191	- 91	18,4	20,4	+1,9	29	32	+3
Mitenaliitto 11	13	13	- 3	120	80	- 40	1,8	1,3	-0,5	1	1	-1
Kristilliset 12	13	15	+2	280	393	+113	3,2	5,8	+2,6	4	7	+3
Konservatiivinen opiskelijaliitto Tuhatkunta (TYK) 13	191	177	-14	1 189	1 088	-101	19,3	18,9	+0,7	33	32	+1
Sitoutumattomat ja oikeistososialistit / oikeistoliitot 14	18	10	- 8	133	94	- 39	1,9	1,5	-0,1	1	1	-1
Perustuslailliset ja vapaa oikeisto 15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Muut 16	28	16	-12	1 002	645	-357	12,4	10,3	-2,3	17	10	-7

Key:

1. Candidates
2. Votes
3. Percentage
4. Positions
5. Socialist Students League
6. Independent democrats/independent leftwing
7. Peoples Democratic Students Organization
8. Association of Social Democratic Student Youth
9. Liberal Students League
10. Student League of the Center Party
11. Mittenforbundet
12. Christian League Students
13. Conservative Students League, Tuhatkunta
14. Nonaligned and independent nonsocialist/rightwing students
15. Constitutionalists and free rightwing
16. Others

10576
CSO: 3107

COMMUNISTS ARE BIGGEST LOSERS IN UNIVERSITY STUDENT VOTE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 5 Nov 80 p 13

> [Text] The voting percentage in the student election at the Social and Communal College was barely 66 percent, which is about 8 percent lower than for the election last year. The result of the election indicates that the communists have lost, but it is impossible to say in how many seats the communists joined in coalition with other parties.

In the election the Crapula group, which consists of feminists, christian communists, and anarchists, won eight seats. Crapula is new this year. The main alternative (Swedish People's Party, conservatives, and moderates) holds two seats, and that is the same as last year. Young socialists (social democrats) got two seats, as they did last year. The center lost one seat and now has seven seats. The library line, which is also a new unaligned group and center oriented, got two seats.

Last year the communists won seven seats, and the feminists, who then had their own group, one seat.

Low Voting Percent

The interest in the election of delegates for the Finnish Student Union was quite low, as the voting percentage was only 41. The election result from the seven colleges where the election was held was not clear on Tuesday evening, but it could be seen that the advance of the unaligned groups has stopped, and that the clearly political alliance has increased its support.

In the Finnish Student Union they say that it is very difficult to draw definite lines from the election because so many groups are running.

The voting percentage has sunk by ten percent from the last election.

9287
CSO: 3109

HIGHLY COMPETITIVE STEEL INDUSTRY EXPANDING

Oslo NORWEGIAN JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND SHIPPING in English 13 Nov 80 p 30

[Text]

The Finnish steel industry is highly competitive in spite of a slump in the market and difficulties within traditional purchasing groups. This is partly due to a national and private speculation which started in the 60's and gave the Finns a head start technically in the international industry, and nobody has managed to catch up with them since. Also the Finns make good use of a well organized market within the COMECON area.

The Finnish authorities have since the 60's cooperated with the steel industry in expanding a steel production in the plate and thread sector etc. to meet the needs of their yards and strengthen export to other areas. The structure of the production was altered so that the producers of steel did not compete against each other. Thus Rautaruukki Oy has charge of plate production and sheet production, Ovako Oy deals with thread production, whilst responsibility for the stainless steel production rests with Outokumpu Oy.

The technical production processes, including a new method of founding a string founding process, gave the Finns a head start on their competitors. 85,7 per cent of Finnish production use this method of casting whilst in comparison the Japanese figures for the same method lie at 46.2 per cent, Western Germany at 38.0 per cent, Swedem at 36.1 per cent and Great Britain at 15.5 per cent. It is this technical advance which makes the Finns som competititive in a difficult market.

CSO: 3120

GROUND FORCES CHIEF EXPRESSES VIEWS

Paris TERRE INFORMATION in French Oct 80 p 8

[Interview with General Delaunay, ground forces chief of staff; place and date not given]

[Text] TERRE INFORMATION: You have been in military service since 1943 and were a cavalry sergeant before entering the Coetquiden [military training camp]; you served in France, Indochina, North Africa and Germany, in regiments, on general staffs and in schools. (You have commanded the 8th Hussars Regiment, the 10th Brigade and the EAABC [expansion unknown].)

What have been the most noteworthy moments of your career?

General Delaunay: I am tempted to reply that periods of operations and commands have been the moments I have experienced most intensely because I was also the chief; that is why I chose this career.

On second thought, I will have to qualify this reaction. My entire military life has been exciting because of its variety. I have attempted with good humor to accommodate to the quick changes in my situation and to take what was good in the circumstances of the moment.

I have attempted to apply one of my favorite sayings to myself: "Responsibilities are what bring all ranks together." (without, however, wiping out their differences)

In short, I have tried to make each day a strong point, and I recommend this philosophy: every moment of military life is exciting when one loves his job.

TI: In a more personal way, what place do you give to your job and to your family life?

Gen D: For me, a happy family life is one of the factors in my equilibrium. Therefore, I try not to sacrifice it. Up to now, I have rarely worked at home in the evening and during the weekends.

That said, my wife and I have deliberately agreed to somewhat sacrifice the continuity of our children's studies by making them move with us at every transfer. This choice at least has had the advantage of keeping them in our nomadic family nucleus. I think I can say that they are happy. For us, human equilibrium has been more

important than studies per se. Too many parents seem to us to place too much value on diplomas at the expense of the "Happiness Capital" which children should accumulate in the home.

TI: Have you any "hobbies," any pastimes?

Gen D: Yes, of course. That is also necessary for my equilibrium. I need physical activity, and I still jog in short workouts of 6 to 8 km every day. I ride horseback, and I recently took up bicycle riding. In the summer, I spend my vacations in the Annecy region, in the medium-height mountains.

What is more, I have always had a veritable mania for reading, history mainly. Finally, every day I take a little time for meditation, while walking, while gardening or sitting peacefully before leaving the house.

TI: You have always exercised your command of men in a very direct manner. Is this still possible in your new job?

Gen D: Following the precepts of my old masters in military wisdom, I am going to try not "to do," not "to allow to be done" but to "have all done" with respect for channels, I mean by arranging to have each command [handle its own affairs], without intrusiveness or laxity. However, I will make "contact with those in the ranks" to see whether my message is getting across. Finally, I will engage extensively in dialogue to resolve the important problems of the ground army.

TI: What do you think about the young men who are taking up the military as a career?

Gen D: I am well acquainted with them since I was with them for 4 years in Saumur and as chief of the School Command. They are as good as those of my generation. Doubtless they are more reflective and open with regard to the world. They are not as strong in history and spelling but are better in mathematics. A general no longer is so intimidating to them, and they talk more freely with him. They are a bit of a problem to their superiors but are completely devoted to their mission. In short, they get the job done.

TI: Quite recently, the ground army disseminated a brochure on the exercise of command in the ground army. Do you subscribe to its contents?

Gen D: Of course I subscribe to its contents. It should become the Bible of every military cadre who should adapt it concretely to his rank and personality. I will personally assure that the cadres have read it, understood it and, above all, have made it part of their daily life, particularly by knowing how to really communicate with their men, which for me is the ABC's of command...

TI: General Lagarde has profoundly changed the ground army. As you replace him, what, in your opinion, are our strong points and what points require improvement?

Gen D: General Lagarde has indeed "shaken up" the ground army, structures, methods and spirit. Noteworthy progress has been made; however, his reforms and his efforts have not yet produced all their positive results; and we must continue to work along the lines that he has initiated: information, harmonization of activities, participative instruction, economies, etc.

What is more, and account taken of the international situation, I will put combat readiness in the number one position of my concerns with, priority of priorities, for the assault units and firepower.

In conclusion, I will follow the directions laid down by my predecessor, particularly all his directives. However, for a few months, I will gather information and see how the ground army works and lives. I do not want to slow down its forward movement; however, I will try to give it even more confidence and place more emphasis on training in the smaller units.

8143
CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

NEW ANTITANK GRENADE--The Model F1/58-mm antitank rifle grenade with a "ball trap" has just been adopted by the ground army. This grenade which is designed for flat-trajectory launching with the FAMAS 5.56 F1 will progressively replace the AC 65 under the same conditions of use, beginning in 1982. The AC 58 PAB F1 has a new shape and the following characteristics: its weight will not exceed 500 grams; it will have a function indicator which replaces the classical security catch; the "ball trap" permits its launching with combat ball ammunition. The "ball trap" is a metal plate placed in the tail end of the grenade which is designed to prevent the shattering of the grenade body by the ball of the launching cartridge. [Text] [Paris TERRE INFORMATION in French Oct 80 p 3] 8143

MINE-LAYING VEHICLE--A new piece of equipment is making its appearance in the Engineering regiments: the precision [ponctuel] Mle F1 mine-laying vehicle. Built by the Matenin Company, this mine-layer has been adopted after testing by the 3d Engineering Regiment. Operated by a two-man crew, the mine-layer is capable of laying 500 mines per hour at the three customary depths in poor visibility. The mine-laying mechanism is carried on a 180 horsepower chassis identical with that of the Mle F1 light excavator. Fed by an automatic system, the mine-layer is designed to permit resupply by means of a TRM 9000 truck equipped with a hydraulic handling arm placed behind the cab. The first assembly line mine-laying vehicle was delivered in April 1980, and the entire fleet is to be placed in service between now and 1983. [Text] [Paris TERRE INFORMATION in French Oct 80 p 7] 8143

INFLATABLE RUBBER BOAT--The first 500 Mle F3 inflatable rubber boats are being placed in service in the regiments. Designed for the crossing of waterways by foot troops, this all-service piece of equipment will replace the F1 and F2 models now in service. Based on a commercial product, this piece of equipment, which is made of neoprene-hypalon and has a light metal alloy footboard and an inflatable hull, can be made operational in 10 minutes by two men during the daytime. Its carrying capacity is 750 kg, and it can be fitted with an outboard motor with a maximum power of 10 hp. The boat has been selected for testing by the 3d and 6th Engineering Regiments. [Text] [Paris TERRE INFORMATION in French Oct 80 p 7] 8143

CSO: 3100

AIR INDUSTRY INSTALLATIONS DESCRIBED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 23 Oct 80 p 9

/Text/ It is practically impossible to give in a short article a complete picture of the area installations and technological equipment of the Greek Air Industry /EAV/ complex at Tanagra. As a whole, it is an impressive complex where the modern spirit of construction and development of work areas "meets" the advanced technology and the methods of its practical application--a complex whose "Swiss watch-like" operational accuracy does not at all give the impression that it is just in its first year of operation.



View of the EAV installations in Tanagra of Voiotia

The EAV development falls within the broad spectrum of our defense industry possibilities. But the specific aspect of the "reasoning" for its establishment is defined by the effort to achieve a double objective:

a. To meet the needs for local support of the national air industry (repair and construction needs of both the air force and civil aviation).

b. To establish a technological independence in the country's defensive ability (development of industrial activity in the air space area--an activity which will result in economic, foreign exchange, and technological benefits to the country and its national economy).

Project of National Need

The establishment of the EAV complex is considered a project of national need--an acquisition for the Greek economy and for the defensive infrastructure of the country. At the same time, it contributes to the expansion of activities in a field of high technology with international goals and prospects.

For completing the project which was finished in 2 years (1977-1979) foreign specialised firms were hired to assist in the construction, outfitting, and initial management of the complex in which a total of 320 million dollars was invested. Today the complex operates as a corporation and has a share capital of 1.75 billion drachmas (88 percent is owned by the state and 12 percent by the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank). It is administered by a nine-member administrative council presided over by Iason Stratos.

Productive Units

The EAV industrial complex, built on a site of 1,800 stremmas, has a sheltered area of 90,000 square meters and consists of four independent productive units:

a. Aircraft Workshop: It includes one small hangar and a large one designed to accommodate the modern giant Jumbo B-747 aircraft and the A-300 airbus.

b. Engine Workshop: In the main workshop, 4th echelon repairs are made on any type of engine used in Greece while the test unit provides possibilities for the simultaneous electronic testing of three engines of up to 30,000 pounds of power.

c. Accessories Workshop: It includes 33 separate workshops and installations for processing various types of parts and materials (shops for: sheet metal; tool making; heat treatment of plastic-wood materials; [word missing--calibration?] of instruments; electric systems, and so on).

d. Electronics Workshop: It includes 18 separate workshops for repairing aircraft electronic equipment and ground-to-air [missiles]. It also has other units (of telecommunication equipment, radar, guided missiles, gyroscope systems, accelerometers and inertia systems).

These units are unique in the world in that they form a complex of such size that repairs and maintenance work on any type of air materiel can be done under one roof.

EAV employs 2,350 persons and has a broad program of training its personnel. Already 900 technicians have been trained while 400 others are being trained within the context of this program.

Periodic maintenance of Air Force Phantoms. EAV is in a position to carry out 4th echelon maintenance on 24 different types of aircraft.

Objectives--Prospects

As mentioned earlier, the EAV primary objective has been to become self-sufficient in supporting the national air materiel. This objective has already been achieved.

When achieved, the second objective which concerns the successful EAV presence in the international area will ensure the ability of the complex to operate efficiently and economically inasmuch as the country's wartime and civil aviation needs cover only part of the increased EAV productive capacity.

As a first step, EAV will take advantage of the obligations it has undertaken for securing offset work assumed by foreign firms which supplied the Greek state and the Olympic Airlines with air materiel.

At the same time, efforts have been initiated to get more work in the international area where EAV has already made its presence known by participating in the Paris Air Exhibition and the Farboro [transliteration] Aeronautical Exhibition. Its presence was purely competitive in seeking contract work on equal terms. An ultimate EAV objective is the plan to extend its activities in the area of air manufacturing. Already the Ministry of Defense has announced plans for the construction of a training aircraft while it considers the possibility of constructing part of the F-27 aircraft of the Netherlands Fokker Company.

Assembling and tuning up a J-79 engine following general overhauling in the engine unit.

In the outlook for successful EAV participation in the international and particularly the Middle East and Africa areas the fact is also favorably considered that Greece, because of its geopolitical location and its traditional friendship with the countries in these areas, constitutes a pole of attraction and therefore becomes a target of interest.

Modern Equipment

EAV's equipment and means of quality control are among the best in the world. The finest safety specifications are also applied to the simplest of jobs. Since its complex is so planned as to be in a position to double its installations (a fact which means that its capacity can be more than tripled) one may conclude that EAV will soon play an effective role in the international air market.

Today, EAV is in a position to serve 24 types of aircrafts and 21 types of engines--a fact which allows it and compels it as well to expand into the international market. It is for this reason that it is trying to get certificates of recognized qualitative reliability and authenticity from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the British Civil Aviation Authority, and the French Bureau Veritas. Already it has been awarded by the Greek Civil Aviation Service with such a certificate of qualitative reliability on 20 May 1980. This certificate allows it to undertake repairs of civil aircraft also and mainly aircraft of the country's national airlines (Olympic Airlines).

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PROJECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF TRAFFIC CONDITIONS PLANNED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "Cloverleaves, Downtown Bypass, New Signals, Garage and Improvement of Communications"]

[Text] A determination of the priority of works of special interest to the inhabitants of the capital was made yesterday during a conference of a technical committee chaired by Prime Minister G. Rallis and composed of the following ministers: Messrs. G. Panagiotopoulos, Communications; T. Tsanetakis, Public Works; G. Plytas, Regional Planning and Development; St. Manos, Industry and Energy and Deputy Minister of Coordination, G. Souflias.

These works, in addition to substantially relieving traffic conditions, will assure a substantial savings in fuel.

Included in these works are:

The construction of seven additional multilevel cloverleaves at sites along Kifissos Avenue where it intersects with Lenorman Ave., Iera Odos, and P. Ralli, as well as at Thivon-P. Ralli, Tatoiou-ISAP [ISAP: Athens-Pizaeus Electric Railways], Skhistou-Skaramanga and Dodekanisou-Vasilissis Sofias in Piraeus.

The bypass Alimou-Karea-Papagou which will be opened to traffic at the end of 1981 and will connect the northern to the eastern suburbs.

Special traffic coordination for the purpose of bypassing the downtown area. To this end, identifying signs, appropriate informative and guiding boards will be installed (during 1981); the right of way at intersections will be secured; the parking of private automobiles will be prohibited and the paving and layout of roads will be improved. Along the length of the downtown bypass, 17 of the 32 single-level cloverleaves are being reconstructed. In addition, three new level crossings will be created on Kimonos, Elasidon and Diomidou Streets where they intersect Constandinoupoleos Ave.

New improved programs of traffic signalling at approximately 100 intersections and a new coordination of traffic lights (green phase) along Mesogeion, Vouliagmenis, Piraeus, Poseidonos Ave., P. Ralli and Kromovitou-Angkhialou arteries. These programs will become operative within the year, until the installation of an electronic computer, the work on which will begin in the summer of 1981 and will be completed in approximately 18 months.

The construction of garages with a combined capacity of 8,150 parking spaces whose location will be connected with terminals of especially scheduled buses while at the same time there will be an increase of legal parking spaces on central streets of Athens and Pireaus and parking meters will be installed on 36 streets in downtown Athens. It was taken into consideration that proceedings have already begun for the construction of garages at Mitropoleos and Kotzia Squares, on Rigillis St., in Plaka, Kypseli and on Lycavittos.

Mr. Plytas explained that as long as the municipalities wish it, the Ministry of Regional Planning and Development will provide technical aid for municipal garages under open public areas or on municipal lots. The funds for the building of these garages will come from the income of the proceeds of public parking spaces and the fines for illegal parking. Similar financial and city planning incentives will be made available for the building of garages by private individuals.

The improvement of public transportation with rolling stock, parking and maintenance lots and the awareness of the travelling public. Regarding the rolling stock, Mr. Panagiotopoulos reported that, in addition to the 500 buses and 124 trolleys which have already been put in service, delivery will begin during the month of December of a total of 700 new buses together with 100 articulated buses for the needs of the EAS [Greek Urban Transportation] and 60 green buses to assist the ISAP operation.

Thus, during 1981 all old buses will have been replaced with new, up-to-date means of mass transportation.

In the meantime, bids were let out abroad for the procurement of 60 cars to improve the services of the Electric Railroad.

Purchase Of 60 New Trolleys Approved--Strong Objections by Communications Experts

The Administrative Council of the Urban Communications Organization (OAS) approved the purchase of 60 new trolleys during 1981, thus ratifying the ILPAP [Electric-Powered Buses of the Athens-Piraeus Area] Project. This project has already been sent to the Ministry of Coordination.

As of yesterday, the decision to purchase new trolleys has raised strong objections by communications experts and by officials of the Ministry of Communications who demonstrated with facts that the strain imposed by the trolleys on the flow of traffic is too great while their contribution in the fight against pollution is minimal. Even when, as is rumored, all combustion-engine buses are taken out of circulation and replaced by trolleys, the problem will remain because the pollution is caused by the lead in the gas used by private automobiles and by factories. They also maintain that the trolleys are difficult to maneuver in the downtown area as demonstrated by the fact that at the rail switches they must proceed at a speed of 6-7 kms.

Green Areas Created

Included among the works which were given priority is the creation of green areas. In this instance, the Ministry of Agriculture has jurisdiction over green areas outside the city, while the Ministry of Regional Planning and Development promotes the conversion of tracts of green areas into groves (located within the city) to be

turned over to municipalities and townships for further use. The Ministry of Agriculture continues the reforestation program and the regeneration of the green areas outside the city limits, while the Ministry of Regional Planning and Development will support, as much as possible, the municipalities (especially on the western side of the Basin) in the development of squares as well as other locations into playgrounds, walks, etc.

For this purpose it was decided to acquire the Agios Ierotheos public land tract in Peristeri; to acquire a tract of land located at Palataki near Khaidari and the improvement of the Khalandri Creek.

At the same time the development and improvement of green areas in the capital will proceed as follows:

a. Akropolis - Filopapou - Pnika - Asteroskopeion, Asyrmatos for a total of 400 stremmas.

b. Akadimias Platonos grove (130 Stremmas) and the building of Plato's library.

c. Lykavittos - Skhisti Petra 375 stremmas

d. Syngrou (Kouponia) 150 stremmas

e. Polygono (Military Academy) 90 stremmas

f. Agios Ionnis Vouliagmenis (Prisons) 10 stremmas

g. Strefi Hill

h. Kolonos Hill

i. Koilis Hill in Petralona

Additionally, the development of the Faliron Beach will be within the framework of the regulatory plan in order to create recreational and sports areas. Finally, financed by the Ministry of Regional Planning and Development and with the work to be performed by the Municipality of Athens, the following squares will be built:

a. Metamorfoseos Square in Kypseli

b. Krymnitsas Square in Erythros

c. Ods Paparouni - Palouvioti streets Square in Tourkovounia

d. Elikonos Green - Tropaion - Aetorakhis in Ano Kypseli

e. Savaginon Square - Lioupoleos - Profiti Ilia in Patissia

f. Publicly used lot on Longinou St. in the area of the First Cemetery

g. Distoritou - Karapanagiotou Grove in Tourkovounia

h. Arakhnaion Square in Tourkovounia

i. Vikela Kourtidou Square in Patissia

FIVE-YEAR TECHNICAL-VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM ANNOUNCED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 30 Oct 80 pp 1, 3

/Article by V. Angelikopoulos/

/Text/ The objective of the broad-scale measures the government announced yesterday is to complete and to decisively promote the Technical-Vocation Education /TEE/. These measures include: obtaining credits (14 billion drachmas) for the implementation of the 5-year TEE development program upon completion of which the building and laboratory facilities of 16 Higher Technical-Vocational Education Centers /KATEE/ will start operating; safeguarding the professional rights of all TEE school graduates; establishing of new types of schools; and hiring by public enterprises, banks, and so forth, of outstanding graduates without examinations. These measures were discussed and finalized during recent meetings under the chairmanship of Premier G. Rallis. The last of these meetings took place yesterday morning following which Education Minister A. Taliadouras and Deputy Ministers V. Kondogiannopoulos and N. Kaltesiotis announced the measures.

According to the new 5-year program the Ministry of Education adopted for TEE, by 1985 all KATEE and Vocational-Technical Education Centers /KETE/ (centers which include Technical-Vocational Lyceums /TEL/ and Intermediate Technical-Vocational Schools of "new type") now in operation or to be functioning by then will have their own /school/ buildings and complete laboratory installations.

Today only 5 of the 10 KATEE in existence are housed in their own buildings. Six more will be in operation by 1985 (in Khalkis, Kalamata, Mesolongi, Lamia, Ipeiros, and Thraki). All will have their own buildings. A total of 13,000 students will be admitted in all 16 KATEE schools compared to 8,500 students admitted in 1980 to the 10 such schools.

As concerns KETE, there operate today 120 KETE schools of which only 39 are housed in their own school buildings while the buildings for the other 22 are under construction. All KETE including the additional seven to be established will have their own school buildings by 1985.

This school year (1980-81) 26,000 students have registered in the 120 KETE (17,000 in TEL and 9,000 in the "new type" schools). It is anticipated that 55,000 students will be attending the 127 KETE. Already, the TEL first grade number of students increased by 28 percent this year, while under the new measure for

transferring from the general lyceums to the technical schools and vice versa, 2,000 students have transferred to TEL from general lyceums and only 13 have done the reverse. Overall, the TEL student potential throughout the country has increased by 24 percent.

For the implementation of the 5-year program, 13.84 billion drachmas will be spent and this amount will be provided by the following: National Bank, 3.5 billion; EEC Regional Fund, 2.2 billion; Public Investments Program, about 8 billion. These amounts will be spent as follows during the 5-year period: 2 billion in 1981 (or three times the amount to be spent this year--670 million); 2.7 billion in 1982; 3.2 billion in 1983 and 1984; and 2.74 billion in 1985. The amount of 13.84 billion drachmas will be spent for the following projects: 700 million for the purchase of lots for 12 KETE; 1.3 billion for completion of the school buildings for 22 KETE; 8.62 billion for the 66 new KETE buildings, and 3.22 billion for 11 KATEE buildings. An additional amount of 200 million drachmas will be spent for Student Homes which will start operating as of 1 January in the Salonica, Larisa, Patrai, and Irakleion KATEE.

Teachers and Textbooks

As of February 1981, a new program of accelerated training for the teachers of all intermediate TEE branches will start at the School for Teachers in Trades and Technical Education /SELETE/ in order for them to better carry out their teaching task. At the same time, the program of a 3-month training of KATEE teachers abroad is being strengthened. Also a system is being introduced for advanced training of superior and intermediate TEE teachers in their respective specialties in the area of applied industrial and trade teaching.

In addition: 400 new teachers are being appointed in KATEE and 460 in KETE; 120 new textbooks were published for all TEL classes and specialties and 35 more will be published this year for intermediate technical schools. Thus, with the appointment of new teachers and the publication of the new books the technical-vocational education will function more normally.

Professional Rights

A continuous demand of the concerned (and a basic TEE weakness) was the absence of safeguards for the graduates of technical-vocational schools. It has now been decided to activate the Advisory Council provided by Law 576/1977 and to issue presidential decrees which will safeguard the professional rights of the graduates of all TEE schools. Each presidential decree will refer to each specialty (which it will exhaust vertically, for instance, professional rights of a KATEE electronics technician, those of a TEL electronics technician, and those of a technical-vocational school electronics technician).

It is expected that about 10-12 such decrees will be issued within 1981. For assisting the Advisory Council /in its task/ a secretariat, a work group and subcommittees of the council are being set up in the Ministry of Education.

It was also decided that a percentage of vacancies in public enterprises, organisations and banks should be filled without examinations by outstanding (honor) KATEE and TEL students. /For implementing this decision/ it will be necessary

to enact a special law for public organisations, while for [private] enterprises and banks a decision by their administration will suffice.

For familiarizing more effectively the students in the area of vocational orientation a broad "system of information" will be set up through the use of mobile exhibits which will involve visits to gymnasiums, special broadcasts, published articles, booklets, the permanency of the TEE pavilion in the Salonica Fair and the establishment of a permanent exhibit in Athens.

New Schools

Perhaps the most important points of the new measures concerning TEE are those referring to the "new type" schools which will start operating early next year:

a. Three new intermediate technical education schools will operate on an experimental basis with practical [on-the-job] training of their students in public services or organisations (the theory will be taught in the schools) thus providing the students with the opportunity to be trained directly in specialties which the corresponding enterprises need. As a result, the employment of these trainees will become easier. These students will be paid during their training period.

It has not yet been decided where these ("new type") schools will be established. In any case, they will be in the (Athens) region.

b. An important decision concerns the establishment of a Vocational Training Center [KEK] by productive ministries and Legal Entities of Public Law. During the first phase, such "centers" will be established by the Ministry of Labor (Labor Force Employment Agency), the Merchant Marine Ministry, and the Ministry of Industry (Public Power Corporation).

The studies in these centers will last for a year and young men of 18 and over can register for accelerated vocational training. The possibility of establishing new KEK's will be assigned to the ministries through [the enactment of] a relevant law. The KEK's will offer after-school-hours vocational training; they are not, that is, part of the educational system.

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PCI PROCACCI'S SPEECH AT BERLIN CP CONFERENCE

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 21 Oct 80 pp 24-27

[Speech by Giuliano Procacci: "Imperialism's Present Problems and the New International Order"]

[Text] The PCI has accepted the invitation of the SED to this meeting which can offer a useful occasion for an exchange of opinions and information between communist and workers parties and movements of liberation, in the spirit of the conclusions of the 1976 Berlin Conference. While reaffirming the need for an increasingly broader internationalist solidarity, that meeting affirmed the need to recognize the full independence of every party in determining its own policies. This is an essential element for every party or movement that would effectively represent the real interests of workers and the popular masses of their own country and make a contribution to the liberation movement and to the struggle for progress and socialism.

A meeting such as ours, which sees everyone making his own contribution and which recognizes to each person the right to affirm his own political positions, to describe analyses and judgments concerning the present crisis and the struggles that emerge from it, cannot presuppose theses prepared in advance, nor can it make reference--as in documents which involve other parties--to resolutions, proposals, deliberations of one or more other parties. Thus we believe it is correct that the meeting must not conclude with documents and common statements of opinion which would diminish the usefulness of the variety of contributions and statements that will be published and which will mirror the progress of the debate, including the differences which refer to objective situations and to deliberations of the executive groups of each party.

On the other hand, documents and resolutions would not be consonant with the character of research and study of this conference.

What is for us the preliminary question, even though I refer to it last in this brief introduction, is that we exclude polemics and even more, judgments, that might sound critical or might even condemn parties which, because they were not invited or because they did not come, would not be able to reply or even to describe their positions. Finally, in my view, the spirit and hope of a confrontation and meetings broader than the one that sees us here united, should animate our work.

The increasingly impetuous development of movements of national liberation in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America, following the October Revolution, the defeat of fascism and the Chinese revolution, was and undoubtedly is, the most important historical phenomenon of our century. To be progressives in the 20th century has depended, and therefore depends above all, on the attitude adopted and assumed in regard to this great historical fact: And this is also true of the forces and parties of the workers movement.

In 1909, at the end of his book "Der Weg zur Macht," [The Road to Power], Karl Kautsky, said: "When Marx and Engels wrote the communist party manifesto, they saw only Western Europe as the battlefield of the proletarian revolution. Today the entire world has become that battlefield. Today the battles in the struggle of liberation of working humanity are not fought only on the Spree and on the Seine, but also on the Hudson and on the Mississippi, on the Neva and in the Dardanelles, on the Ganges and on the Huangho... Happy is he who is called to participate in this noble battle and in this magnificent victory!"

Old and New Contradictions

Certainly these are pretty words, but it should realized that the socialism of the Second Internationale, to which Kautsky was an eminent representative, was not capable of fighting this battle because it remained substantially a prisoner of a new Eurocentric reformist conception of the world that prevented it from concretely becoming linked with anticolonialist movements. I believe that the communist party is entitled to the historical merit of having broken with the Eurocentric traditions of the Second Internationale, and that this permitted it to make a great contribution to the process of emancipation and liberation of our century which changed the face of the world. With few exceptions, there has been no battle in this great struggle for liberation--from China to Cuba to Vietnam--in which the communist parties did not play a part or toward which they did not express their active solidarity to the extent to which they were able to understand the original and new characteristics.

However, it is not the habit of the workers movement to indulge in complacency about successes achieved. We know, in fact, that the solution of the old contradictions generates new contradictions and that this poses new tasks for the workers parties and the national movements of liberation. And it is on these new contradictions and on these new tasks that I desire to dwell in this speech.

Anyone who considers the immense geographical area of the nations of the Third World, seems to see a mosaic of independent states in various forms and degrees, large and small, run by different political and social systems. There have been nations that have based their development on a socialist option, others that have substantially adopted a capitalist development model, and still others which follow intermediate roads and attempt a combination between various economic and social systems.

These different choices of domestic policy, while not mechanical, are accompanied by different foreign policy choices. This diversity of situations and development naturally reflects a similar diversity of traditions and historical precedents and above all mirrors the different way in which each of the Third World nations achieved the process of gaining national independence. This general picture could, and perhaps does, change according to the development of the struggle in individual

nations between the forces of progress and those of reaction, but it remains overall a historical fact that is destined to last for a long time.

Even from the point of view of economica development and of national income, differences among peoples of the Third World are considerable. Particularly accentuated are the existing imbalances between the oil-producing nations and those which do not have petroleum or are obliged to import it. A greater integration between the different national economies could contribute to attenuating this imbalance, but it must be considered that such an integration is not being achieved today except to an insignificant measure.

The existence of these political and social differences and of these economic imbalances is not without negative consequences. In fact, it generates a series of frictions and conflicts that contributes to causing a general state of insecurity and instability. Proof of this, among other things, is the fact that in recent years the rearmament race has become increasingly intense and that it has involved, although to different degrees, all the nations of the Third World, thus swallowing enormous sums in unproductive expenditures which could have been channeled toward development. It is also known that some nations of the Third World have atomic arms and that others are hastening to possess them.

By far the most alarming fact is that these weapons do not always remain unused, but that they are employed increasingly. In recent years we have been the spectators of a series of conflicts and local wars, the last of which was that now being fought between Iraq and Iran. These conflicts have had tragic consequences on the populations involved in them. Consider the millions of refugees in a series of Asian and African nations. Furthermore, hot spots of possible new conflicts exist in various other parts of the world.

In a situation of this kind, the national sentiment which the acquisition of independence has legitimately developed and strengthened, risks giving way--as in fact has happened--to orientations and attitudes of a nationalist or chauvinistic type. In turn, the just resentment against imperialist domination to which in the past most nations of the Third World were subjected, and the neocolonialist and multinational exploitation to which they are subjected today, risks being changed into an attitude of indiscriminate hostility toward the entire complex of industrialized nations, including socialist nations, and of leading to a distorted view of international problems, particularly of the great questions of detente and of peace. In certain extreme interpretations, the latter are seen as a plot among the "superpowers" and of the rich and satisfied peoples to the disadvantage of the "damned of the world." All this cannot fail to introduce elements of further deterioration into the overall international situation.

The North-South Dialog

Therefore there exist in the nations of the Third World a series of negative phenomena and tendencies that move in the direction of disintegration, and it would be a mistake to be blind to them or to underestimate their danger. However, it would be even more mistaken to fail to see how these negative tendencies are counterbalanced by others, much more robust and solid, that move in the opposite direction, in the direction of solidarity and economic and political cooperation. These are

based on the awareness that the condition of underdevelopment, largely a heritage of imperialist exploitation, is a fact that is common to all peoples of the Third World, independent of their political and social regime and of the size of national income, and that the struggle to emerge from this condition cannot, if success is desired, be anything but a common struggle. That awareness and that solidarity have found a partial expression in the series of organizations and associations among various nations, whose aim is that of promoting coordinated action for the purpose of safeguarding the economic interests of their associates in the international market. The most notable of these associations undoubtedly is OPEC. However, in this case, as in others, it is a matter of associations that bring together certain nations on the basis of their specific economic interests and which, therefore, are not able to carry out a general representative function. Though in a nonpermanent and noninstitutional way, the Group of 77 tries to carry out such a function. The Group embraces most of the developing nations and in recent years has become an authoritative interlocutor in well-known international negotiations such as the North-South dialog.

The nations belonging to it demand a stabilization of the price of raw materials which they export; that the industrialized nations eliminate, or at least reduce, the protective barriers designed to slow down importation of finished industrial products from the Third World; that measures be taken to reduce the fearful indebtedness of the developing nations to the industrialized nations; and that there be a reform of the system of the large international financial organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund), freeing them from the control of the imperialist circles and the United States. The Group of 77, furthermore, fights for greater economic integration among the developing nations. It is a matter of objectives whose achievement involves a radical revision of the current international division of labor, dominated by the interests of imperialism and of the multinationals. It is not by chance that the totality of these demands constitute what is usually defined as the program of a new international order.

It is evident that such a demanding objective cannot be followed if a relationship not only of economic cooperation, but also of political cooperation, is not established among the nations interested in it. This is the aim of the various regional associations such as the OAU, OAS, the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League. The highest and broadest expression of the desire for political cooperation among the nations of the Third World is represented, however, by the movement of nonalined nations whose membership includes almost all developing nations, regardless, of their social and political nature. Membership in the nonalined nations also includes several socialist nations, and Cuba currently is its president. It is superfluous to recall at this point that, overcoming injuries and conflicts that exist and continue despite everything, this movement has achieved a considerable degree of unity and very important political questions, such as for example, the attitude toward the South African racist regime and toward the annexationist policy of Israel, and how it makes its voice felt with increasing authority and weight in the great international organizations beginning with the United Nations. The most important thing, however, is that, to the extent to which it achieves unity among nations with differing political and social regimes in the struggle for a new international economic order, it constitutes a powerful defense against the destructive tendencies that operate both within its member nations as well as in its overall international relations. The movement of nonalined nations, therefore, constitutes an important factor for detente and peace, and this is its great positive function.

Integration and Cooperation

Thus, the panorama of the Third World is marked by different and contradictory tendencies. Pressures that operate in the direction of disintegration are opposed by pressures that operate in the opposite direction in favor of economic integration and political cooperation. This analysis, however, could not only be incomplete, but not even believeable, if we were not to take into consideration the problem of attitudes of the United States and imperialist circles and the role they play in influencing the situation which has been described and the various tendencies functioning in it. In fact, it is a matter of an essential role. To pose this demand is equivalent to posing the problem of the characteristics and the nature of imperialism today, of changes that have taken place in it, and of those that have not taken place. A serious reply to this question demands from Marxists a dedicated work of research that must be conducted without prejudice and without schematic development. The imperialism of the 1980's, if on one hand it presents elements of continuity with its preceding phases, also presents new aspects not only regarding classical imperialism analyzed by Lenin in his celebrated work of 1916, but also regarding imperialism and neocolonialism in the 1960's. Without pretending to anticipate the results of research that still must be done, nevertheless it seems to me that some points of orientation can be singled out now and submitted for our discussion.

It seems necessary above all to have a preliminary explanation. In recent times in Italy and in other nations of Western Europe, the tendency to produce an extensive and distorted interpretation of the concept of imperialism has made headway to the point of including in it all the manifestations of power politics and spheres of influence. I believe this is a tendentious and arbitrary interpretation and that what is needed instead is to hold firm to the Marxist concept which holds that one of the essential hallmarks of imperialism is the existence of an unequal economic relationship based on capitalist profit, between the nation that practices and the nation that suffers capitalist exploitation, a relationship that in addition has its origin from a past of colonial or semicolonial domination. This distinction between imperialism and power politics is important in several respects. In fact, it produces the consequence that the concept of imperialism can be applied only to those capitalist states which in the past have benefited from colonial exploitation and which in any case now benefit from this unequal relationship. On the other hand, this leads to the fact that there must be a discussion of the policy of power or of spheres of influence concerning acts of this kind that are committed by non-capitalist nations or even socialist nations.

Entering now into the merits of analysis of imperialism, it seems to me that it must be first of all pointed out that the degree of political and cultural influence available to imperialism has been considerably decreased. How distant today seem the years in which one of the major leaders of American ideology--Walt Rostow--published a presumptuous "noncommunist manifesto" in which he suggested a capitalist model of development to newly independent nations. These ambitions and these illusions suffered a harsh blow following the defeat of American aggression in Vietnam, and recent events have brought other bitter disillusionments to their bearers. In Iran, a nation in which the model of capitalist development was fully adopted, there has been a revolution; and South Korea itself, one of the bastions of the multinationals, is shaken by powerful liberation movements. In Latin America, there is increasing

intolerance toward U.S. exploitation and the fight against it is being strengthened with different means that do not merely repeat the plans of the past. Weakened in its foreign relations, imperialism also has been weakened internally. As was demonstrated by the Vietnam war experience, public opinion and not negligible sectors of the political world can in certain circumstances exercise an important leverage on government to achieve more reasonable positions and a policy of detente. This element is very important. It must be taken into account if we do not want to fall into superficial interpretations. Despite the defeats suffered and their diminished influence politically and culturally, the imperialist circles however always preserve considerable power and are able to exercise a determining influence on their respective governments. Not only that, but they now have available, through the large international companies, instruments for economic control and penetration (and not only economic) that are far more complex and refined than in the past. Unlike classical imperialism, for which the Third World nations were only markets from which to import raw materials and to which finished products could be exported, the imperialism of the multinational corporations controls massive investments in some nations of the Third World thus creating production in place and a flow of exports of industrial products to international markets. This is certainly possible thanks to the unscrupulous exploitation of local workers, but it is also diffidult to contest the fact that the productive activity of the multinationals contribute to initiation of a certain type of development even though it is a distorted development. If we examine things more carefully, however, we soon realize that the productive activities of the multinationals are not only limited to restricted areas and politically integrated into the sphere of American influence, but also and above all, that, due to their intrinsic characteristics, they are not able to promote widespread and harmonious development within the nations in which they work, particularly regarding relations between industry and agriculture. Much less are they able to promote processes of economic integration in broader areas and among different nations. The industrial products of the multinationals are in fact not directed to the internal market, and the profits from them are not reinvested in the nation of production except in unimportant ways. The typical areas in which the multinationals operate (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong) thus seem to be enclaves in which an "industrial monoculture" is practiced which in some ways is not unlike the "one-crop agriculture" practiced at one time, and even today, in several Latin American countries.

The Multinationals

Therefore, the imperialism of multinationals prejudices the possibility of real independent development of the areas in which they function, and precludes any possibility of economic integration. It accentuates the isolation of the nations in which it works and in that way also accentuates economic dependency. Because of its characteristics, it not only has no interest in working for a different international division of labor and for a new international economic order, but rather its interest is that no progress be made along this road. It is in this resistance to even partially changing the present organization of the international market and to accepting the needs of a new economic order that the reason should be sought for the profound failure of the strategy of the decade of development for the 1970's and the bogging down of the North-South dialog. The substantial failure of the recent UNCTAD Conference of Manila and of the UNIDO Conference in

New Delhi, and the progress of the recent extraordinary session of the United Nations are the most recent confirmations of the intransigeance with which the multinationals, and the governments of the large imperialist powers influenced by them, oppose the aspirations and demands of the developing peoples.

Fearful of hopes for a greater economic integration among developing nations, and of a change in iniquitous relations now existing between them and the industrialized nations, imperialist circles show that they are equally fearful of hopes for political cooperation expressed in the movement of nonalined nations.

The conlcusion of this analysis are that the logic of imperialism of the 1980's has not given up the criterion of divide and conquer of classical imperialism and neocolonialism, but has only brought it up to date. Even though it has not renounced the use of force and of the club, it preferentially aims at accentuating, on the economic and political planes, those elements of destruction that operate within the nations of the Third World and to discourage, on the other hand, tendencies toward aggregation and solidarity. This logic includes acts, such as the Camp David agreement, directed as they are toward sabotaging political cooperation among the Arab nations and favoring an expansionist Israeli policy and even the policy of the so-called "Chinese card." That is not in fact intended to encourage China in its appropriate effort toward modernization, as it is rather to try to embitter the conflicts existing between China and the USSR, with the risks that this involves for general international relations.

Favoring centrifugal and destructive forces and opposing initiatives and attempts toward building a new international economic order, the imperialist circles do not work to favor detente and peace, but contribute to increasing the dangers and threats that now weigh upon humanity.

In this situation, which presents new and contradictory aspects in the presence of changes in the strategy and tactics of imperialist and multinationalist circles, the problems of the relationship between the workers movement and the national liberation movement is also posed in new terms and it is therefore necessary to undertake a research and analysis effort.

One premise seems to me necessary above all. The parties that are expressions of the workers movement are different and function under different conditions. There are workers parties of the socialist nations that hold power in their own countries. There are communist parties in the capitalist nations. Among these are the Eurocommunists who have developed their own independent strategies of advancement for a socialism adequate to the reality of the nations in which they work, strategies which are based on pluralism. On this basis they decide their own political choices in full independence. There are socialist and social democratic parties which in some countries have the responsibility for government. Finally, there are the socialist and social democratic parties that are not in government, but which represent the majority, or a large part, of the working class in their respective countries. The workers movement overall, with greater or lesser coherence according to its various components, maintains relations with national liberation movements both, as happens in communist parties, in a bilateral form, and as happens in some socialist parties, through international organizations (the Socialist Internationale). In their turn, the national liberation

movements also present different characteristics according to the conditions under which they function. Some of them hold power, others fight to get it. Some identify with the ideals of socialism and the teachings of Marxism, others are inspired by forms of socialism on a national, or even religious, basis and others, finally, are not inspired at all. A case that merits separate mention because of its specificity and its importance is that of the Indian Congress Party. Under these circumstances, to pose the problem of the relationship between the workers movements and liberation movements, taken together, evidently cannot mean following the plan of an organizational unity and trying to develop a common program. Much less, does it envision a leadership and an organizational center. There are too many differences among the traditions, the ideological inspirations and political orientations of various parties and movements which should flow into this common front. There are too many legitimate special interests. It must above all be kept in mind that the parties which have responsibility for government are naturally induced to focus on what they consider, rightly or wrongly, to be the interests of the nation they lead or govern, particularly when it is a matter of a large power, and that these interests can not always be reconciled, but rather can enter into conflict with the aspirations of individual national movements. This is also true of socialist nations.

The New Internationalism

Does this mean to say that only bilateral relations are possible among the various workers parties and national liberation movements? Certainly the latter represent an essential element and as regards the communist party, they, as they have done in the past, must continue to support the progressive forces that work in the various nations along this road, developing and strengthening their relations on the basis of full respect for the independence of the various national movements and renouncing any paternalistic or pedagogical attitude.

From the analysis made thus far, it appears, however, that even on the broad themes there exists the possibility of broader convergences both among the various workers parties of industrialized nations and the national liberation movements, and, finally, between the former and the latter. This convergence can also be extended to movements that are different in character and nature. I am thinking, in the first place, of Catholic movements which function in various nations of Europe and Latin America and which in various cases have developed a considerable degree of anti-imperialist consciousness. The possibility of these convergences, granted the independence of the individual parties and their right to establish bilateral relations, can in my opinion, derive from the recognition that it is in the common interest of all workers parties and all movements of national liberation to oppose the centrifugal and destructive forces that function in the Third World and perturb the system of international relations to the advantage of imperialist circles, and, on the other hand, to encourage the forces that go in the direction of aggregation and economic and political cooperation in the interests of detente, disarmament and peace. This means specifically that there is a common interest in maintaining the requirements and demands of advanced developing nations in the expectation of a new international economic order and to support, as a consequence, the movement of the nonalined nations which is the most authoritative expression of those requirements. The final objective is rather that of a real political cooperation between the overall workers movement and the movement of nonalined nations. It is above

all to this that the PCI refers when it speaks of a "new internationalism." However, this means that all parties have obligations and precise commitments, first of all that of respecting the unity and independence of movements of nonalined nations, to abstain from any attempt to harm unity, to limit that independence and to give up any interpretation of nonalinement as a movement that constitutes a kind of milestone on the way to a future "alinement." This means that even the bilateral relations established between single parties--especially when they have the responsibility for government--and the single national liberation movements, must not depart from the general principle of respect for unity and independence of the nonalined movement and of its individual members and must rigorously respect the principles of self-determination, noninterference in the affairs of other nations, and nonexportation of counterrevolution and revolution.

It is not admissible to try to "aline" any nonalined nation in any way whatever, either through political and economic pressure, or, with greater reason, through military intervention. It is on the basis of these considerations and these principles that during its 15th congress, our party took the well-known positions on the intervention of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and on the Chinese punitive expedition in Vietnam. Also well-known, and here we reconfirm it, is the position of condemnation of Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan and our demand for withdrawal of occupation troops within the framework of a political solution that would guarantee the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan and the security of bordering nations.

The objective of political cooperation between workers movements and movements of nonalined nations does not, however, involve only obligations of a negative nature, of things, that is, that must not be done, but also obligations of a positive character, that is, of things that must be done.

The principal and most comprehensive of these commitments is naturally that of greater involvement, especially for the parties that have responsibilities for government, in the North-South dialog and a more decisive support for the peoples' struggle in developing nations for a new international economic order. For these to be realized, the workers parties must make efforts to overcome old patterns and old divisions and to develop new approaches to the dramatic reality of the contemporary world. It is an effort of research and of updating that requires considerable lack of bias and analytical ability, and in which a particular commitment must be made by the workers parties that operate in the nations of advanced capitalism. The PCI is profoundly aware of this need and it has committed itself to this end in developing a "charter of peace and development" on which my speech is largely based. In this final part of it I want, in this regard, to call your attention to several points that seem to me particularly important.

The workers parties that function in advanced capitalist nations must first of all acquire the full awareness that socialist changes for which they fight cannot be conceived outside the framework of a new international economic order. However, that awareness cannot be acquired without a clear-cut renunciation of conceptions and illusions that belong to the social democratic tradition which still today are circulated and rooted. I refer particularly to the idea that economic development of nations of the Third World can take place through a sort of diffusion and irradiation effect of the "prosperity" of the industrialized nations and that therefore any growth of the latter, even a capitalist growth, is the condition to solve t

problems of so-called underdevelopment. Such ideas and such illusions, which had their apogee in the 1960's, today are flatly denied by the present crisis of capitalist economy. The recent Brandt report undoubtedly constitutes an important step on the road toward this change, inadequate as it may be in its proposal section. Yet we cannot fail to note that its spirit is contradicted in practice, as has been seen on the occasion of the recent UN session in which the FRG was alined with U.S. positions in rejecting the proposals of the Group of 77.

But it is not sufficient to free ourselves from the erroneous conceptions and illusions of the 1960's. The workers parties of the advanced capitalist nations must also be aware of the fact that a new and more equitable international division of labor and a new international order involve a radical restructurization of the present system of trade and the productive apparatus, and that such a restructurization also involves costs and sacrifices. This leads to the fact that, if the working class and the parties that are expressions of it intend to undertake this restructurization, directing it toward a socialist path, they must also undertake the costs and sacrifices it necessarily involves. It is in this sense, and not only in order to deal with the problems of our national economy, that the PCI, unlike what has been done by other communist parties in the West, has advanced and adopted the slogan of austerity, understood as rejection of consumerism and the waste of the 1960's and as the affirmation of a new, more rational and more modern method of producing and consuming based on social justice.

Another obsolete but still rooted concept from which the workers parties and particularly the communist parties must definitively free themselves is that deriving from the remnants of a catastrophic view of capitalism and of the world economy. This is an urgent and present task. The capitalist economy in fact, after the great development of the 1960's, entered into a period of prolonged recession and it is increasingly exposed to the dangers of inflation, mass unemployment, and monetary disorder. Furthermore, it is threatened by an energy crisis that weighs upon it with a murky future.

However, it would be profoundly erroneous to think that this crisis could remain confined within the borders of the capitalist world. The contemporary world, in fact, has reached a degree of economic interdependence such that the capitalist crisis cannot fail to affect overall international economic relations. It has been affecting the nations of the Third World for some time and it now affects the socialist nations, as was demonstrated by the recent and important events in Poland which were characterized by a broad workers mass movement concerning which the Polish communists themselves were committed to consideration and debate that together dealt with the problems of the economic cycle and of social and political relations.

We followed these events and this consideration with interest and the confidence of one who thinks that independent and sovereign development of socialist democracy based on responsible participation of the workers and their trade unions is the essential condition for establishment of socialist life. If the economic crisis should worsen, the system of international relations would be shaken and the cause of detente and peace would be further prejudiced.

Under these circumstances, the workers parties would commit a serious error if they believed that a worsening of the present crisis could represent a point of obligatory passage on the road to establishment of a new international economic order. Instead, the contrary is true: Only concrete steps on the road to a more equitable international order can ward off a worsening of the world's economic crisis and favor a solution of it. The workers parties must be aware that the struggle to avoid a precipitate worsening of the crisis and to establish a new international economic order is one of the principal ways to work for those objectives of detente and peace which are of primary importance today.

We Italian communists believe, in fact, that in today's world, threatened by the terrible fate of atomic extermination, defense of peace represents an absolute value to which all others must be related. This is one of the fundamental teachings left to us by Comrade Togliatti and we constantly refer to it in our action. "Peace first of all:" This is the order of the day with which we now address the masses of our country.

Certainly we know that the maintenance of peace has been based and is based today also on the balance of the military blocs and of armaments. Starting from this realistic observation we do not question Italy's membership in NATO, and at the same time we have supported every effort for a parallel reduction armaments and we have voted against recent NATO decisions to rearm. However, at the same time we have also advanced concrete proposals for a balanced and symmetrical reduction of medium-range missiles installed and to be installed in West and East Europe. We greet with satisfaction the resumption of negotiations between the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact and we hope for a tie between them with the approval of the SALT II and with negotiations for every other kind of disarmanent.

However, we are also aware that the destinies of peace and of humanity cannot be entrusted indefinitely to the equilibrium of blocs and of weapons and that therefore it is necessary to work tenaciously to reestablish and strengthen a climate of confidence in international relations based on repudiation of power politics and spheres of influence and on the principles of peaceful cooexistence. This must not be limited merely to the military and political sphere, but be extended to cultural life, achieving the principle of free circulation of men and ideas and putting an end to the limitations and abuses that today take place in many nations and also in some socialist countries in confrontations of manifestations of dissent.

It is necessary above all that this climate of confidence invest the entire system of international relations without geographical limitations. It is not in fact thinkable that the improvement of East-West relations could be dissociated from an analagous improvement in North-South relations. This specifically means that the consolidation of detente and the establishment of a new international order are processes which are intertwined and condition each other and that therefore must proceed together. In more general terms, it can be affirmed that the two major problems faced by humanity today--the problem of war and the problem of hunger and underdevelopment--even though they can be solved according to different time schedules can only be solved jointly. This is the great challenge facing humankind today; it is the measure of the strength and wisdom of the workers movement.

By placing the struggle for disarmament, for detente and peace in the forefront, the workers parties do not renounce the struggle against imperialism, nor do they

mute it in any way. On the contrary, they pose this struggle in its most correct terms, rejecting the logic of division of imperialist circles and instead exercising leverage on everything that unites the forces of progress and peace. Imperialism cannot be fought effectively by accepting the terrain they chose which is that of destruction, spheres of influence, of divide-and-conquer, but by establishing a united terrain on which there can be the recognition and convergence of all the forces interested in disarmament, in detente, in the democratization of international economic relations and the establishment of a new international order.

The struggle for peace is the terrain par excellence on which socialism can advance. Its principal force does not in fact consist of the military power of the socialist nations, but in the inexhaustible capacity of attraction of the ideals of justice and freedom which have inspired generations of worker militants, and in the capacity which the workers movement has to achieve these ideals.

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FORMER TERRORISTS OF 'FRONT LINE' INTERVIEWED

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 2 Nov 80 p 148

[NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR correspondent Pierre Blanchet interview with former Front Line terrorists, Marcello and Alessandro]

[Text] One, of proletarian origin, is the son of peasants; the other came from the upper middle class. Together they represent the two extremes of the chain of Italian red terrorism. Members of Front Line, the most important revolutionary armed organization after the Red Brigades, Marcello and Alessandro, today are repentant terrorists. Unlike many others who abandoned violence, they do not believe that exposure is the best way to separate oneself from the past. Nevertheless, they got into contact with me some weeks before the beginning pf the trial of the seven young Italian sympathizers of their organization arrested in France and threatened with extradition. Why that contact? To make it possible to understand, and perhaps also for them, themselves, to better understand, their story. How does one become a terrorist? Following what course do young men with noble ideas suddenly find themselves in the midst of a nightmare and enmeshed in a situation where the only law is the law of blood? Why is it that after the crisis of May 1968, which in Italy lasted until 1969, they were carried away by homicidal violence, whereas, in Franch, many of those who like themselves had been activists and distributed pamphlets at factory doors were able to escape that logic of death? In recounting the history of their recruitment, the fascination with violence and later the break, it is the history of the Italian terrorist movement itself that they are writing. For several days, in a mountain hamlet somewhere abroad, Marcello and Alessandro, both 29 years old, reiterated the shock that Aldo Moro's assassination represented to them. They explain the wherefores in the long interview that follows and explain why, before it is possible for them to return to Italy, they choose as their objective helping all those who want to abandon terrorism.

With Moro's Death, the Change

Question: You are what we call repentant terrorists. You left Italy some months ago. What is your situation today?

Marcello: We were members of the Front Line group, the most important of the terrorist groups after the Red Brigades. We left Front Line in the summer of 1979 before the great wave of repression of last spring. Then, together with other comrades of the organization and former sympathizers of armed struggle, we organized ourselves so that that abandonment may serve some purpose. Since then--and that is why we accepted this interview for NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR--we have been fighting to stop that infernal spiral in which terrorism evolves, to interrupt that "night of the long knives" where the myth of vengeance and blood alone reigns supreme. To interrupt does not mean to name names. Exposure nurtures frustrations and renews hatred, the idea of vendetta.

Question: How did that happen? How does one abandon terrorism and why?

Alessandro: At the center of all that, of course, there was the Moro case, the culminating point of terrorism in Italy. The Moro case did not open everyone's eyes at the same time, suddenly. That occurred progressively. Before the Moro case, the Front Line tried to stamp the struggles with the reality of the situation. After Moro, it began to look more and more like the Red Brigades.

Question: How is that?

Marcello: The objective and strategy of the Red Brigades is to attack the center and the organizations of the state. That is what they did with Moro. The Front Line, on the other hand, sought to be a clandestine organization in the service of the workers struggles.

Question: For example?

Alessandro: Before the Moro case, the mortal attacks were quite fewer in number. Afterwards, even for Front Line, killing became a habit. The first action of Front Line was in Fiat of Turin in November 1976. It was a probe, an "exploratory trip", as they say. The militants, armed and masked, arrived at the headquarters of the Fiat directors' association. All documents were sacked.

Question: Was anyone hurt?

Alessandro: No. The officials were immobilized at gunpoint and closed in the bathrooms or in closets.

Question] Were you against physical violence?

Marcello: No. The foremen in Fiat and in other companies have been attacked for a long time. Sometimes collectively in demonstrations inside the factories or on the way out; or individually, by workers who could no longer tolerate their bosses. It was not we, it was not the revolutionaries, who invented violence.

"You Break the Fellow's Arms and Legs, Striking Where Necessary"

Alessandro: Well before the Front Line existed, we regularly participated in patrols in the plants to make overtime work impossible. We used to form a sort of corridor; we grabbed all those who continued to work and advised them to stop. Obviously, things did not always go well for the foremen, the supervisors and certain union representatives.

Marcello: One day, during a strike in a small town, a boss attacked a worker. The result: the worker spent 90 days in the hospital. Some time later, the boss was attacked and his car set on fire. Today he is paralyzed.

Question: Paralyzed because of the attack?

Marcello: There is a type of attack that is almost scientific. You break the fellow's arms and legs with a monkey-wrench, striking where necessary.

Question: Was it the workers who did that?

Marcello: Yes, also. Furthermore, that boss tried to prevent another strike. Since he was paralyzed, the workers (some 300 people) contented themselves with hanging a placard around his neck and spitting on him. After that, he quit his job.

Question: Was that before the creation of Front Line?

Marcello: Yes, before.

Question: Wasn't that type of violence enough for you? Was it necessary to create an organization of a military type, the Front Line ....

Marcello: We thought it was necessary to create a group capable of intervention with sophisticated methods and that to do that a real military training was necessary.

Question: What for?

Alessandro: To accelerate history, to speed up the pace. We thought that in order for the mass struggles to develop, at a certain point they called for putting into practice complex and sophisticated military methods.

Question: That is theory and gibberish.

Alessandro: It was our theory.

Question: And in practice?

Alessandro: One of the Front Line's most sophisticated actions was carried out in the Siemens factories in Milan in July 1977. There was an excess stock of material and the factory threatened to dismiss workers. Some members of Front Line arrived in a police car in police uniforms. The security agents were taken far away from the factory and Front Line set fire to the stocks.

The damage amounted to 10 billion lire. For Front Line, it was a double blow because at that time there was a lot of talk about electronics, particularly for the modernization of telecommunications.

Question: Were the workers pleased?

Marcello: Very .... Besides, many of the actions connected with the refusal of overtime of holiday work did not come from Front Line. In Milan, for example, the organization blew up the tracks and blocked two subway lines to prevent the workers from going to work on a holiday. But that same day, about a hundred buses were immobilized by militants who were not members of Front Line, and Milan stopped completely for 2 hours.

"At Present, We Are Trying To Analyze the Past, To Understand Everything We Went Through"

Question: You wanted to accelerate the course of history and one fine day you found yourselves with a gun in your hand ....

Alessandro: There were already weapons in the group, except that they were more spread around. They were kept, for example, by the personnel charged with the security of demonstrations. One must not forget that the Italy of the seventies lived in the fear of a military coup d'etat, that there was the bomb in the agriculture bank on Fontana Square in Milan and that there were daily disputes with the fascists. It is easily forgotten that that was the time when the police had been able to lay the Milan attack on the back of an anarchist.

At that time, black terrorism was much more dangerous than red terrorism. In 1974 there was the Brescia massacre and on 4 August the first Bologna attack against the Italicus train. At that time, there was a lot of talk about Chile. For some, the Chilean tragedy was cause for strengthening Popular Unity in Europe. But we thought that that was suicidal, that on the contrary, it was necessary to prepare militarily for a civil war.

Question: Italy was not on the brink of a civil war! In 1974, Greece and Portugal had just freed themselves from fascism.

Marcello: Regarding Portugal, we were sure that one dictatorship would replace another.

Question: But there is no longer any dictatorship in Portugal!

Marcello: That is what we thought in 1975. At present, we are trying to analyze the past, to understand everything we went through. What we want to say is that at that time that seemed normal to us. From the student movement of 1968-1969 to extreme leftist groups such as Continual Struggle and Workers Power, then to the grassroots committees or the neighborhood organizations, and finally to terrorism, was a road that thousands of persons took.

Question: Thousands?

Marcello: Between 1977 and 1978, there were thousands of attacks, big and small. If you consider that regardless of how small the attack may be you need at least three persons, figure it out. At present, there are about 3,000 people in prison. I believe we can say that there were close to 10,000 terrorists in Italy. Of course, they were not of the level of a Mario Monetti or a Renato Curcio ....

Alessandro: What is never said, and which the Moro case hid, is that at a certain point terrorism directly or indirectly cut across all of Italian society. It was quite different from the Red Armed Faction in Germany. For us, the Baader group was exactly the typ' of organization disassociated from everything, with its desperate heroes.

Question: They say that terrorism had ramifications even in the upper echelons of the state. Some even say that the Moro case would have been impossible without a well-placed mastermind.

Marcello: It is true that those rumors circulated. But the biggest error is to believe that there was a genius, a Machiavellian "Grand Old Man", capable of planning the whole Moro case. In fact, there were thousands of them.

Question: Thousands?

Alessandro: Before the Moro case, yes. Don't forget that a large part of the Italian extreme left came from the upper middle class.

Question: They were children of the bourgeoisie?

Marcello: Children of the bourgeoisie who necessarily retained links with their milieu of origin. In 1977 a large part of the movement was comprised of former 1968 militants who were now in the world of labor. Ten thousand terrorists: that represents an incredible number of contacts, of informants who help them, shelter them. In each large Italian city, there were thousands of people who helped the armed groups in some way. And those people were not only criminals.

Question: For example.

Marcello: Employers, judges, directors of newspapers, secretaries, clerks, administrative employees.

Question: Certainly, but there is a difference between throwing a Molotov cocktail and killing. All those people must have become seriously confused when the terrorists began to kill systematically.

Marcello: Yes, but that comes before the Moro case; there was a gre't debate within the movement about "political murder". As a matter of fact, that debate began in 1973 at the time of the assassination of Commissioner Calabresi, responsible for the death of the anarchist Pinelli. The death penalty was demanded by a whole part of the movement. But in the Front Line, we believed that should be an exception; that certain people under particular and exceptional circumstances deserved death. In the Red Brigades, since they had adopted a logic of weakening the state apparatus, killing was more common.

Question: When did you fire against anyone for the first time?

Marcello: In 1975, against fascists.

Question: Were they very far?

Marcello: Not very.

Question: What did you feel?

Marcello: A very strong emotion, of course. But I must say that I never launched an attack against abstract persons, without a definite identity. Up to the end, we always fired against people, rightly or wrongly, considered bad, nasty people.

Question: Did you like violence?

Alessandro: We lived in it. All Italy lived in the midst of violence. But we did not particularly like violence.

Question: Did some like it?

Alessandro: Yes.

Question: What did you think about the Palestinian attacks against children, for example?

Alessandro: We were against them, even at that time.

Question: What did you feel when Moro was assassinated?

Alessandro: A great feeling of isolation, of despair. Even when we were with our closest friends. We were tired of that morbid spectacle, of that caricature of a court, of those letters. We were paralyzed, inhibited. That day, we understood the weakness of the Red Brigades. In killing Moro, the Red Brigades showed that they did not have the capacity to utilize what he could say. It was the last failure of terrorist violence.

Question: Nevertheless, you continued ....

Marcello: The break occurred progressively. It was at the time of the Moro case that the debate arose between those who wanted to follow the model of the Red Brigades and those who thought that the Front Line should continue to be the "front line" of a movement. But in fact the exact opposite occurred. The semispontaneous attacks or attacks against assets diminished in favor of organized attacks against people. Shooting at the legs, for example, became much more common than before the Moro case. Until then, the Front Line had only committed four of five attacks of that type.

"Heroes Who Live In A Military Sect and Who Little By Little Become More Cruel"

Question: Which is not that few. But tell me something, isn't shooting at somebody's legs precisely a workers way of fighting? Aren't the workers in the habit of carrying guns?

Alessandro: One of the first attacks of that type occurred in the Fiat plant in Rivalta in 1975. A foreman had been expelled from the factory by the workers. He returned on the following day, a group of organized workers shot him in the legs in front of the factory. So shooting in the legs was form of protest invented by the workers. And Front Line was one of the last organizations to practice it. The first time was in July 1977 and the victim, an individual named Bruni, an engineer for the Falk factories in Pistoia, was a member of the Christian Democratic union.

Question: Did you consider him a criminal?

Marcello: His union violated strike picket lines. Bruni had crossed a strike picket line in his factory. As a motive, that was more than sufficient.

Question: If everybody who crossed a strike picket line was shot in the legs! ....

Marcello: I repeat that that originated in the factories themselves.

Question: You are always talking about workers, struggles, masses ....

Marcello: All of our history is based on the fact that we were sustained by a minority of workers.

Question: Shooting in the legs, "scientific" beatings, attacks .... What does that do to the minds of people?

Marcello: We founded Front Line as an armed instrument but also because it was necessary for the militants underground to be able to live. In a certain sense, the underground becomes a way of life that finds its justification in the armed struggle. That feeling of power given by the idea that we can act in the life of people is incredible. And those who at the present time refuse to abandon terrorism are the ones who felt most at ease in that spirit: heroes who live in an idealized military sect, in the cult of the elite, and who little by little become more cruel.

Question: Have you escaped that?

Marcello: In time. We were not really underground. We lived with our real documents. Of course, we did not declare our terrorist activities but we were not Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Our parents, our friends suspected something and, in a certain way, this type of semiclandestine status is much more tolerable than being completely underground. Furthermore, it is much easier to stop everything, to disassociate oneself from the movement when one is not underground. We didn't go underground until much later, when the principal Front Line informer, Roberto Sandalo, began to supply names.

Question: You were not completely underground when you were active and now that you have disassociated yourselves, you are.

Alessandro: Yes, and that is the hardest thing to bear. If all those who are underground had the possibility of escaping, there would be many more repentant terrorists.

Question: Is the desire to break away that great?

Marcello: Yes, the desire to leave behind a past that we cannot analyse. The desire to stop acting in the name of others. The desire and the need for silence. Well before the informers began to go into action, documents on that subject were circulating around. Being underground does not permit one to work, it prevents any kind of regular life. We are led to compensate for our needs through attacks, holdups and assaults. It is an endless logic. If the Italian state had a little intelligence, if it were not moved by the desire for revenge, it would help us stop this spiral ....

Question: You say that everything was upset by the Moro case but that is not sufficient explanation; as far as you were concerned, Moro was just a rightist politician ....

Marcello: If Moro had been murdered on the first day, we would have applauded it at the time. I underline: at the time. What bothered us was the theatrics, the macabre spectacle. Not to mention that the Red Brigades did not know how to conduct the gambit, inasmuch as Moro could have turned over many things.

Question: You had the impression that the terrorists were no longer stronger than the government?

Alessandro: Yes.

Question: I am going to ask you a brutal question. You say that you began to become aware at the time of the Moro case. Couldn't we simply say that you were afraid? Afraid because you perceived that your action too was doomed to failure? Afraid also of the repression that was increasing ....

Alessandro: At the time we stopped, the repression had not yet achieved great victories. We were not afraid. On the contrary, I would say that we were afraid of the image of ourselves reflected by the underground members of Red Brigades and the Front Line. They wanted at all cost to transform us into romantic heroes a la Dostoyevsky. We did not consider ourselves lone heroes creating fantasies about a hypothetical kidnapping. The unionists and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) today seek to hide the violent dimension of certain workers actions. At the time, we were completely proworker. We erred perhaps, but that does not mean that that did not exist. I reiterate that we could estimate the number of terrorists in Italy at 10,000.

Question: Let us go back a little. In terrorism, at a certain moment, there is a transgression. A moment when one throws a Molotov cocktail and a moment when one kills. What was the first mortal attack by the Front Line?

Marcello: After the Moro case, in December 1978.

Question: How was it?

Marcello: The fellow, the victim, was named Paolella. He was a well-known criminologist who headed a task force on special prisons and who promoted surgical experiments on prisoners as in Germany.

Question: Who decided to kill him?

Alessandro: He was murdered in Naples. It was the members of the Front Line in Naples who decided to execute him.

Question: Were you aware of that?

Alessandro: The Front Line did not have a strategic leadership like the Red Brigades. We used to discuss means of action and their significance among ourselves, without knowing how they would be employed.

Question: Were there people specialized in more difficult actions; were there killers?

Alessandro: At first, no. Afterwards, yes. There were more and more people going underground. A caste was formed. In each city, there was what we called "fire groups". At the beginning, the groups rotated, then they became fixed.

"The Members of the Red Brigades Were Forced to Join the Communist Party"

Question: Where did the weapons come from?

Marcello: The weapons? Everybody had one. First, there were the assaults on gun shops, quite frequently. Furthermore, the first member of the Front Line organization to be killed was killed during an attack on one of those shops in July 1977. There were also weapons from the police and soldiers. We disarmed many isolated soldiers at night. Finally, there were the weapons of the former militants. On 12 March 1977, there was a demonstration that brought together 100,000 people: thousands were armed.

Question: There is talk about a load of machineguns distributed to the Red Brigades and the Front Line at the time of the Moro case.

Marcello: We do not know anything.

Alessandro: I would like to point out something about the Red Brigades. At the time of the Moro case, there was much talk about manipulation from abroad. Just look today, after the statements and confessions of Peci, the informer of the Red Brigades: many unionists, completel unsuspected, were arrested.

Question: Go on.

Alessandro: Unlike the Front Line, made up of 20 or 21-year-old youths, the Red Brigades are comprised of unionists, intellectuals or former communists.

Furthermore, at a certain period, the members of the Red Brigades were compelled to join the Communist Party. There was a whole Stalinist faction, hostile to the "historic compromise", fascinated by the Red Brigades. At that level, perhaps there were relations with the Soviet Union ....

Question: Interesting ....

Marcello: It is possible that the USSR or the KGB may have thought at one time or another about being able to destabilize Italy, as the media say, but that is a scholastic hypothesis.

Question: Let us talk about the weapons. Where did the money come from?

Alessandro: From the bank holdups.

Question: Did your organization commit many?

Alessandro: More holdups than political actions.

Question: Was anyone killed?

Marcello: Yes. It was during the holdups that we lost many of our comrades. Nobody knew it because the holdups were not claimed. It must be added that our comrades were less determined, less prepared for these actions than for political actions.

Question: Perhaps you were naive about the underworld .... Tell me how you operated. First, what did you live on. Did you have a job?

Marcello: Yes. A job that left us much free time. We lived quite normally.

Question: Were there salaried personnel in the Front Line?

Alessandro: Yes, about 30.

Question: How much did they earn?

Alessandro: Three hundred thousand lire per month.

Question: You said that you lived normally; did you go out, have male and female friends?

Alessandro: Yes, great disorder reigned in Italy.

Question: They say that the Red Brigades are much more closed. Did you know members of the Red Brigades?

Marcello: They are not that much different .... But they were much more intransigent than we.

Question: What happened when you decided on an action?

Marcello: One example: in a factory, some 30 members of a grassroots organization who did not belong to the Front Line decided to shoot the legs of an executive but they did not have the means to do so. So they went to a group that included the members of neighborhood committees, "the fire groups" .... The group decided to accept that action and there the Front Line intervened with its technical assets.

Question: Did you carry out many attacks? Every week? Every day?

Alessandro: No. We would not have withstood it. It is very difficult psychologically.

Question: You explained that after the Moro case, part of you began to harbor doubts, while the premeditated mortal attacks multiplied. What were the actions that shocked you the most?

Alessandro: Moro, of course, and the William Waccher case, or the attack on the school for industrial executives in Turin.

Question: The story about that school where the future engineers were shot in the legs.

Marcello: Yes. It was monstrous. They took the lists of students and picked the people by lot. We learned afterwards that among them there was a sympathizer with the Manifesto and a unionist known for his militancy.

"Yes, We Are Considered Traitors by Our Former Comrades"

Question: Talk about informing.

Alessandro: We can distinguish two types of informers or informing. There is the case of Fioroni who informed on the Autonomy personnel; or the case of Peci, who turned in the Red Brigades; or Sandalo, who turned us in. That type of informer tells all, he embellishes, he even becomes a paranoic police inspector. He avenges his own past, like Fioroni, who imagined a paranoic organization stretching from Autonomy to the Red Brigades. Or like Peci, who became the bravest of the informers, the most courageous, just as he had been the bravest of the antifascists.

Question: And the others?

Alessandro: There are only two or three informers like Fabrizio Peci. The others are the mass of youths or adolescents who confess, who unburden themselves and no longer believe in armed struggle. The latter do not necessarily inform on hundreds of people. There are many youths who cannot hold out .... The Fioroni law (precisely named after the first informer) permits questioning them without a lawyer. The Fioroni law also permits a reduction of sentence. However, there are people who spoke without asking for a reduction of sentence; for them, it was a way of atonement. One hundred and twenty persons suspected of having connections with the Front Line have been arrested since April 1980. Of those 120 persons, 40 talked. Nevertheless, not all are informers. It is

necessary to know that in Italy the fact of having harbored someone in 1975 without knowing exactly why can send one to prison as an accomplice. That is the case of the seven comrades who are currently under arrest in Paris and who will certainly be extradited.

Question: I am going to ask you a question that may seem absurd: Isn't the best method to put an end to terrorism to dismantle the organizations, that is, to talk, to inform?

Marcello: No! Informing incurs a vendetta, it is an endless cycle.

Question: You are considered traitors ....

Marcello: Yes, by our old comrades.

Question: And elsewhere?

Marcello: The whole problem lies in the fact that the Italian justice system is very severe on those who abandon terrorism. There is the influence of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) there. The PCI never wants to admit that terrorism was a fact of society in Italy, that it has a political-social origin. For the PCI, terrorism, the terrorists, were always criminals.

Question: But the terrorists were not very sensitive either. With the magistrates, particularly. Judge Alessandrini of Milan, for example, was assassinated by the Front Line.

Alessandro: Judge Alessandrini was assassinated in January 1979. He was the one who conceived the theory that autonomy, criminal violence and ultrasophisticated violence were one and the same thing. Besides, that action was disputed by many members within the Front Line itself. There were three assassinations almost simultaneously (the criminologist Paolella, Alessandrini and a jailor from Turin suspected of being a torturer) and they were beginning to be excessive. We had the impression that all of that was nothing more than revenge and counterrevenge.

Question: Traitors for some, criminals for others if you do not inform on your comrades. It must be difficult to get out of that web ....

Marcello: Terrorism will not end in Italy despite the arrests and the exposures. On the contrary, it runs the risk of becoming still more fierce because, for some, it is the only way to exist. Our objective is, first of all, to stop the vendetta. It is possible to get used to the violence; some succeeded. We started with a mass violence, the proletarian violence that we exalted, without perceiving that it too should be criticized, and we reached a physical, mortal, violence, the cult of the military thing. Some like it, others don't. The latter would leave if they had the possibility. That is why a truce is necessary, an amnesty that will permit hundreds or thousands of terrorists or sympathizers to get out honorably.

8711
CSO: 3101

DC BASILICATA REGIONAL COMMITTEE EXAMINES SITUATION

Bari LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO in Italian 14 Oct 80 p 8

[Article: "The DC Affirms the Validity of the Policy of Dialog"]

[Text] Potenza--"The action of the DC [Christian Democratic Party] has been inspired by the desire to impart vitality to the regions and--in the local entities--to councils of coalition with the parties of the secular and socialist sector, pursuant to the policy of reaching programmatic agreements with all the parties of the constitutional spectrum."

This is in substance what Gianmaolo D'Andrea, regional secretary of the party, had occasion to say during the meeting of the regional committee held for the express purpose of studying the local and national political situation, with particular reference to the political and programmatic problems in connection with the opening of the third regional legislature and with the events attendant on the evolution of the governmental crisis.

For this Christian Democratic spokesman, moreover, the unwillingness of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] to participate in any agreement that does not provide for its admittance into the councils has made it impossible to bring this plan to complete fruition and has prevented the reelection of a communist to the chairmanship of the Regional Council and of the second permanent council committee.

He contended that these events (which are currently adjudged by the communists to be signs of inflexibility and hostility on the part of the DC-PSI [Italian Socialist Party]-PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] majority) are the consequence of an a priori decision to reject any executive body that does not include the PCI and any majority that does not provide for its admittance into the council. D'Andrea emphasized the positive value of the renewed solidarity with the PSI and PSDI and affirmed that "the coalition which has been formed at the regional level does not intend to close itself off from the outside but rather to be receptive to the positive contributions that other groups of the constitutional spectrum (and therefore the PCI first and foremost) will wish to offer toward a solution of the problems posed by the state of emergency."

Opposition of the PCI

"In recent months," he continued, "we have discovered what is behind the stern opposition of the communists, with their recurrent inclination to utilize all possible extrainstitutional pressures to carry out a strategy of attacking the council and

the majority that it represents. However," he declared, "the PCI's tactic of attempting to make the reconstituted solidarity among the DC, PSI, and PSDI appear to be a maneuver on the part of the government has not been successful, nor has its attempt to portray the Regional Council--and the majority--as being on the side of those who oppose the interests of the Lucano workers and the needs of the Basilicata region." He explained that from this point of view "the Lucano PCI's position is a very sterile one, so much so--and so conspicuously so--that it has brought about the political isolation of that entity." It is no accident that the regional secretary affirmed the validity of the policy of dialog being promoted by the party which enjoys a plurality: a policy which in the future--with the aid of timely initiatives--could prevail "over the narrow attitude and arrogance of the opposition" while at the same time seeking points of convergence, without, however, making these points of convergence appear to be full-fledged agreements concerning the program, in order not to nullify the positive accomplishments that have resulted from the period of "regional solidarity."

Relations With the Labor Unions

A substantial portion of D'Amirea's address was devoted to the problem of relations with the unions, particularly in the light of the events of the past few weeks. In particular, he denounced the hasty and summary judgments announced in advance by certain union sectors with respect to the performance of the Regional Council and also censured the attitude of open hostility and sometimes of defiance. In this context the secretary of the DC drew attention to the "maneuver--completely political in nature--staged in connection with the attempt to make the council appear to be an opponent of the workers' struggles for jobs and development. These objectives," he declared, "are objectives for which we too are fighting at the side of the working class, from which only artificial machinations can divide us." Concerning relations with the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] D'Andrea asserted that his party does not desire a return to "collateralism." "Nor do we intend," he continued, "to contrapose to the PCI-CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] 'transmission belt' another 'transmission belt' that would lead to a decline in the credibility of the union, whose autonomy is an unalterable aspect of our principles.

"We are therefore," he explained, "not asking the CISL to renounce its autonomy vis-a-vis us; on the contrary, we would like the CISL to be an even more vigilant guardian of its identity vis-a-vis everyone."

The meeting concluded with an extensive debate in which the participants included the agricultural adviser, Romualdo Coviello; the regional group leader of the council, Giuliani; the party leaders Sisinni and Loponte; the representative of the women's movement, D'Eufemia; and the regional chairman, Deputy Verrastro. The latter in particular announced that in order to achieve better coordination between the executive committee and Regional Council with respect to decisions relating to the emergency and to the priorities established in the programmatic statements, the council will--at the next meeting of the Regional Assembly--report on the problems relative to implementation of the public health reforms; Law "285"; and the Quadrifoglio Plan.

10992
CSO: 3104

FIGURES ON FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY FOR FIRST HALF OF 1980

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 28 Oct 80 p 14

[Article by Anna Maria Moretti: "The Crisis Is Knocking at the Doors of Shoe Factories"]

[Text] Exports decreased 10.6 percent during the first 6 months.

The statistical data of the footwear industry for the first 6 months of 1980 manifest the disquieting difficulties of the sector. There was a 10.6 percent decrease in Italian exportations and a 58.8 percent increase in importations; and even if a comparison of the data shows a very great difference in market value--177,314,239 pairs of Italian shoes exported for 1,580,543,483 lire, compared with 20,460,262 pairs of shoes imported for 57,557,182 lire--this certainly is an unprecedented trend for Italy, which has always been the leading exporter of footwear on the international scene.

The recessive phenomenon is a harsh surprise, because 1979 results were very good. Italy was the top exporter of footwear, with 374 million pairs exported--compared with 590 million for the entire EEC [European Economic Community]--for an overall price of 3,124 billion lire and an increase of 27 percent, compared with 1978. 1980 also began rather well: up to April foreign orders had dropped only 2 percent; but in the next quarter, they dropped 24 percent; and for the next 6 months, it is foreseen that the downswing will amount to 26 percent. The 1980 export downswing is estimated at 18 percent.

A further analysis of the statistical data shows that in the first 6 months of this past year Italian shoes were sold abroad for about 1,400 billion lire, while during the same period of 1980 exportations amounted to 1,580 billion lire (+10.6 percent), but with 21 million fewer pairs of shoes.

This means that they were sold at a higher price, but that there was less production, and that above all there was less work, a serious consideration, since the Italian footwear sector employs 220,000 of the 450,000 persons in the entire EEC.

Was less sold because costs increased and prices are no longer competitive? Or, on the other hand, because inflation is international and strikes hard at consumer goods everywhere?

For both reasons. The cost of hides went sky high, and in spite of taxation to cover social charges, which is a moderating element, the cost of the finished product is high, certainly higher than that of emerging countries, which are producers of unrefined hides, are rich in poorly paid manpower, and which have undertaken massive production of footwear that is of inferior quality, but is competitive in the climate of international inflation, which reduces the demand for quality goods in favor of goods that satisfy need. Chinese sports shoes, of canvas and rubber, cost a third of the much finer Italian canvas and rubber shoes. This is a clear example that demonstrates that it will be difficult to sell our kind of shoes on the domestic market.

Another reason for the crisis is the competition of some European countries, already heavy, but which will become even more so soon when they join the EEC. Spain (163 million pairs of shoes per year), Greece (14 million pairs), Portugal (12 million) will invade the community with their products--and at lower prices than ours.

Italy is still absolutely competitive with respect to the production of beautiful, technically perfect, inimitable Italian shoes, which are expensive on the domestic market and very expensive on the foreign market. How much can we sell? Traditional foreign markets are not able to absorb more because of the referred to inflation. It will be necessary to open other markets, if that is possible. Otherwise, employment will suffer, since the intermediate category of shoes is affected by competition and the higher category has no outlet for expansion because of its de luxe quality.

In the meantime, we must ask ourselves who, in this downswing period, will pay the price for this: will the small artisan workshops close down since, when orders drop, business firms return articles to a plant and do not distribute the surplus productive material to the small workshops? Or, on the other hand, in order to reduce the cost of products, will the business firms convert from production enterprises into business firms and distribute all of the production to artisan shops? This is a course that is being dangerously affirmed. In either case it is certain that the employment of the sector will suffer and entire regions--Tuscany, Le Marche, Campania--will suffer, since their economy relies heavily on the production of the footwear industry.

8255
CSO: 3104

EFFECTS OF NATION'S STEEL CRISIS DISCUSSED

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 28 Oct 80 p 31

[Article by Giulio Mazzochi: "Italian Steel Industry Is Hard Up; Insufficient Customs Examinations; Dumping Steel Is Also Imported"]

[Text] While the EEC [European Economic Community] discusses the adoption of the "state of manifest crisis," public and private producers will apply for the special wage supplement. But if existing laws were applied, the sector would soon return to normalcy. In the meantime, all of the industries are accumulating a mountain of losses. For example, by the end of the year Italsider will have attained a record deficit of 500 billion.

Rome--Both public and private Italian steel producers are getting ready to apply for a special wage supplement for thousands of workers. The adoption of the state of manifest crisis for the European steel industry absolutely will not serve to eliminate the need for the wage supplement if at the same time one does not apply the other measure provided by the European Coal and Steel Community treaty that protects Europe from an invasion of steel from third countries.

The Crux of the Matter Lies in Imports

But it is enough to make a tour of the industrial Genoa-Turin-Milan triangle to discover that Italy has its own problems, for once no worse than those of others, and that those are the problems to be resolved and that they must be resolved by means of our ministers' decisions--decisions, however, that are seriously overdue. The fact is that this year the world decrease in the demand for steel will reduce national consumption to 30 million tons and thus to 8.5 million imported tons, while Italy, with a production capability of 32 million tons will not succeed in placing more than 20-21 in Italy and will not succeed in producing more than 24, taking exportations into account.

From our investigation it turns out that half of our steel importations are taking place in derogation of existing laws: the application of these laws would be enough to restore normalcy to the sector and to avoid wage supplements. On the other hand, the nonapplication of these laws is causing frightful losses to Italian producers. And thus at the two extremes we have, on the one hand, the "small" Redaelli company, a private Milanese concern that is already drawing a wage supple-

ment, but which at the height of the crisis is now able to resume production, only because it is finally receiving an injection of public capital (which, if it had arrived in time, would have avoided its crisis); and, on the other hand, we have the national public colossus, Italsider, which in recent months has been accumulating additional losses, which by the end of the year will amount to 500 billion to be added to the thousand billion already requested to save itself).

Is it indeed possible, as emerges from our investigation, that the blame for hundreds of billions in losses that the steel industry is accumulating in the treasury lies in the nonadoption by Customs of legal provisions already in existence and which should therefore be applied? In the forthcoming installments of the next few days we will see the "evidence" of this reality more clearly. We will now describe the phenomenon for the top-level chiefs so that the ministers of foreign trade and of finance, socialists Manca and Reviglio, who are responsible for customs, may immediately know what it seems they have not been told in either the Council of Ministers or elsewhere by the ministers who are responsible for the steel sector, that is, the ministers of industry and of state participation, christian democrat Bisaglia and socialist De Michelis.

The fact is that any country in the world is now in a position to begin to produce steel. Automation makes it possible to overcome the long periods that otherwise would be necessary to train manpower. The important thing is to have capital--a capital of a thousand billion in order to produce a thousand tons of steel. The current estimate is that a new steel plant produces a kilo of steel for a thousand lira. Naturally by exploiting non-European working hours and shifts, those steel plants produce more than what is produced in Europe. In addition, the steel no longer has to share in the depreciation and the remuneration of capital and its selling price depends only on its variable components: cost of labor and of raw material.

Competition From Third Countries

Where there is raw material--coal or iron or both--and the possibility of paying less for labor than in Europe, new steel works have emerged: in South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia. From these places and also from Greece, and then again from East Europe, an uninterrupted supply of steel arrives in Italy--in Italy, but not in the rest of the EEC [European Common Market]. Other European countries are also disturbed by the new and ruthless competition of third markets. But Australian or South African steel does not enter their countries. And why is that?

The "why" can be quickly explained. Actually, to explain it, it would be enough to recall the behavior of French Customs with respect to the wine or onions of others; or with respect to the mussels of Taranto, which French customs officers do not have time to examine the day they arrive; and when they do examine them days later, they obviously must be destroyed. It is said that there are procedures for steel, too: the types of steel that are produced in the above mentioned countries do not have the qualities that would permit their being used for the declared ultimate products.

More. Border duties are consequently applied on the basis of declared quality and price. It turns out that we import wagons of damaged steel, that is, discarded sheets of steel, and these are always what are seen at first glance--the rolls that are placed at the front part of shipments. Underneath, however, there is good material, which comes in as "dumping" material. Is that all?

No. There are cases in which Italsider offered goods to its clients at the same low price for which they were importing, but without succeeding in getting orders. The explanation is simple. As a matter of fact, the Italian user buys at 290 lire per kilo abroad, but invoices the "Italian" price at 310. Its final product is as competitive as that of the competitors who really acquire steel at the Italian price, but the young man has concealed a handy 20 lire per kilo, which he deposits in a foreign bank into the bargain.

We will explain why our borders are so friendly in another installment. It is enough to say now that, as usual, the problem is one of the intermediations that are a part of trade and of all of the definite interests that are concealed in our too numerous, and too good humored (though antiquated), customs offices.

8255
CSO:3104

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY FORM PEACE, SECURITY COUNCIL

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 23 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] Professional military personnel of the army, the air force, and the navy who are seriously alarmed about modern weapons developments have formed a special council for peace and security within the armed forces.

As it believes and fears that acceptable limits are being violated the council wants to subject development of weapons, currently accepted as a matter of course, to an investigation based on principles.

The Peace and Security Council of the Armed Forces--VVBK--has already been in existence several months but it did not want to manifest itself before a conversation with the minister of defense could be held. Since it is now certain that Minister De Geus will receive the VVBK leadership on 11 November the conscience-stricken professional soldiers--who according to army chaplain E. Brautigam "feel left out in the cold"--are willing to reveal their identities.

The VVBK consists of about 30 military members and wants to create a platform for the discussion of nuclear and other weapons systems within the armed forces.

The protestant reformed army chaplain W. Fokkens says: "The great dilemma of professional soldiers is how anticommunist they should be and what kinds of weapons are consequently admissible." The Reverend Fokkens and his colleague the humanist adviser K. Boers were responsible for the groundwork for the establishment of the VVBK; they acted in close contact with the Interdenominational Peace Council (IKV).

Lieutenant Colonel of the Army Corps of Engineers J.H.A. Mohr acts as chairman. He says that the VVBK has no intentions whatsoever to become an action committee against the minister, and it purposely disassociates itself from Air Force Captain M. Stelling and his special principles, even though he is a member of the VVBK.

10319
CSO: 3105

SOLDIERS PROTEST LOWER PAY

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] Utrecht/Ossendrecht, 28 Oct--Tonight and tomorrow drafted soldiers will conduct actions against lower pay: the VVDM [Craft Union of Drafted Military Personnel] fears that Minister Albeda of Social Affairs has planned this and that the Department of Defense is ready to act upon his plans.

Minister Albeda wants to reduce minimum wages and this is closely connected with the pay soldiers are receiving. According to the VVDM it means a reduction of 124 guilders for soldiers 18 years old and younger, a reduction of 83 guilders for 19-year-old soldiers, and a reduction of 60 guilders for soldiers above the age of 20.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defense declares that nothing is as yet known about the size of the reductions.

Tonight there will be a demonstration in Utrecht organized by the VVDM and a number of youth organizations. There will be a parade on the Prins Boulevard and the Boulevard of the United Nations, where there will be speakers and music.

Near the Belgian border, in Ossendrecht, soldiers plan to go to Belgium under the slogan "for such pay we will not fight for The Netherlands." They want to demonstrate on Antwerp's Market Place but negotiations with Belgian authorities about the feasibility are still in progress.

During the past few days nuisance actions against the wage reductions have already been held in several places. It happened for instance in Wezep, where last Tuesday about 70 draftees prolonged the coffee break as a form of protest. Ten soldiers were cited by the military police.

Reprimand

As a result of that action State Secretary of Defense Van Lent reprimanded the VVDM and told its management that such actions are illegal and could cause those involved to be court-martialed. The soldiers craft union looks upon it as a local initiative and stated that VVDM sections are autonomous in this respect. According to the VVDM leadership it does not intend to stimulate strikes. However, if drafted personnel gets into trouble through such actions the VVDM will take care of legal assistance.
10319
CSO: 3105

LABOR UNIONS WARY OF WAGE DISCUSSIONS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 27 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: "FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] Takes Decision on Discussions, CNV [Christian National Labor Union] Is Still Undecided"]

[Text] The Hague, 27 Oct--Today the Netherlands Trade Unions Federation (FNV) is to decide if it will go on with the discussions on the social economic policies for 1981. At the last moment the CNV deleted the issue from today's agenda because it is still without an additional clarification from the government. Now the FNV has refused to comment on the conditions for resumption of the discussion in the Labor Foundation as imposed by VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises] chairman Van Veen.

Van Veen as chairman of the employers believes that the stymied discussions on wages can only be put in motion again if the FNV abandons its inflexible attitude regarding restraints on wage expenses.

Van Veen also favors a "breathing spell" by way of extension of the present wage measures to, for instance, 1 April 1981. In any event that would mean cancellation of the price compensation on 1 January 1981. During this breathing spell the social partners would as yet have time to come to terms.

Van Veen is in agreement with his colleague Van Eijkelenburg of the Christian employers who said last week that he was still hopeful that continuation of the negotiations would yield results. He brought this up in reaction to the statements by Van Veen, who believed that the government had better come up with new wage measures immediately.

Last week the discussions bogged down in the labor movement's unwillingness to agree to wage restraints of a 1-percent decrease in purchasing power for lower incomes and a 3.5-percent decrease for higher incomes. FNV and CNV want to maintain the purchasing power of the lowest paid workers.

Last week the CNV already clearly indicated that it does not want to break off the negotiations. Among other things it proposed the formation of a fund for the creation of employment. VNO chairman Van Veen is willing to discuss this plan "if private industry will not have to foot the bill."

The government does not consider last week's breakdown of the negotiations a reason to stop talking and to act on its own instead.

Possible new discussions in the Labor Foundation should have results before 15 November. If by that date no clarity about the social economic policy for 1981 can be obtained--established either through cooperation of employees and employers, or through the government--it will be too late to prepare before 1 January 1981 appropriate measures, regarding taxation, for instance.

10319
CSO: 3105

NCW WARNS AGAINST OVERALL WAGE RESTRAINT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 80 p 11

> [Text] The Hague, 28 Oct--The chairman of the Christian Employers Union, NCW, Van Eijkelenburg, sees no advantage in the proposal of the largest employers organization VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises] to interrupt the negotiations on working conditions in the year 1981 with a breathing spell. Van Eijkelenburg believes that a decision should be reached in the very near future.

This weekend VNO chairman Van Veen proposed that the government extend the present wage arrangements to 1 April 1981 to allow employers and employees more time to reach an agreement on the policies for next year.

Van Veen's proposal came after he had said on an earlier occasion that he considered further negotiations on wages and other working conditions useless. At that time he advocated that the government take immediate measures on wages.

NCW chairman Van Eijkelenburg did not agree. Yesterday, during an NCW press conference, it appeared that the difference of opinion between the two employer organizations had not yet been cleared up.

The NCW stands by its opinion that the negotiations should go on. Van Eijkelenburg was indeed pessimistic about chances of success in view of the "immovable positions on wage developments." According to him the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] should drastically reverse its stand.

The NCW would like the cabinet to present proposals accepted by a majority in the Second Chamber including the delegations of the government parties. These proposals with wage restraints of 3 to 4 percent are more encompassing than the wage restraint of 2.5 percent proposed by the government to the social partners. As recorded in a motion of CDA faction leader Lubbers a majority in the Chamber believes that price compensation should be completely abandoned as of 1 January. The ensuing loss in purchasing power should be compensated by smaller dues and contributions.

Irrespective of the results of the negotiations on wages the NCW wants to discuss on short notice with other employers organizations a solution to the unemployment problem and ways to stimulate employment.

The NCV would also like to see that in the first half of next year periodic wage increases will become part of the discussions. It sees an inequity in the fact that the wage measures end on 31 December. Workers with the right to a periodic wage increase as of 1 January will get that raise if no preventive steps are taken. However, workers who were entitled to a periodic increase on 1 July did not receive it this year because the wage stipulations prohibit it.

10319
CSO: 3105

CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CRITICIZED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 1 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] "The whole affair does not have to be unilateral. One favor is worth another. If they need a truck, a lathe, fertilizer, or a pump, why not from The Netherlands? Because something flows back to our industries there will always be a broad social base for development cooperation."

As opposed to these arguments in favor of Dutch development assistance dependent on the condition that goods be purchased from our country P.J.Th. Marres presented the following thesis: "conditional assistance is contrary to the principles of the government's development policy."

The question whether development assistance should be conditional or not was today the subject of research conducted by the union of workers for development assistance in the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague.

Marres, who works at the Directorate for Development Cooperation for Asia and for General Financial Matters of the Department of Foreign Affairs, considers making Dutch development assistance "a necessary step towards improvement of its quality." Marres said: "Our policy intends to improve the fate of the poorest categories of the population in the developing countries; we must ask ourselves to what extent our help suits their most urgent needs."

Assistance with conditions is protection of one's own interests. "Goods given under certain conditions are more expensive because a part of the competition is excluded."

The biggest part of Dutch aid comes with strings attached. Gifts to the not so poor, the so-called concentration countries, are even completely conditional. The same is true for the 100 million guilders annually reserved for export transactions connected with development assistance.

Illustrating

The second speaker, Dr H.J. Tieleman, scientific assistant of the section Development Economics of the faculty for economics of the Free University of Amsterdam stated that the fact that the Dutch claim to be unable to eliminate conditions from their aid illustrates "that we are much less concerned with the target categories than with the potential suppliers of the relief merchandise."

That other nations are also giving conditional assistance is not a valid agreement against unconditional assistance by The Netherlands, according to Dr Tieleman.

As far as quality improvement is concerned there are no arguments to be found against unconditional assistance; on the contrary, he is convinced that a lot can be said in its favor.

Quality improvement of development aid would mean that The Netherlands can exercise such influence on expenditures that the assistance funds contribute optimally to lasting improvement of the living conditions of the poorest categories of the population.

Dr Tieleman said that forced purchases in The Netherlands are in this respect an obstacle because they impose a practical limitation dependent on what products the Dutch have to offer. Moreover, it limits the room to negotiate with the governments involved about expenditures in favor of the poorest categories of the population.

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AMSTERDAM MAYOR CRITICIZED FOR HANDLING OF SQUATTERS' RIOTS

Amsterdamers Down Polak

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 4 Oct 80 pp 14, 15

[Report on public opinion survey conducted by Elsevier's publishing house and NIPO (Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion) for publication in this article by J. Heinemans: "Revealing Elsevier/NIPO Survey: Amsterdamers Down Polak"]

> [Text] Practically the entire Amsterdam population (95 percent) has little or no confidence any more in Mayor Polak's leadership and the city council. Nearly 90 percent has (every) understanding for the protest action by the Amsterdam police at the time of the squatters' incidents at the Grote Keyser. More than half of the Amsterdamers are of the opinion that the squatters' bastion at the Keyzers Gracht should be leveled to the ground. Those are the equally revealing and remarkable figures produced by an Elsevier/NIPO inquiry among the Amsterdam population.

The Amsterdamer, slowly beaten to a pulp by riots, has spoken. And remarkably: for the first time since the turbulent Provo years and all that came after them, the citizens have now clearly and for the first time by a huge majority chosen the side of the police. And at the same time pronounced a devastating verdict on the government of Mayor Wim Polak, the city's executive council, and the Community Council.

The distrust and disapproval of the Amsterdam city government's actions runs through all the parties. Only 5 percent of PvdA [Labor Party] voters have confidence in the policies of the highly socialist city government; two-thirds call Polak only "fair", and one-third say outright that it is a question here of "bad" government. D'66 [Democrats of 1966] express themselves a[illegible] even more disturbed about the government, while among VVD [People's Par[illegible]reedom and Democracy] voters, no less than 68 percent speak of a substan[illegible]ern-ment, 26 percent say they would call it "fair", and only 4 percent [illegible]e VVD members feel the mayor and aldermen are doing a good job. In the CDA, 10 percent say that things are going well, two-thirds speak of "fair", and one-third roundly rejects the government. Of the smaller parties, CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands], PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] and PPR [Political Party of

the Radicals], only 1 percent expressed themselves as having confidence in Polak and his aldermen, 43 percent said "fair", and 55 percent "bad".

This devastating verdict by the voters--the poll was held among Amsterdamers of 18 years and older--may give the political parties cause for deep reflection. At the same time, after all, a verdict was also given on the program accord which has left the metropolis rudderless for years at a time. It is clear that the citizens of Amsterdam are sick of the eternal squabbling and uproar within and among the political parties over the head of the worthy voter. They are not only fed up with Polak, but obviously also with the majority of the aldermen and council members.

The police, so often reviled in earlier years, are clearly gaining ground, earning the confidence of the Amsterdamer more and more, and are succeeding in jacking their battered image up appreciably. The poll figures permit no misunderstanding about that: nearly two-thirds of the Amsterdam population (58 percent) find the police protest action to be not only understandable but also correct, nearly one-third (31 percent) are of the opinion that the police ought to carry out their (entire) job under all circumstances, but nonetheless fully sympathize with the choice of the personnel at the Lijnbaansgracht bureau not to carry out Mayor Polak's order to deal tolerantly with the blatant offenses which were organized in connection with the squatters' demonstration around the Groote Keyser. The police decided then to ignore petty crime in the whole district, to the great ire of the mayor, who let it be known that such provocations could not be tolerated.

The Amsterdamers spoke out all too clearly about the squatters, too. With a fifth uprising in Amsterdam in the offing--the reports of the opposition organized by the squatters during the festival opening of the Metro on 11 and 12 October can be called clearly disturbing--about half of the citizenry feels that an end should be put to the occupation of the Groote Keyser as soon as possible and that the mouth of the illegal transmitter, which calls day in and day out for uproar and opposition, must be stilled. Of those queried 35 percent feel that first and as soon as possible negotiations must be entered into with the squatters, and 1 in 10 Amsterdamers feels that the city government must leave the squatters alone.

The Elsevier/NIPO survey also viewed the question "clean out or not" by party affiliation. Among PvdA voters, 39 percent say clean out at once, 48 percent say talk with the squatters first, 11 percent say let them alone. In the CDA, thesefigures are respectively: 60-30-4; in the VVD: 79-17-4; in the other small (leftist) parties: 28-40-30.

The protest action by the policemen of the Lijnbaansgracht bureau finds the greatest support among CDA voters: 70 percent say they find the provocating action "proper and also quite understandable", 26 percent have every understanding for it but find it improper, and only 2 percent disapprove of the action. There was also very much understanding among VVD voters (as second) for the hard-pressed policeman: 64 percent agree fully with the action, 28 percent speak of "understandable but improper", and 8 percent disapprove of the action. More than half (54 percent) of the PvdA voters agree with the

police action, one-third find the action understandable but improper, and 18 percent speak of "incomprehensible and improper". Among the D'66, the figures are approximately the same as with the PvdA: respectively 53-41-6, so there is a bit more understanding among the Democrats. But even among the small leftist parties quite a bit of understanding is shown for the police behavior: 40 percent completely agree with it, 41 percent find the action understandable but still improper, and 20 percent disapprove of the action.

For the police the tide seems to have turned; for the Amsterdam city government as well, but for them in an unfavorable sense. The Amsterdam citizenry has put down Polak and his city government.

Police Dissatisfaction

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 4 Oct 80 pp 16-21

[Report on spot interviews with Amsterdam policemen about their morale and the squatters' riots by Jan Heinemans and Onno Reitsma: "If Polak Leaves, We Will Give Him A Box of Tin Soldiers"]

> [Text] The Amsterdam policeman can no longer take it sitting down. He can no longer get a line on what passes for policy. Straight is not straight any more; crooked is not crooked any more. So more and more he has to steer by his own compass: his healthy farmer's instinct. But if he does that demonstratively, he is lectured from above. But: "To heck with them". ELSEVIER spoke with quite a few Amsterdam officers and noted the dissatisfaction.

No Metro festival in Amsterdam. Amsterdam's businesses have given up the celebration of the opening of the Metro on 10 and 11 October. The Association City Amsterdam, which saw a fine chance of giving the slowly failing inner city another boost upwards, is scared to death of riots. The squatters of the Groote Keyser have already pertly announced them: "Take things to throw and to hit with along on 10 and 11 October and make this an unforgettable happening!" is the call of the illegal radio transmitter in the untouchable squatters' stronghold. And when the merchants heard from the officer of justice that the police would not be able to protect the festival adequately, they simply gave up the festival.

The backwards world: the squatters' demonstration, held without permission, must not be hindered in any way, with four platoons of Mobile Unit [ME] in reserve to combat possible muscle teams and thus protect the squatters. The City festival: too bad, but we cannot do anything about it. City Amsterdam and the Chamber of Commerce have written grumbling letters to the mayor and the officer of justice since then stating that businesses are not defended adequately against the results of riots. During the latest uprising, the inner city merchants suffered damages amounting to many hundred thousand guilders from fire and theft.

Opinion on Amsterdam City Government Policy With Respect to City Problems In General	Men	Women	Total Surveyed
	%	%	%
Good	5	4	4
Fair	52	47	50
Bad	42	48	45
Does Not Know/No Response	1	1	1
Total Surveyed	100	100	100

Opinion on Cleaning Out The Groote Keyser	Men	Women	Total Surveyed
	%	%	%
Clean Out Now Without Further Ado	50	53	51
First There Must Be Negotiation With The Squatters	38	32	35
No Need To Clean Out	10	10	10
Does Not Know/No Response	2	5	3
Total Surveyed	100	100	100

Opinion on Cleaning Out The Groote Keyser	PvdA	CDA	VVD	D'66	Other Parties
	%	%	%	%	%
Clean Out Now Without Further Ado	39	60	79	63	28
First There Must Be Negotiation With The Squatters	48	30	17	33	40
No Need To Clean Out	11	4	4	3	30
Does Not Know/No Response	2	6	-	1	2

Opinion on Policy of Amsterdam City Government With Respect to City Problems in General	Political Party for Which Respondent Would Vote if Elections Were Held Today				
	PvdA	CDA	VVD	D'66	Other Parties
	%	%	%	%	%
Good	5	10	4	3	1
Fair	62	60	26	59	43
Bad	33	30	68	36	55
Does Not Know/No Response	1	-	2	3	1
Total Surveyed	100	100	100	100	100

Opinion on Protest Action by Amsterdam Police Last Weekend	Men	Women	Total Surveyed
	%	%	%
Understandable And Proper	53	64	58
Quite Understandable But Improper	35	26	31
Incomprehensible And Improper	11	8	10
Does Not Know/ No Response	1	1	1
Total Surveyed	100	100	100

Opinion on Protest Action by Amsterdam Police Last Weekend	PvdA	CDA	VVD	D'66	Other Parties
	%	%	%	%	%
Understandable And Proper	54	80	64	53	40
Quite Understandable But Improper	28	26	28	41	41
Incomprehensible And Improper	18	2	8	6	20
Does Not Know/No Response	-	2	-	-	-

What It All Costs

The squatters' actions guzzle government money. The Prins Hendrikkade operation--the figures are now complete at the city hall--cost the municipality (or rather the community, for Amsterdam has no money) a fat 2 million guilders. This year the Amsterdam policemen have made 100,000 hours of overtime. And it has to come from somewhere. On Coronation Day, 150,000 guilders of tear gas alone was shot up. A policeman: "You could just about say: 'Municipality, let the squatters sit there in the Groote Keyser, for if we go on this way: clean out--Mobile Unit--operation--riot, and that is the way it goes, then it will cost us many times more than to simply say: Boys, just hold your horses'".

But there is also a completely different, deadly frustrating angle in that hundred thousand man-hours, for they had to be put in by a police force that is already severely understaffed in Amsterdam. And there will certainly be policemen who can really use that extra penny, but the protests against this being called in unexpectedly are getting increasingly vehement. ["]You think you have a free weekend coming after so many weeks of irregular hours, and then there you go again. Papa has to catch squatters and the birthday did not go through for him."

And The Petty Losses

"During the coronation riots my wristwatch got away from me," says one ME [Mobile Unit] man. "Then you fill out a statement about it and it disappears into the official works. It will probably all get straightened out, but I have just coughed up the money for a new watch, for I still have not heard anything about a compensation settlement." Another: "My glasses splintered on the asphalt of the Rokin. And I need them. Bought a new pair. They were supposed to replace the old ones. And now they tell me that my old glasses were 14 months old and so there will be a deduction from the compensation figure. Just imagine: An insurance company tells a man with an amputated leg: You have already used that leg for 70 years; naturally we cannot pay the entire insured value, for it was rather an old leg."

And Things Are Not So Great at Home, Either

"You have your regular policework, and that is not always pleasant. I had just come to Amsterdam, 19 years old, and in the cruiser I heard that something was going on at the Sloterdijk station. We went. A woman, about 24 years old, had thrown herself in front of a train and lay there literally in two pieces. You know that you cannot just stand there or run away, so you help the medic from the ambulance put her on the stretcher. You do think about that kind of thing at home from time to time. But with all of this mess in Amsterdam, the pressure strikes at your wife and children, too, without your being able to do anything about it. They see ME men being carried away wounded on television. Is that Papa? Then when you come home, like the last time, after 18 hours service, you cannot talk pap. But your wife's voice is hot, too. And nervous. At home they know exactly what all has happened. They watched when that police vehicle was turned over with our men in it. They could see, and later once more read the details described precisely in the papers, the way the squatters

sharpened concrete reinforcing irons and poked them right through the bars of our so-called armored cars. Through the glass and then just stir. One time I stood facing a fellow with a loaded harpoon gun. That does do something to you. And then later from the chief or the judge: You struck back with stones. Not permitted. But what can you do then? Between the cordon and the stone throwers there is a distance of 60 to 70 meters, and that distance can easily be covered by anyone with a good arm. And you with just your useless baton behind your shield. For an outsider it must be a ludicrous sight. But to throw stones back? That is forbidden, the squatters and their lawyers cry."

The Firearms Order

The "average" ME man reacted rather laconically to the expansive compliments they got from Wiegel, Polak and the Amsterdam council members after the coronation riots. "We acted so terribly disciplined. For while there certainly were situations when use could--and should--have been made of the pistol, that did not happen. That was crazy! Polak had told the highest chief, All well and good, no matter what happens, there will not be a shot fired. Do you understand that? The head commissioner understood that and passed the order down. And no matter how you look at it, it was a bad order, for it was in conflict with the official instructions where there is a precise description of when you may or may not make use of your weapon. It turned out that Polak does not even know those instructions. He really ought to read them, for he is the head of the police."

Fear

"Our adversary in the riots is out for the first fatal sacrifice. Preferably an innocent passerby, a woman with a child in her arms, or the like, a martyr. At that same moment there will be return fire, for there are firearms enough in those circles. We are on the edge of urban guerrilla warfare. The only wait is for the first crack in the ice."

Information

"When Polak had decided for the second time to postpone clearing out the Groote Keyser, the squatters there immediately received a letter about it, complete with the entire motivation for not clearing it out. But his own policemen, who had been called up, who had had to break their promises for the nth time, who saw their free time going up in smoke ... not one word. Did they not have a right to information? But these same boys might very well have to accompany the porter the next morning because a little family was to be evicted from an apartment. What do you think of the motivation of those boys?"

Polak

"If that man goes, the sooner the better, than we will give him a box of tin soldiers. Then he can plan happily with an apparatus that does not have any families behind it, that does not need any information or any support. And he's supposed to be a socialist mayor, a man of the people. Well, just give me that liberal stuffed shirt from Utrecht, Vonhoff. When he sends the police

into action, then he himself appears on the stage, shows himself to the men. Polak? He gives his chauffeur orders to drive quickly through into the courtyard of the main bureau, so that he does not have to walk through the ME men himself. Just imagine: Perhaps then he would have to talk to the common policemen himself."

Frustration

"You help put a fellow behind bars for 3 months. His wife keeps the business going, profits of 3,500 guilders net per month, a quick hundred cars a month, I figure. But the business is not in her name, so during those 3 months she gets a benefit payment from the welfare service. The fellow comes out from behind bars again, the reclassification service writes a sad report that in those 3 months his business has failed and that he needs 250,000 guilders government support to set it on its feet again, and he gets that money! Do I have to contribute to that? Oh, you don't just quit, but you generally get sick and tired of it. If it has to be ....?

Probation Period

"The young ME men come straight from school, they have not gone through any social formation, they are only theoretically educated. As beginning policemen, the boys have a probation period of 2 years. One of the young fellows had all his teeth knocked out and his jaw broken to splinters in the Vondelstraat. Now I hear that he has to go, that he is not adequate as a policeman. Naturally, that is possible; I cannot be the judge of that. But then you do ask yourself: Not suitable to be a policeman, but fine for catching stones in his teeth?"

Fear of Falling

"When they shout 'Amsterdam, police city!' on the street, I am tempted to take up the cry, to start shouting with them, for is it not that way? In Amsterdam, the police have to find their own way, you cannot expect anything from the policy makers, they pursue an ad hoc policy, hindered by the fear of falling. But the blame does not rest with Amsterdam alone, but with the Hague as well. What has become of the vacancy law, just to name one?"

Tolerance

"There is a lot of that. We catch it from everywhere, and we almost never do anything right. If you talk to an Amsterdamer who has just driven through a red light and you point it out to him and you give him a friendly little talk, you are the greatest. If you reach for your ticket book, for after all, that is what you are there for, then you are a big fraud, who goes after the little fish and lets the big ones go, and that sort of remark. But believe me: If my buddy and I leave the police station here and start out towards the Leidseplein, then after 100 meters I have already seen I do not know how many things you really ought to do something about. There are petty infractions against the Law on Public Places (tapping beer on the street, terraces without permits), you really ought to be able to do something to combat drugs, for on

the Melkweg you hear the hissing of the dealers offering their goods for sale, you have things you could do about lese-majeste, for there is a portrait of her majesty hanging that is so shameless that according to a strict reading of the law both the maker and the one who hung it up ought to be behind bars, or at least fined. You see a few hundred improperly parked cars. You could really keep busy. But you just leave it alone. No time, or: there is certainly meatier work to do, you think. But naturally it is frustrating, for that is not what they taught you at the police academy. The chiefs do expect you to use your eyes and report offenses and write summonses, but the old saying: 'If you want to stay, write tickets,' is not so any more. Sometimes you think you've gone crazy: We see two Chileans without passports, residence permits, or anything. We pick them up. They are deported by way of Schipol. We see these two guys again 2 weeks later. They have outstanding passports, but there is something fishy about them. Back over the border. What do you think we should do if we see these two just wandering around again? That is right.

"Amsterdamers are a separate public. In your car you get an order, high priority: a big accident or something; just after that you hear on the two-way radio that there is a cat in the canal somewhere. Would the police come and pull it out. Naturally you first finish up with the priority 1, then you go after the cat, which has died in the meantime. And then you should see the way the public looks at you. Could we not have come earlier, or are we sometimes afraid to do a little work?"

Frustration

"In the fight against heroin, the municipality has decided that there ought to be cafe-like rooms to take in addicts. Then the fellows could relax a little over a beer, in their own atmosphere and among their own kind. Now they always taught me that alcohol and drugs do not go together, but all right .... In those subsidized, cafe-like rooms there is an estimated 400 kilos of heroin traded a year. Under our noses. Forget the opium law just this once, the designated authorities say, and the drinking and public places law, and the law on closing times and the music permits. But then do I really have to give a poor Schlemiel of an ince cream vendor a ticket because he is standing there without a license, 20 meters from that cafe-like room? Well, to heck with them!"

Frustration

"Those two Antilleans who were shot dead this year in Amsterdam in emergency defense situations. And then the whole flood tide of society-improving know-it-alls pours all over you. Then the police have done it again. But then no one asks how often you have tried to get these people picked up by the medical authorities, because the situation is getting unbearable for a whole neighborhood. 'That is the way it goes, and it will not work,' you hear then, 'just keep an eye on it for a little while longer, our reception facilities are so overcrowded.' Until those boys ran amok, and, sadly enough, were shot down by an officer in fear of his life. Who did that? The officer. But you do not hear anything about the institutions that ignored the situation for so long.

"If you want to hear rightist talk, then you have to listen some time when the wives of policemen get together. 'Those guys really look crazy to us, just set up a machinegun.' That is not good either, naturally, but it is understandable. In my ME platoon in the Vondelstraat I had a boy from the province who was wounded. We just went to look him up in the vacation, my wife and I. And then you hear your wife thinking, there in the nice, single-family residence with a front and a back yard, garage next to the house: 'I could just as gladly live here, instead of in that fifth floor flat in Purmurend, because you cannot find a house in Amsterdam.' Nice and rustic, about all you have to deal with there all the time is traffic accidents with sheet metal damage, with chalk marks on the road and sketches of the scene. In Amsterdam you would perish with that. Do you know how many Amsterdam officers put in for the 8 vacancies that occurred when Lelystad was given a municipal police department? 300 men! Still, for the usual work you do not have to leave. That kind of thing remains a little crazy for the people of Amsterdam. And the atmosphere within the department is good. Take him: two stars on his shoulders, inspector, just out of the police academy. Knows the whole thing from books, but he does not know anything from experience." (The one so spoken of softly admits, "Well, nothing".) "But that does not matter, for that is why he tags along with us. On good terms, none of that separation between officers and other ranks. You do hear different stories about that from other places in the country."

Amsterdam Should Have An Alderman For the Police

"It is unimaginable that the Amsterdam city government--with a few exceptions here and there I really must say that I mean the VVD here, for I was brought up to be a moderately leftist person--has so incredibly little understanding of the police and their job. There are some involved who do not begin to have the faintest notion. The law unfortunately sets down that police matters are the responsibility of the mayor, but in big cities like Amsterdam he really ought to be able to delegate the work to a different man, for Polak is much too busy with other things. There is too little contact on both sides. And that also applies to the courts. We recently had an officer of justice who wanted to go on the beat with us at night from time to time. That was a good one, an exception. Later he told us that he had had no idea what we were up to. The mayor does talk to his chief commissioner every Monday, but we get the impression from time to time that that is as far as it goes. He does not have the faintest notion as to what is going on with the average man. No wonder that many of the Amsterdam policemen try to get away. They have had enough here. But in the past few years, the departments elsewhere have gotten full and it is getting harder. One of my colleagues got a position in Zeeland. After everything was settled, the chief of the department said: "Just ride along with me. We will go look for a house for you." He had the choice of five residences, half as much in rent as what he had paid for a garden apartment in Amsterdam. Why should you stay in Amsterdam, with all of its foolishness, then? Many of my colleagues live a long ways off, because you cannot get a decent roof over your head here. They come in every day from Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Purmerend, Almere. You do get travel compensation, but you do not make out on that, and it costs you extra time."

Another opinion: "They could not pay me enough to leave Amsterdam. It is a real education. Every day you have something different. I would not want to sit way out in the boondocks."

Union Support

At a heavily attended membership meeting last weekend, the Amsterdam chapter of the Netherlands Police Association aligned itself behind the personnel of the Lijnbaansgracht bureau, who took no action against petty crime on account of the Groote Keyser demonstration. "If it comes to an inquiry," President L. Pleging said, "but I do not believe it will, we are going to stand behind the personnel who began the action and who have received the support of the other district bureaus." Pleging called the action "a signal from the personnel who have already worked for years under pressures exceeding the maximum." That evening the Amsterdam chapter demanded "a clear, comprehensible police policy in the interests of society." And also that the strength of the force be expanded. Naturally, the union wants more: extra pay and allowances due to working in an extremely troublesome city with entirely typical Amsterdam problems, and also because many big events take place in the metropolis, and then particularly on weekends, with all the extra pressures coupled with that.

"And Then You Are Called As A Witness"

Amsterdam's chief officer of justice, Mr A. N. Meeschaert has ordered the National Detective Force to institute an inquiry into possible mistreatment of the squatters by members of the Mobile Unit. "Naturally we, too, make mistakes and oversights, but to say that we attacked the squatters like beasts during the clearing of the Vogelstruys on 3 July .... Nonsense. Do not forget: In this instance, very young ME men were employed, who had just gotten through their 6 or 7 weeks' training. Young men who were called on to deal with dyed-in-the-wool rioting squatters. But that we are said to have bestially mistreated the squatters. Various of the young policemen have given statements, but do not forget the violent tensions. A policeman--and particularly one who is still wet behind the ears--(we are talking about kids 19, 20 and 21 years old) is only human, too. You could safely call what the squatters and their allied do a series of attempts at murder. You do have a helmet on your head and a shield in front of you, but they throw an awful lot of cement awfully hard. For that matter, when you look at the casualty lists, those left wounded by the riots, you will see that each time there have been more victims among the police than on the other side, which can be much more flexible, can flee or can act violently against small groups of isolated policemen. We are said to have used forbidden teargas. I really think that the other side used forgidden firebombs, and forbidden concrete reinforcing rods, forbidden clubs and stones. And at a trial like that, you get the feeling: are these the suspects? Young policemen who can tidy up the rotten mess the big bosses, the city government, the national government, have made of it. And then you read the views of one of the police magistrates, who sees the ME man as something nasty to be pushed around; then you read the questions in the municipal council and in the Chamber, and then you really have to reach for your head. The government keeps on just barely muddling through ad hoc, a zig-zag policy, whether it has to do with squatters this

time, or with heroin, or the deportation of foreigners. Or they just say, 'Boys, we know that it is forbidden, but just let it alone, or else we will just have a bigger mess to deal with.' I have never yet gotten to hear an answer to the question of how in Heaven's name things could ever get this far. Then the policymakers are not in, and then there remains little for a policeman to do other than to try to think logically. Then you just have to interpret the law a little yourself, for it will always keep on being chaotic. You know, for example, that sales night in Amsterdam will keep on being a rotten mess each week (last Thursday there was another massive battle in the Martelaarsgracht district: police against 150 hopped up youths(ed)). They strut along the whole Nieuwendijk and the Kalverstraat up to the Munt armed with clubs. Passers-by are beaten without cause. You just go up there again and drive them apart. And each time you arrest a few. But that does not accomplish much. But you never find out how it comes about and whose fault it is and what could be done about it. You are there to keep order, so you just go up there again."

Unequal Enforcement

"You receive orders not to interfere when squatters and their sympathizers drag in whole truckloads of stolen construction materials to build themselves barricades. Intervening would mean a confrontation and not enough men are available. That may very well be true. But then how hard do you think I will run after a guy who has nabbed a portable radio from a couple of teenieboppers on the corner? Not all that hard, I think."

Tactics

"Then you get orders to clear out the Vogelstruy: 30 or 40 men are supposed to make their way into those premises unobserved. Unobserved. The squatters have their lookouts posted all around. They even have a constant watch on the Unicorn, where the ME members have to pick up their equipment. At the moment that pressure is reported there, the squatters alarm is put into operation. It does not take long then before Radio Stad ['City Radio,' the squatters' illegal transmitter] is on the scene, and you know that wherever Radio Stad is, there will be riots. Still: 30, 40 men must try to make their way into those premises unobserved. Well, it went well that time, but could it not just as easily have been 40 wounded ME members lying on the street? The risks are too great, you cannot take them with so few people, the men are sacrificed as they were in Vondelstraat.

"On 23 February, 72 Vondelstraat was broken into by squatters, on 24 February we cleared it out. With two platoons of the Mobile Unit in service, we were called on to prevent the then continuing reoccupation of the building by squatters 5 days later. It turned into a full-fledged battle, with 62 policemen wounded. And how come? Because the squatters were better informed than the police. It turned out that the premises were vacant and being held by speculators, the premises were only occupied pro forma, while the municipality of Amsterdam had an option on those premises, and was negotiating for their purchase. Polak and Schaefer were fully informed of that. Thus, the police were not called out to prevent the nth squatter action, but merely to protect a piece of the municipality's property. Policemen were sacrificed for that. And who was blamed? Not Mayor Polak, not Mr Messchaert, the chief officer of justice, no, it was the Amsterdam police. Thank you very much."

SECOND CHAMBER MAJORITY AGAINST RENT, SUBSIDY POLICY

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 21 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] The Hague, 21 Oct--A majority in the Second Chamber formed by the opposition and the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] combined, rejects several essential points of the rent and subsidy policy the cabinet wants to see introduced next year. The VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy], on the other hand, largely supports the cabinet's proposals.

The Chamber majority's criticism is sharpest with regard to rents in the urban renewal areas and the proposed treatment of renters with minimum incomes who receive individual rent subsidies.

The Chamber talked with Secretary of State Brokx (of Housing) in an expanded committee meeting [Committee of the Whole]. In a meeting of that kind, motions can be voted upon, but the votes are reserved until the budget discussions in the last week of November.

The cabinet wants to abolish the guarantee and comparability rents for next year. Hidden behind these concepts are special regulations which result in lower rents for urban renewal districts which are known to the residents in advance (guarantee rents) or in moderate rents which are somewhat consistent with the rents of comparable residences (comparability rents).

In order to simplify all of the regulations in the housing area and also from budgetary considerations, the cabinet wants to do away with these separate systems as of 1 January 1981. To replace them there would be a separate discount on rents, such as is already in effect in urban renewal districts.

For CDA spokesman Dijkman, this attempt by the cabinet was an indication that the ministers were not adequately involved in the difficult process of urban renewal. This difficult operation can only succeed if those directly involved know where they stand (guarantee rents) and if they are faced with acceptable and payable housing costs (comparability rents).

PvdA [Labor Party] spokesman Van Dam put it a bit more sharply.

Brokx rejected the criticism. If a relationship is reestablished between the costs

of providing housing and the rents of the housing, then there will be a stimulus for limiting the costs of providing the housing, and that in turn will result in lower rents.

However, a munificent Chamber majority maintained its objections, even after Brokx had made a few promises, one of which was to spread the bite of abolishing the comparability rents over a period of 4 years.

Subsidy Policy

The secretary of state came to oppose his fellow CDA member Dijkman sharply in the matter of the individual subsidies for renters with a minimum income. Next year the cabinet wants to have these renters pay a quarter percent more of their income for rent next year, resulting in a full percent in 4 years. Those receiving the median income would have to pay a half percent more of their income per year, or 2 percent in 4 years.

Dijkman opposed this meddling with the buying power of those receiving the minimum income.

In his defense, Brokx stated that it is only a matter of small steps, for those receiving the minimum wage about 4.50 guilders per month and for those receiving the median income about 11.50 guilders per month.

Dijkman found that to be a "pitiful tale." The individual rent subsidy remains a cornerstone of the CDA's housing policy, he said, and in accordance with the coalition agreement there must not be any meddling with the position of those receiving the minimum income in that area.

VVD spokesman De Beer expressed understanding of Brokx's statements.

One-Sided

Van Dam (PvdA) spoke of "regular breach of faith" and called it scandalous that the new housing cost policy would apply only to renters, while the owner residents would get off scot-free.

Brokx assured the Chamber that the cabinet is working on this last-mentioned policy (interest deduction, rental value forfeit, and so on), and that proposals concerning that could be expected within the forseeable future.

De Beer wanted to know from Brokx how big the deficit in the budget deficit would be, and long-term estimates were given of 9 to 10 million guilders next year if the CDA and PvdA motions were to be carried, and "at least 10 times that much" in the following years.

The debate on the rental and subsidy policy will be continued during the debate on the budget for Housing and Space Allocation. Then the CDA and PvdA motions will be brought up again.

6940
CSO: 3105

BRIEFS

CDJA ESTABLISHMENT DATE POSTPONED--The establishment of the CDA's [Christian Democratic Appeal] youth organization has been temporarily postponed by a few weeks. However, the youth organizations of the KVP [Catholic People's Party], ARP [Anti-revolutionary Party], and CHU [Christian Historical Union] will embark on a far-reaching form of cooperation as of 1 November. This was the decision reached yesterday evening by the federation management of the CDA youth organizations. We already reported earlier that the mandatory three-quarters majority for dissolution could not be reached at Saturday's general membership meeting of the Arjos [Anti-revolutionary Youth Study Club], the ARP youth can therefore not yet obtain membership in the CDJA [Christian Democratic Youth Organization] on 1 November. Tonight the federation management will study the legal shape of closer cooperation. [Text] [Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 80 p 3] 10319

CSO: 3105

DIEGO MARQUEZ ON FALANGIST MOVEMENT OBJECTIVES, PHILOSOPHY

Santiago QUE PASA in Spanish 30 Oct-5 Nov 80 pp 9-11

[Interview with Falangist leader Diego Marquez Horquillo, by M. Angelica Bulnes during 18 October seminar on nationalism in honor of Rolando Matus, in Santiago, Chile]

[Text] Diego Marquez Horquillo (a 49-year old Spanish attorney, married, with two children) is by background a major Falangist. As a child he belonged to the so-called "arrows" of the Falange. He has been the commander of the 20th Division of Franco's guard, national inspector of the National Movement, secretary general of the Spanish University Union (SEU), founder and president of the Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera doctrinal clubs and is currently the visible head of the Spanish Falange, since its number one leader, 82-year old Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, has had to halt most of his activities for health reasons.

Marquez Horquillo visited Chile for the first time last week in response to an invitation from the National Command of Workers to take part in a seminar in Pucon (See separate article). After an active weekend by the shores of Lake Villarica, Marquez Horquillo traveled to Santiago to attend a meeting at the Corporation of National Studies, give a talk at the headquarters of the Workers Command and hold a number of private conversations. During his conversation with QUE PASA he expressed great enthusiasm over the affinity of thought that he had found with most of the people attending the Pucon seminar, an affinity which, in his opinion, does not exist to the same extent with European nationalist movements. He was very cautious in voicing judgments on the current situation in Chile, pointing out that he had only now received more thorough information on what is happening in Chile and that, therefore, he respected the paths and solutions that were being pursued here. When asked whether at times in Spain Franco is compared with President Pinochet, he said that the parallel is often drawn and that even some friends of his told him when they found out that he was going to Chile: "See if you can bring Pinochet back to Spain."

Nothing Being Done Under Suarez

Marquez Horquillo calls himself very much a "sui generis" politician, "because I have never been in power," and he feels that in general Spanish politicians have not been equal to the occasion. "Power perhaps corrupts, and those of us who have still not wielded it are not corrupted and we see things differently. The current government politicians are the negation of politics; they do nothing but adjust their chairs." He includes the head of government, Adolfo Suarez, in this assessment, stating that the Falange could never reach an agreement with him even though Suarez is a former Falangist and a "typical product" of what used to be Franco's National Movement. "It would be easier for us to reach an understanding with any other political faction, except Marxism, because Suarez is up to here with commitments and surrounded by incompetent people."

In Diego Marquez's opinion, the Falange has now overcome its internal divisions (Edillismo, Francoism and the followers of the deceased poet Dionisio Ridruejo) and is trying to establish its own political identity. Even though they say they have close to 600,000 active members, they had to form a coalition for the elections with Blas Pinar's New Force movement, achieving a single deputy, Pinar himself.

QUE PASA: Isn't it a bit romantic at this point in Spain's new political era to try and revive the Spanish Falange?

Diego Marquez: It's not that romantic if you consider that communism has also had a revival in Spain and is an older movement than we are. The Falange is the most modern political movement in my country because it was founded in 1933. It is a product of this century, whereas the other movements are more than 100 years old.

QUE PASA: Has the Falange changed some of its former positions in the face of today's Spain?

Diego Marquez: No, because the Falange's economic and social doctrine was never implemented. Franco had to represent many political forces that were at times at odds. Socioeconomically, Franco applied the church's social doctrine more than the Falange's, which is very advanced.

Neither Capitalism Nor Marxism

QUE PASA: How would you summarize the Falange's economic and social ambitions for Spain?

Diego Marquez: Economically, we advocate a system that is neither capitalist nor Marxist. We are trying to go beyond these two philosophies. Our ambition is a union society. We want the workers to be the owners of the companies,

something like cooperatives. We recognize individual private, community, family, union and cooperative property, but we do not accept private ownership of the means of production. We believe that production ought to be in the hands of the entire people, not just of a fellow with money. We want Spain to be a giant union of workers (with a very broad spectrum of meanings to the word "worker"), because they are the main figures in politics. A society based on labor, not money, or blood or the predominance of the state. A major congress of workers would make the various policies and represent all of the factions and the sectors of production, seeing to it that the general interest comes before the interest of groups.

QUE PASA: In terms of political action, how does what you propose differ from what the Soviet Politburo is doing and from the Marxist aspiration of a "dictatorship of the proletariat"?

Diego Marquez: Under Marxism the state owns everything. The Politburo serves a political party that is Communist. Under a Unionist National Government, political parties would have no raison d'etre or importance because class and other interests would be represented and defended at the congress of workers, which, in turn, would defend the interests of the entire Spanish people. Nor is it like a dictatorship of the proletariat because this represents a class, and the workers are all classes.

Right and Left

With regard to political organization, Diego Marquez points out that the Falange would have a government administration similar to the current one, with a chief of state elected by universal suffrage or indirectly ("The problem is of no concern to us") and various ministries. They say they are totally against Spanish separatism ("This is a crime that we will never forgive") because it runs counter to Spain's essence and only helps Marxism. "Separatism has evolved towards the left, and many of the people who defend it state openly that their goal is to establish a Soviet Socialist Republic." The role of the Armed Forces under a Falangist government would not be political, Marquez explains; rather, "they would carry out the task that is theirs in defending our sovereignty." In his opinion, the Spanish Armed Forces supported Franco but did not undertake political action "because they do not have that sort of training."

"The Falange," Marquez says, "is neither on the left nor the right. We believe that deep down the right wants to maintain an unjust social system and that the left is trying to establish a social order that although it might have some justice to it, in the long run entails the destruction of permanent values." Nor would it be a centrist movement, "because we are trying to surpass these two ideologies. Spain cannot be looked at from just one side, the left or the right; you have to look at it from both sides, head on, because otherwise your vision is incomplete."

With regard to Marxism, Marquez feels that a Falangist government would have taken care of any social grievance that the Communists might want to bring up. In any case, however, he personally would not legalize them, because "they are working for an international, not a national policy." He concedes, nevertheless, that at present in Spain the communist vote is neither increasing nor decreasing,

holding steady at two million. QUE PASA asked him whether the current government system did not deserve part of the credit for this, to which Marquez immediately replied in the negative, pointing out that "communism does not have to make voting gains, because the government is doing what the Marxists want."

A Franco Mistake?

QUE PASA: Do you feel that Franco made a mistake by not preparing a political solution in time?

Diego Marquez: Franco erred, not because he did not prepare a political solution in time but because he prepared the wrong solution. He trusted the men who paved the way for the current political reform, thus destroying the continuity of the Franco system. Franco did not properly sound out the National Movement, which was inoperative towards the end. Most of our members were outside the movement for various reasons, one of the major ones being economic development; because of the high standard of living people became unconcerned with politics.

QUE PASA: But if Franco had made a political opening long before his death, wouldn't he have been able to better gage what would happen in his own party?

Diego Marquez: If he had done so 10 years earlier, perhaps he would have succeeded in gaging what you are talking about and thus create a system with continuity. But Franco had to play ball with the political forces that made up the Movement. At the beginning he acted with the Falange. After the Second World War, when he was branded a fascist, he called in the Christian Democrats, and finally the circle closed with the technocrats, who consolidated Franco's social and economic accomplishments. But politically, things had fallen apart, combined with large-scale development and intense work by Spaniards (up to 17 hours a day, if necessary). There was disinterest and political frustration. This is the great success of the liberal democracies in the superdeveloped countries! I do not deny that it is a lifestyle and that it works in some countries, but it is a materialistic lifestyle that has led to chaos in Spain. Spaniards were well-disposed towards and hopeful about democracy, but what we have is a pseudo-democracy that has not even succeeded in preserving the material goods that people obtained under Franco. It is a clumsily applied democracy.

Falange and Fascism

QUE PASA: What if Spain managed to consolidate its democratic system and get it to function as in other European countries? Would the Falange settle for this system?

Diego Marquez: We advocate our own system, but if a real democracy were established in Spain, we would go home because we would have nothing to do politically. That is our fear as a political group, because we would have to recognize bitterly that there is another solution, but if it were for the good of Spain, we would, in fact, accept it. In any case, I don't like to play futurologist but I am certain that Spain's democracy is crumbling.

QUE PASA: What would come afterwards?

Diego Marquez: I don't know, because to me a military coup is not a solution as a permanent system.

QUE PASA: What does the Falange think of violence as a method?

Diego Marquez: We do not advocate violence, but if the political struggle is being waged on that terrain, we will have to be present. The Spanish Falange does not take reprisals until it is up to here in dead people; that is the way it has been throughout its history.

QUE PASA: Is there an ideological identification with fascism?

Diego Marquez: We shun identification with the so-called fascists, but it would be useless to deny that we have points in common, universal values such as homeland, family and work.

QUE PASA: What sets you apart from the fascists then?

Diego Marquez: The fact that we believe that fascism winds up serving capitalism, while we try to serve labor.

8743
CSO: 3110

COASTAL SHIPPING CONTRACT WITH MOZAMBIQUE

Oslo NORWEGIAN JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND SHIPPING in English 13 Nov 80 p 30

[Text]

The Swedish Thun concern which at present specializes in coastal and inner-sea shipping has received a task from the Government of Mocambique of solving the problems of that country's coastal shipping. This shipping, of high importance to the country's communication system and trade, is not functioning satisfactorily. Therefore the Thun concern has had three men at work down there doing preliminary survey and the reorganizations is expected to take a couple of years.

The Swedish airline company, Linje Fly, has also a similar contract as consultants for the Mocambique Government with the aim of improving the country's civil aviation situation.

CSO: 3120

IMPACT OF COUP ON CYPRUS PROBLEM EXAMINED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 25 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Professor Doctor Dervis Manidaze]

[Text] The anarchy in Turkey which began with external and internal provocation has, thank goodness, come to an end with the 12 September takeover by the armed forces.

Thus the tranquility and state authority which the Turkish people have so long been missing has been restored. The very courteous but precise communiques and speeches of Chief of State General Evren which guarantee the Ataturk revolution and inaugurate a new period delighted true Ataturkists.

The declarations of confidence in the newly formed regime in Turkey on the part of western states, especially world economic powers give evidence of their satisfaction that the economic difficulties which have been experienced in the past years will not be repeated. Now in the light of the fact that Turkey has returned to the Ataturk era, let us review events related to Cyprus in order to examine this problem as it may be affected by 12 September.

First Reactions

In his reply to the TFSC President Denktas' congratulatory message the Chief of State Evren's statement that "Cyprus is an inalienable part of the Turkish fatherland" and his reference to "the offspring nation" has caused a furor among the Cypriot Greeks. Distorting these words to signify "Turkey wishes to annex Cyprus" just as they always do they have begun to spread propaganda based on a lie.

In Greece also leftist students have organized demonstrations against the takeover in Turkey by the armed forces in front of the American and Turkish Embassies.

America and most of the western powers who appear finally to have somewhat grasped Turkey's political and strategic importance (leaving aside for the moment the latest debates in the European Council) have greeted the new regime in Turkey with understanding and even approval. The press and television in our near neighbor Greece, however, have dealt with this historical event belatedly, unwillingly, and without comment. It is noteworthy that in the discussions in the European Council all of the Greek representatives together with certain leftist delegates exerted themselves to have resolutions passed against Turkey.

In short when the armed forces stepped in temporarily to rescue the collapsing democratic regime brought to a point of paralysis by party disputes in the parliament and restore the Ataturk revolution, our friends were pleased and our enemies were thrown into confusion and anxiety.

Turkey has never contemplated annexing Cyprus. The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots both know this equally well. But as always they seized every opportunity to propound their "enosis" propaganda which is their basic aim and which is based on false premises. But the Greeks still do not believe that the Ataturk revolution has been restored and they hope by countermoves to throw Turkey again in confusion and profiting from that they hope to advance possibilities of "enosis."

In point of fact that Cypriot Greek leaders in a panic after 12 April held an extraordinary meeting where the subject was debated and although the majority of the participants maintained that Turkey had returned to stability and that in these circumstances it was necessary to seek for some kind of reconciliation, Kiprianou insisted on waiting. It is worth noting Klerides who is an intelligent politician in the Venizelos tradition did not participate in this meeting.

The fact that Turkey has achieved a strong and stable administration has not persuaded the Greeks to abandon their constant malice. Today our Greek friends should know that the Ataturkist armed forces in Turkey have taken things in hand and that anarchy and upheaval will certainly come to an end and that a democratic but strong leadership will evolve. Thus the Greeks must return to an intelligent policy such as that which was pursued by Venizilos.

It is very wrong to think as some pessimistic persons claim that whatever the administration may be the human material available remains the same and that, therefore, it will be impossible to establish a strong and excellent building with the same stones and those who do not know Turkey may be led to incorrect conclusions thereby. Over thousands of years of Turkish history the Turkish nation has always found within itself great statesmen and produced great architects of the state and founded many a government.

Basically when the military took over in order to save democracy which was on the point of collapse 45 million persons experienced delight and relief and confidence. The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots must understand that the time has come to abandon the 1,001 deceits and lying propaganda with which they hope to achieve "enosis."

The Sole Solution

The Greeks must understand that forbidding Turkish yachts to visit Greek harbors, to stone Turkish tourist vessels, to cut off the water for Turkish villages in Cyprus, to evade negotiations for years and to work in international conferences to produce resolutions hostile to Turkey is not the way to achieve peace and understanding in Turkish-Greek relations.

The hope to exact concessions from the new Ataturkist administration is an illusion. The only way to resolve the Cyprus problem lies in accepting a central government with weak authority, two communities, two regions, federal or confederal type of government. For Turkey the continuity of Turkish existence in Cyprus is of vital importance.

The founder of our republic the great Ataturk also always indicated this. Ataturk also said that "Turkish Greek friendship was necessary and useful but it may be that it will be necessary to maintain sufficient strength to compel our Greeks to be friendly," and I think that it is especially useful these days to call these words to mind.

Following 12 Sep it is certain that a democratic but a strong administration will be established in Turkey and with the support of 45 million people it is impossible to imagine that this effort will be unsuccessful and no one should doubt that in the future the Greeks will be compelled to seek friendship with Turkey.

9353
CSO: 4907

INVESTIGATION OF NAP BROADENED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Oct 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--It has been learned that the investigation concerning the NAP has been broadened a great deal in light of findings and information acquired after the operation which the Turkish Armed Forces brought to fruition on 12 September.

According to information which has been obtained, security forces initiated broad nationwide operations following the capture of certain NAP leaders and the principal perpetrators of certain terrorist incidents which created a major reaction in public opinion. It has been reported that as the result of these operations a large amount of incriminating items were seized and the investigation concerning the NAP was gradually broadened. Also among the information obtained is news that in operations conducted in Ankara and surrounding areas alone, a great many persons have been arrested and close to 60 incriminating items found. It is stated furthermore, that the clues and information which have been acquired are being investigated and the operations will continue.

Investigation of the NSP

In the meantime, it is said that the investigation which is going on following the arrest of NSP Chairman Necmettin Erbakan and his colleagues by the Military Court, is being widened. It has been determined that, up until today, Korkut Ozal and Kader Misirlioglu, members of the NSP General Administrative Council for whom arrest warrants had been issued in abstentia, and who are lying in a hospital after having had a traffic accident in Bolu, have not surrendered themselves to the Military Prosecutor.

It has been learned that there is a strong possibility the petitions of objection which the defense lawyers for the NSP and NAP have prepared against their leaders' arrests will be taken up and studied within the coming week. The Ankara Martial Law Command's Third Military Court will investigate and decide upon the objection concerning the NSP, while the Second Military Court will do the same with regard to the NAP objection.

Statements Taken

Two days before the holiday, the Ankara Prosecutor [at the building near the Central Command where Turkes is being held prisoner] took NAP Chairman Alpaslan Turkes' statement concerning seven separate files. Certain of these criminal files were sent to the Martial Law Prosecutor's Office because of its interest and suits were initiated concerning the others. There are also suits among those filed by the prosecutor against Turkes which were initiated because of his actions in violation of Turkish Law 159.

Legal files were also sent to the Martial Law Command relating to remarks by the NAP chairman which he made both at the end of 1978 and in connection with the army taking power.

9236
CSO: 4907

AEGEAN ISSUE BEING REVIVED

Talks on Aegean Problem Begin

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 19 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Nilufer Yalcin]

[Text] Athens and Ankara have arrived at an understanding with regard to the defense of the Aegean sea and air space on the basis of the text of an agreement which reads "The areas of command and control will be determined on the basis of agreements between Turkey and Greece." Thus Greece has abandoned its insistence that the responsibility for the defense command should be once more given to her upon her return to the military wing of NATO as it was before 1974. The Turkish Government also has changed its stand in opposition to the military integration of Greece prior to the determination of the command question.

The commander of the NATO European alliance, General Rogers, who has been carrying on the efforts to bring the two countries together on this question, completed the details on the text of this agreement in discussions with the chief of the Greek general staff in his Naples headquarters the day before yesterday and flew immediately to Ankara with his private plane where he was received by the Chief of State, General Evren. The text which General Rogers had prepared and which was approved by the chief of the Greek general staff was found satisfactory and was approved by General Evren and officials of the general staff. Thus Turkey and Greece have arrived at a formula for working out the question of responsibility for command in the Aegean sea and air space. Through this agreement the way has been opened for the return of Greece to the NATO military wing. The agreement will be made public in the near future.

According to this agreement Athens has abandoned her claim that command responsibility over the Aegean sea and air space, a claim which was created by the de facto situation prior to 1974, belongs solely to her. Command arrangements relating to the Aegean will be negotiated between officials in the Nato headquarters in Izmir and a similar separate joint headquarters which is to be established in Greece. The NATO southern European forces headquarters in Naples will also participate in this command and the areas of command question will be worked out in this three-way negotiation. Until the sides have worked out a definitive solution the system which has been followed since 1974 with respect to NATO maneuvers and national maneuvers will remain in force. Greece will make its own arrangements to fit into this ad hoc system.

There is no suggestion whatsoever in the text of the agreement as to how the two countries are to share the responsibility for the Aegean or as to what approaches they may make in the negotiations. This subject is completely left to the military officials of the two sides and of the Naples headquarters. Furthermore, the abandonment by the Greeks of the idea of reentering NATO under conditions which prevailed prior to 1974 could eliminate quite a few technical problems on the Aegean sea and air spaces which have created friction with Turkey after Greece enters NATO. For example, it might be hoped that Athens will abandon the six-mile continental waters and the ten-mile air space resolution which was passed in the 1930's.

In answer to concern which has been expressed that the Greeks after they have reentered NATO might prolong the negotiations regarding arrangements concerning the responsibilities of the two countries for the Aegean sea and air space or even create an impasse in the discussions, officials are expressing the following views:

"From the Turkish standpoint it is not believed that such a situation will be cause for great concern because the ad hoc situation which is still in force has prevailed for six years and despite all of Athens resistance Turkey has carried on both national and military exercises and has participated in joint NATO maneuvers. Great pains have always been taken to ensure that friction which has arisen between the two neighboring countries and allies should not lead to hostilities.

"Now there is a reconciliation in the offing" Greece has abandoned its demand stemming from the de facto situation before 1974 (the Aegean is completely mine) a demand that was never accepted by Turkey and no longer insists that the responsibility for the defense of the Aegean be accorded her. In response to this Turkey has given up its view (first of all determine the areas of command and then let's solve the problem of Greece's reentry into NATO) and has accepted the formula 'there are no areas of command control in the Aegean at the present moment; these will be determined through negotiations'.

"The prolongation of the negotiations or their deliberate delay will not damage Turkey in any way but the rapid determination of these command areas assume importance from the viewpoint of Athens. Therefore, the duration of the negotiations is a matter for Athens to decide."

Air Space Issue

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 17 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Arif Cavdar]

[Text] According to a legal principal rooted in ancient Roman and Hebrew Law and incorporated in European and Anglo-American legal systems "the owner of an immovable property is the owner in its use whether this use is greater or less than its potential benefit."

Even though in the 19th century air space could be exploited only with the help of baloons, states basing themselves upon the aforementioned legal principal claimed absolute sovereignty over the air space above their own land and water. Later on with the astonishing developments in air and space travel it was felt that there was a need for bringing air and space into some kind of order. Both for reasons of military security and security of air travel organizations for early warning and air space control were created.

As a matter of fact the United States and Canada with respect to their air space defense have created an air defense region and have informed the world that there will not be any undeclared and unpermitted flights within two hundred miles of their own coastlines. Whether this declaration has been made or not they are followed by means of strategic and tactical defense radars and control centers which comb the coastal areas of the North American continent night and day.

Despite measures which were undertaken for military considerations and which were later tightened up because of economic requirements, thanks to developments which were brought about by modern technology, the growth of air transportation in terms of speed, range and carrying capacity and the great potential which arises from them have created a limitless demand in society for the use of air transportation. For this reason the countless restrictions which have been placed upon it have not been able to prevent the development of aviation.

International Law

In order that air transportation might be able to carry out the duties which have fallen to it a number of facilities must be provided as follows:

The right to the free use of the skies must be recognized;

The necessary facilities must be established in order that air traffic may be made secure in the routes used;

It is not possible for airplanes to make free use of the skies. As we have stated governments have regulated the air traffic in their own skies according to laws of their own. This is accomplished by regulations, laws, rules and formulations. Furthermore, there are international agreements which have gained the character of law which also regulate this air traffic.

Therefore, in order for airplanes to make international flights they are bound by rules which have an international character.

Because of all of these requirements international law has acquired a branch known as international air law.

Its source, the international space law in the general assembly of the United Nations springs from a desire to devote space efforts to peaceful purposes. In contrast to the tendency to establish absolute limits to air space, at least for the present the tendency prevails to deal with space more freely.

The free use of air space has never been recognized throughout history.

In the first 10 years of the 20th century under the leadership of a French legal scholar, Fauchille, a group of legal scholars wrote that air space must be absolutely free. According to them "Apart from rules to ensure the safety of flight there is no need for further intervention by governments."

On the other hand in contrast to these ideas states have put forward the claim to "complete and absolute sovereignty" over their own air space in view of the dangers which it presents to them.

The "full and complete sovereignty" principal which was at first proposed because of requirements of military and personal security, gained even greater strength in the 1919 Paris Air Conference out of economic considerations.

However, the degree of freedom accorded to civilian air traffic, limited though it may be, has made great strides for political, cultural, economic, psychological and military reasons and has gained a great deal thanks to growing pressure from public opinion. States, through their governments, have established international aviation and air traffic control organizations in order to bring activity in their air space under regulation.

It is necessary to apportion fairly the responsibility entailed by the need for bringing flight paths, flight security, and air traffic control under regulations, to provide air traffic facilities and to build up a legal basis by which to manage these. This job is performed sometimes on a universal plane (for example the United Nations Civil Aviation Organization which regulates flight patterns over the North Atlantic, and sometimes on a regional one such as the air traffic control organizations.

In order that military and civilian planes may travel through the air space over the Aegean sea which shelters more than 3,000 islands between Turkey and Greece, proposals were made as early as 1954 to give Turkey a role in controlling air traffic. However, the Turkish government turned down this proposal "because there were not sufficiently trained personnel."

However Greece, despite great problems resulting from World War II and the civil war that followed, agreed to carry this burden. Consequently, the administration of the Aegean Sea flight information region which began as a duty assumed for a fee in order that planes might securely travel through the Aegean air space and that air traffic control facilities might be established and run has gained the character, ten years later on an international platform, of a claimed right.

By asserting "complete and absolute sovereignty" over the air space above the Aegean Sea in which she occupies more than 3,000 islands the boundaries of which and their continental waters she has only just expanded, Greece is planning to convert the Aegean into a "Greek Lake." The problem in broader perspective and in view of Greece's posture and behavior regarding the question of the continental shelf is gaining a much more comprehensive aspect. Her assertion of political sovereignty and its expansion to encompass undersea mineral and petroleum rights as well as marine products places Turkey in a bind from the standpoint of economic geography and military considerations and forces her to take consideration of the Greek aim to make the Aegean her own property.

As a consequence the following situation has arisen:

The Basic Question

The natural resources of the Aegean Sea and its floor, were they to be exploited by Greece and Turkey both without envy, are generous enough to contribute to the wealth of both countries. It would also be a benefit to the two countries if both could ignore the provocations of super powers which see advantage in prolonging bad relations between the two countries and could establish a just order over the Aegean Sea. There would be infinite benefit to Greece and Greek statesmen in following a commonsense approach to this issue.

9353
CSO: 4907

AID BEING RECEIVED FROM HALF OF THOSE PLEDGED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Oct 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--As Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal went to Paris today to determine the aid to be given Turkey in 1981 by member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it was established that as of today only 8 of those 17 nations which had "pledged" aid in 1980 have made good on their pledges.

A delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal went to Paris today to ensure that the OECD member nations provide economic aid to Turkey this year as they did last year. Aid which materializes in the framework of the OECD passes through various stages. The first of these stages pertains to the preparations of a commission called the "Number Two Working Group." This working group reviews the initial economic data for the current year on the country to receive OECD aid. The countries here are represented based on their technical level. This commission executes the first technical tasks concerning the aid and takes up developments and expectations with regard to the nation's economy. Later the OECD Secretary General discusses the matter with the member countries one by one and, after a certain period, the member countries gather in Paris and determine the amounts of aid they will give. Ozal's trip today carries with it the aim of participation in two three-party working groups.

Eight of Seventeen Countries

As Ozal went to Paris today to participate in the initial work for the OECD aid that will be given in 1981, it has been determined that as of today only half of the aid "pledged" in Paris in April 1980 has been realized.

Although they "pledged" the aid, the countries which have followed through since April are Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Also, a portion of the aid that the United States will give has come. The U.S. aid is comprised of two portions, one of which is Export-Import Bank aid and the other, federal aid. The Export-Import Bank portion of this has been given to Turkey, the remainder has not yet started flowing. It is being reported that agreements concerning the aid the other nations have announced they would give, will begin to be put together in the coming days.

Reasons for Delay

According to information which has been obtained, after it is announced that aid is to be given, bilateral agreements are concluded between the other member countries and the country to receive the aid (Turkey). These agreements generally pass through the parliament of the nation which gives the aid. Parliamentary working sessions or the starting dates of the fiscal year as it relates to the country's budget may be different from each other and the aid may be delayed. However, from time to time in the course of bilateral agreements, countries put forth certain conditions which may prolong the conclusion of an agreement.

Six Hundred and Seven Million Has Come

Furthermore, two types of aid may be received. The first in the form of direct cash, the second in the form of credit for goods. The OECD nations announced that they would give a total of $1,166,000,000 to Turkey for 1980 but as of today the credit amount which the eight countries and the U.S. Export-Import Bank have sent is only $607 million. A portion of this $607 million is direct cash and another is tied to goods or for use in the equivalent of goods purchased from that country. For example, the credit coming from France is invested in sugar which is then purchased from France.

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EXPORT PROGRAM TO RUN BEHIND SCHEDULE

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[Text] Previously programmed exports will be somewhat off schedule. Ankara (Agencies): Trade Minister Kemal Canturk held a news conference yesterday and announced the new export schedule for 1980-81.

The minister, who pointed out that in the new program 18 new measures have been taken aimed at promoting export development, said "The new export program is structured to stimulate and increase exports in a very rapid manner. However, I want to emphasize that even if we were to implement all of these measures in full it would still be somewhat behind the previously programmed $3.5 billion export target by the end of the year."

Trade Minister Kemal Canturk stated that the 1980-81 Export Program declaration and its regulations had been published in the Official Gazette and said:

"Turkey is today a country where all sought-after goods are found even though some are expensive. What I say is fact, outside of certain monopoly goods such as cigarettes. But, the other fact is that Turkey today is in an economic crisis caused by an insufficiency of internal and external financing. In order to emerge from this crisis we have to, first of all, straighten out our tax system, and collect taxes equitably and in sufficient quantity. Not collecting sufficient taxes will result in public income not being able to meet public expenditures. As long as this is the case the state must resort to sources other than taxes to meet its expenses. The result of this is inflation."

The Problem of Foreign Financing

Kemal Canturk also touched on the subject of foreign financing during his talk, and said that Turkey is today not in a position to obtain the necessary foreign currency from its own sources for raw materials and intermediate and investment goods, and for this reason is borrowing from the outside.

New Measures

According to information the minister gave, data concerning sales in hazel nuts, cotton, seedless grapes, dry figs and tobacco, which are among the goods subject to support purchases, will, in accordance with the new program, be gathered at the Ministry of Trade with the aim of following export movements.

The extent of ready foreign exchange has been broadened [with regard to the export of goods paid for with foreign exchange on hand in Turkey]. Additionally, the Kuwaiti dinar, the Australian dollar and the Saudi Arabian dinar have also been included in the "list of currencies with which exports can be paid."

A method has been created to enable the transport of every type of our goods to free zone or duty-free entrepots outside the country and to, therefore, sell goods at the customer's feet.

A system also may be introduced which will be comprised of exceptions in existing ministry regulations concerning border trade.

In other changes made on the list of goods requiring licenses A) Certain goods, export of which had been stopped, were again added to the list; B) Export of wheat flour has been tied to the fund mechanism; C) Refined olive oil exports have been decontrolled; D) Fason margarine which is produced for export from oils brought in from outside the country, has been taken off the list of good requiring a license.

Questions-Answers

Trade Minister Kemal Canturk later answered reporters' questions and in response to a reporter's question asking what sort of measures were being considered to prevent price increases and inflation, said that the prevention of inflation would necessitate bringing out new tax set-ups, accelerating investments and increasing production.

In response to another question, Trade Minister Canturk, stated that, in his view, the requirement of bringing foreign exchange derived from exports into the country within 2 months had impeded exports and he said that this matter had generated a great deal more interest in foreign exchange regulations and, consequently, this problem would not be a part of the new program. He said, however, that work would begin in the shortest possible time [to bring into the country within 90 days] foreign exchange derived from exports.

New Export Program Published

The export program declaration, which covers commercial exports from Turkey to foreign countries, transit trade, border trade, interim exports and their finishing out of country, cost-free commercial exports along with arrangements for the introduction and marketing of our export products, was published in the Official Gazette and went into effect yesterday.

According to the export program declaration, the export of all goods other than those designated as prohibited to export by laws and decrees, will be free within the framework of this declaration and the regulations and circulars that will be published.

Included in this declaration is a provision enabling the Trade Ministry to stop, on a continuous basis, the export of a good in circumstances where such action is deemed necessary and to affect new regulations in connection with implementation.

It is stated in the declaration, which designates the Trade Ministry as the authorized department for exports, that this ministry will also ensure coordination with regard to exports.

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MINIMUM WAGE ISSUE GIVEN IMPETUS

Certain Compensations Affected

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Oct 80 pp 1,5

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] Apart from the fact that the longevity compensation is linked to the minimum wage it has been determined that the minimum wage also affects social insurance premiums, base salaries for retirement purposes and subsistance [tax] deductions.

The minimum wage which was incorporated in the labor law of 1963 for the first time in Turkey has passed through different phases and was defined as follows in the first article of the "minimum wage regulation" dated 12 February 1972 number 14097:

"The minimum wage is that wage which is paid to workers for a normal work day and which is sufficient to meet, at a minimum level on the basis of current prices, the worker's needs for food, shelter, clothing, health, transportation and amenities."

Scholarly books describe the minimum wage as follows:

"...the wage paid to an average worker living in a civilized and modern society which meets the normal needs of that worker and which provides a level of subsistence for that worker and his family acceptable in the society in which they live" (Metin Kutal, Cahit Talas, authors of relevant [illegible]).

The definition of minimum wage made by the international labor organization is as follows:

"A salary which provides a worker and his family mere subsistence is not an adequate salary. A minimum wage is that amount which provides the worker a suitable living according to accepted norms."

The Influence Of Laws

Apart from the fact that longevity compensation is based upon the minimum wage, from the standpoint of current laws the minimum wage also has the following affects:

The minimum wage affects social insurance premiums under law number 1912 dated 16 May 1975, amending the social insurance law number 506 article 78 reads "Premiums which are to be collected from persons covered by the insurance and payments which may be made will be calculated on the basis of the lowest limits of daily earnings, i.e., the minimum wage determined according to the labor law." In this case insurance premiums for part time workers and for those who for reasons of irregular employment receive a daily wage less than the norm will be deducted in accordance with the law on the basis of the minimum wage.

The minimum wage affects the base monthly allowance for retired workers. According to article 96 of law number 506 amending Article 6 of Law 1912 "Monthly payments to the insured and to beneficiaries of life insurance will be not less than the annual amount of the minimum wage." Article 97 of Law 506 draws attention to "increases in the lower limits of daily earnings which will occur and upon which retirement annuities are reckoned" and predicts that "the newly fixed lower limit" will affect the situation of retirees. Consequently when the minimum wage increases the annuities of retired workers will also increase.

The minimum wage also affects the base salary increases for civil servants. Resolution number 12 which has the force of law states "the lowest salary bracket for civil servants may not be less than the minimum wage required by the labor law for workers. Since the monthly amount of salary to be paid may not be less than the minimum monthly wage any difference must be compensated. Consequently any civil servant whose salary is less than the minimum wage will automatically be raised to this wage level.

In point of fact when the minimum wage rose to a gross 5,400 Lira, Grade 16 and 15 were automatically eliminated. Now if the minimum wages once again increase the salaries of civil servants, since they may not be less than the minimum wage, will automatically increase also.

The minimum wage also affects the standard [tax] deduction. At present the finance ministry is preparing a tax bill which calls for exempting minimum wages from taxation. The bill takes the current minimum wage of 5,400 Lira as a fixed figure and exempts this amount from taxation. However the same bill gives authority to the council of ministers to exercise flexibility with regard to the budget laws and calls for the minimum wage to be exempted from taxation.

Officials are expected to keep these effects of a minimum wage in mind.

Turk-Is Working to Increase Minimum Wage

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Oct 80 pp 1,5

[Text] As the new longevity compensation law takes effect with its publication yesterday in RESMI GAZETE the Turk-Is executive committee yesterday met to undertake to have the minimum wage redetermined.

The fact that the longevity compensation is linked to the minimum wage increases the importance of the minimum wage. It has been learned that the Turk-Is executive committee in response to the latest developments with regard to longevity compensation will renew its efforts to have the minimum wage redetermined. Several months

ago, Turk-Is appealed to the political leadership of that period to redetermine the minimum wage. This effort bore no results at that time and then later the 12 September take-over by the military occurred.

The Turk-Is executive committee which met yesterday announced that their efforts in this matter would be renewed in view of the linkage between longevity compensation and the minimum wage.

According to law the determination of the minimum wage is effected by the Minister of Labor convening a commission for this purpose. Turk-Is will appeal to the Minister of Labor or perhaps directly to the Prime Minister to get the Minister of Labor to move in this regard.

Price Rises Amount to 175 percent

The minimum wage which is still a gross 5,400 Lira was determined in June 1979. According to law the minimum wage is to be redetermined "at the latest every other year." The preparatory work for determining the minimum wage calls for a study of the price increases which have developed over the period which has elapsed between the date of the latest determination and the date of redetermination and arriving at a figure geared to this increase.

According to Turk-Is's research in the process of determining the minimum wage, prices of consumer items in 11 large provinces are reviewed and an overall figure for price increases is arrived at. The Turk-Is study discloses that between March 1979 and June 1980 consumer prices in eleven provinces rose an average of 174.8 percent. In its research Turk-Is utilized the price indexes worked out by the state statistical institute, the Istanbul chamber of commerce, and the conjuncture office of the Ministry of Trade and derived an average from them.

"Foodstuffs" prices make up 45 percent of consumer prices and 55 percent share is made up of "non foodstuff" prices and these relative shares go into the calculation of the new minimum wage figure.

In the appeal which the Turk-Is executive committee will make, this increase in prices will be taken into consideration and will constitute the basis for the new figure desired. It is reported that the data which have been prepared will be forwarded to the Social Security Minister Sadik Side.

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STUDENT DORMITORY REGULATIONS TIGHTENED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] The regulations governing student dormitories attached to the Kredi ve Yurtlar Kurumu [Yurt-Kur] have been changed and conditions under which students are to be accepted in or evicted from dormitories have been changed.

The administration of Yurt-Kur has introduced conditions into the regulations stipulating that students who are accepted in the dormitories may not be working at any job which earns salary or wages, that they must not have participated in any mass or individual incidents documented in police files, and that they agree to abide by the rules specified in the regulations governing the dormitory.

According to the provisions of the amended regulations, penalties involving temporary suspension of the student from the dormitory will be given for using obscenities in the dormitory, for striking comrades or others, for cursing, threatening, belittling or attacking others, for behaving disrespectfully to the personnel working in the dormitories, for making the administrative work of the dormitories more difficult and for tearing down or writing on notices posted by the management.

Circumstances which may result in indefinite expulsion from the dormitory include speaking in a manner tending to demean the dormitory management or the encouragement or provoking of this, failing to abide by the orders of the dormitory management intended to ensure the health, order and tranquility of the dormitory, the arranging of protest demonstrations without permission of authorized persons, engaging in activities intended to benefit in any way whatsoever, illegal organizations and behaving in a manner destructive of tranquility of the dorm.

Furthermore, students who are expelled either temporarily or permanently from the dormitories will have their credit cut off.

By other changes in the regulations the period during which a student will be barred from the dormitory building because of a disciplinary investigation conducted by the director of the dormitory has been extended from one week to two weeks, male students have been forbidden to spend the night outside of the dormitory without a written permission from their parents or guardians and all offenses on the part of students will be recorded on their student cards.

On the other hand, it was announced that students who have not yet completed all formalities for permanent registration in dormitories may stay as guest students in the dormitories subordinate to the Yurt-Kur. Students who wish to stay in dormitories as guest students must have begun their studies in some accredited school.

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WEAPONS, AMMO, DYNAMITE SURRENDERED TO AUTHORITIES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 24 Oct 80 p 8

[Text] In the period stipulated by the newly enacted firearms law a total of 160,140 firearms of various makes and 541,468 cartridges of various caliber have been surrendered to established authorities.

According to a disclosure made by the military services coordination directorate of the martial law authorities, during the period following the enactment of the law on 29 September to 17 October 132,522 pistols, 2474 automatic hand guns, 23,560 infantry rifles, 615 automatic rifles, 364 rifle-barrel hunting rifles and 623 hunting rifles of various kinds and calibers were surrendered to military authorities designated by the martial law commands.

In the same period 521,723 pistol cartridges, 19,695 cartridges of various kinds, 260 kilograms of block explosives, 2,768 kilograms of dynamite, 8449 cutting instruments, 1569 meters of fuse, 2110 kilograms of gun powder, 18,470 electric primers and 21 bombs of various sorts were surrendered to the appropriate authorities.

At the end of this announcement, the following was stated with regard to the matter in question:

"The amount of surrendered firearms and explosives clearly indicates what a dangerous environment we have been subjected to. The interest and understanding which our citizens have displayed in the surrender of these weapons at the same time is an example of confidence in the administration. The interest and confidence displayed by the Turkish nation is being considered as a sign of faith in and support of the government. The public has become aware of the importance to our nation's security of having every citizen exercise the same degree of sensitivity with regard to weapons smugglers and those who possess weapons and to give to the authorities information and assistance regarding them."

Arrests and Detentions

The martial law military services coordination directorate also made a disclosure regarding terrorists who have been caught following armed confrontations as a result of operations conducted by the security forces in various martial law regions. The disclosure is as follows.

"In Istanbul Kadikoy, one of two terrorists who raided the population office, in Urdu Aybasti District one terrorist from the leadership of an illegal organization, in Urdu Fatsa District one terrorist from an illegal organization in Cavusbasi Village, in Antalya's Gazipasa District one terrorist who has been sought for various armed robberies in Adanalicile Village, and the murder of two persons inall four terrorists, in Tunceli Pertek District in an operation which was mounted to catch Teslim Koc and friends convicted of armed assault against the gendarmerie post eight terrorists three of whom were wounded, in Riza's Gundogdu District one terrorist a member of an illegal organization in Balikcilar Village, in all thirteen terrorists for whom four were wounded were placed in custody.

"Moreover during this period 938 persons were taken into custody for various reasons and of these 181 were placed under arrest."

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